Can Families Resist Managerial and Financial Revolutions? Swiss Family Firms in the Twentieth Century

The aim of this contribution is to highlight the long-term evolution of family capitalism in Switzerland during the twentieth century. We focus on 22 large companies of the machine, electrotechnical and metallurgy (MEM) sector whose boards of directors and general managers have been identified in five benchmark years across the twentieth century, which allows us to distinguish between family-owned and family-controlled firms. Our results show that family firms prevailed until the 1980s and thus contradict the dominance of 'managerial capitalism'. Although we observe a decline of family capitalism during the last decade of the century, the significant remaining presence of family firms in 2000 allows us to relativise the advent of investor capitalism.

Do Financial Incentives Affect Firms' Demand For Disabled Workers?

A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 nondisabled workers and are subject to a tax if they do not. This "threshold design" provides causal estimates of the noncompliance tax on disabled employment if firms do not manipulate nondisabled employment; a lower and upper bound on the causal effect can be constructed if they do. Results indicate that firms with 25 nondisabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12%) more disabled workers than without the tax; firms do manipulate employment of nondisabled workers but the lower bound on the employment effect of the quota remains positive; employment effects are stronger in low-wage firms than in high-wage firms; and firms subject to the quota of two disabled workers or more hire 0.08 more disabled workers per additional quota job. Moreover, increasing the noncompliance tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to overcomplying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of the tax.