The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors

This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors.

Prevenzione dell'obesità attraverso un'educazione alimentare nell'infanzia : teoria e creazione di strumenti pedagogici concreti

L'obésité est un problème de santé qui augmente fortement dans tous les pays industrialisés. L'obésité infantile suit la même tendance vers le haut. Ce travail traite de l'éducation nutritionnelle adaptée aux enfants de 8 à 12 ans. Deux instruments pédagogiques sont présentés : le premier consiste en un conte qui révèle l'importance de l'alimentation pour la santé, le rôle que les différents aliments jouent dans le corps et les règles pour avoir une alimentation équilibrée; le deuxième est un jeu de société dont le but est de composer des repas équilibrés.