Does Direct Democracy Matters for Political Parties : An Empirical Test in the Swiss Cantons

According to most political scientists and commentators, direct democracy seems to weaken political parties. Our empirical analysis in the 26 Swiss cantons shows that this thesis in its general form cannot be maintained. Political parties in cantons with extensive use of referendums and initiatives are not in all respects weaker than parties in cantons with little use of direct democratic means of participation. On the contrary, direct democracy goes together with more professional and formalized party organizations. Use of direct democracy is associated with more fragmented and volatile party systems, and with greater support for small parties, but causal interpretations of these relationships are difficult.

Directly Elected Mayors and their Parties: The Cases of Genoa and Lausanne

While the literature on directly elected mayors has largely neglected the relationship between mayors and their parties, studies of party transformation have generally ignored how changes in local democratic rules and practices affect parties. This article addresses these questions using a qualitative case study of the relationship between mayors and the three faces of their parties (in local public office, local central office and on the ground) in Genoa and Lausanne. Based on interviews with the mayors, elected representatives and party members, it finds in the two cases that, as long as these mayors can count on high levels of popularity and are not nearing the end of their term, they are 'party detached'. When these factors do not apply and/or party institutionalization increases, the relationship with the party in local central office (although not with the party in local public office or on the ground) becomes more significant.

The views of rich Europeans are more likely to be reflected by political parties than those of poorer citizens

How does income inequality affect political representation? Jan Rosset, Nathalie Giger and Julian Bernauer examine whether politicians represent the views of poorer and richer citizens equally. They find that in 43 out of the 49 elections included in their analysis, the preferences of low-income citizens are located further away from the policy positions of the closest political party than those with mid-range incomes. This suggests that income inequality may spill-over into political inequalities, although it is less clear whether this effect is likely to get better or worse as a result of the Eurozone crisis.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.