Do we fear tax competition among new and old European countries ?

The purpose of this paper is to study both theoretically and empirically tax competition in the enlarged EU and to provide some insights on ongoing reforms concerning business taxation. We support the idea that even if one can observe cuts in "new" members statutory business tax rates, this should not result in fiercer tax competition between the "core" and "the "periphery" since infrastructure endowments and the existence of agglomeration rents in the core of the EU may prevent (at least partially) activities to relocate to the "new" members.

Alleged Tax Competition: The Mysterious Death of Inheritance Taxes in Switzerland

Interjurisdictional competition over mobile tax bases is an easily understood mechanism, but actual tax-base elasticities are difficult to estimate. Political pressure for reducing tax rates could therefore be based on erroneous estimates of the mobility of tax bases. We show that tax competition provided the overwhelmingly dominant argument in the policy debates leading to a succession of reforms of bequest taxation by Swiss cantons. Yet, we find only very weak statistical evidence of a relationship between tax burdens on bequests and the concerned tax base of wealthy elderly individuals. Moreover, inheritance tax revenues are found to increase in inheritance tax rates even in the long run, and actual tax rates lie well below the revenue-maximising levels throughout. The alleged pressures of tax competition did not seem in reality to exist.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the specificity of the Swiss case - already considered a quintessential tax haven at the time - in comparison to other banking centres? The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens is still little known for the decades before World War II. Up to now the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 30s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of four countries, this paper offers therefore a new comparative look on international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: was the Swiss case - already considered as a quintessential tax haven at the time - specific in comparison to other banking centres? This research has two results. On the one hand, the 1920s and 30s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Actually, most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the extremely limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. On the other hand, within this general balance sheet, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the bankers, the British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury and the English business circles.

Do Agglomeration Economies Reduce the Sensitivity of Firm Location to Tax Differentials?

Recent theoretical work in economic geography has shown that agglomeration forces can mitigate 'race-to-the-bottom' tax competition, by partly or fully offsetting firms' sensitivity to tax differentials. We test this proposition using data on firm births across Swiss municipalities. We find that corporate taxes deter firm births less in more spatially concentrated sectors. Firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity in the top quintile are less than half as responsive to differences in corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity in the bottom quintile. Hence, agglomeration economies do appear to attenuate the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.

Internationalization dynamics in the Swiss Corporate Tax Reform III

Over the last years, in a context of international tax competition, international and regional institutions such as the G20, the OECD, and the European Union are redefining what is acceptable in terms of corporate fiscal policy. Certain Swiss preferential tax treatments are considered by the above-mentioned institutions as harmful tax practices. As a consequence, the Swiss government has planned a third corporate tax reform (CTR III). The objective of this reform is to ensure international acceptability of the corporate tax system without prejudicing local public finances and Swiss corporate tax attractiveness. Therefore, we can posit that the CTR III is an internationalized object influenced by both regulation trends and tax competition framework. The main purpose of this paper is to provide elements of answer on how the currently discussed CTR III is influenced by the international environment, by focusing on its content as well as the reactions and positions of local stakeholders. With the help of internationalization literature, two distinct internationalization processes have been identified through the propositions of compliance measures with internationally-defined standards and competitiveness-enhancing measures. With regard to the configuration of local actors, the degree of conflict seems to be rather high. The current content of the reform is supported by the business community and right-wing parties and rejected by the unions and the Socialist Party.

Topics in public finance: social security and taxation

Summary The field of public finance focuses on the spending and taxing activities of governments and their influence on the allocation of resources and distribution of income. This work covers in three parts different topics related to public finance which are currently widely discussed in media and politics. The first two parts deal with issues on social security, which is in general one of the biggest spending shares of governments. The third part looks at the main income source of governments by analyzing the perceived value of tax competition. Part one deals with the current problem of increased early retirement by focusing on Switzerland as a special case. Early retirement is predominantly considered to be the result of incentives set by social security and the tax system. But the Swiss example demonstrates that the incidence of early retirement has dramatically increased even in the absence of institutional changes. We argue that the wealth effect also plays an important role in the retirement decision for middle and high income earners. An actuarially fair, but mandatory funded system with a relatively high replacement rate may thus contribute to a low labor market participation rate of elderly workers. We provide evidence using a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier men, and to a smaller extent women, tend to leave the workforce. The fact that early retirement has become much more prevalent in the last 15 years is a further indicator of the importance of a wealth effect, as the maturing of the Swiss mandatory funded pension system over that period has led to an increase in the effective replacement rates for middle and high income earners. Part two covers the theoretical side of social security. Theories analyzing optimal social security benefits provide important qualitative results, by mainly using one general type of an economy. Economies are however very diverse concerning numerous aspects, one of the most important being the wealth level. This can lead to significant quantitative benefit differences that imply differences in replacement rates and levels of labor supply. We focus on several aspects related to this fact. In a within cohort social security model, we introduce disability insurance with an imperfect screening mechanism. We then vary the wealth level of the model economy and analyze how the optimal social security benefit structure or equivalently, the optimal replacement rates, changes depending on the wealth level of the economy, and if the introduction of disability insurance into a social security system is preferable for all economies. Second, the screening mechanism of disability insurance and the threshold level at which people are defined as disabled can differ. For economies with different wealth levels, we determine for different thresholds the screening level that maximizes social welfare. Finally, part three turns to the income of governments, by adding an element to the controversy on tax competition versus tax harmonization.2 Inter-jurisdictional tax competition can generate at least two potential benefits or costs: On a public level, tax competition may result in a lower or higher efficiency in the production of public services. But there is also a more private benefit in the form of an option for individuals to move to a community with a lower tax rate in the future. To explore the value citizens attach to tax competition we analyze a unique popular vote for a complete tax harmonization between communities in the third largest Swiss canton, Vaud. Although a majority of voters would have seemingly benefited from replacing the current tax rate by a revenue-neutral average tax rate, the proposal was rejected by a large margin. Our estimates suggest that the estimated combined perceived benefit from tax competition is in the range of 10%.

Activation of HTLV-I transcription in the presence of Tax is independent of the acetylation of CREB-2 (ATF-4).

We have previously demonstrated that the bZIP transcription factor CREB-2, also called ATF-4, trans-activates, in association with the viral protein Tax, the human T-cell leukemia virus type I (HTLV-I) promoter. In this study, we have examined whether CREB-2 acetylation affects transcriptional activation mediated by Tax. We present evidence that CREB-2 is acetylated in vitro and in vivo. CREB-2 is acetylated in two regions: the basic domain of the bZIP (from amino acid residue 270 to 300) and the short basic domain (from 342 to 351) located downstream from the bZIP. We also demonstrate that CREB-2 is acetylated by p300/CBP but not by p/CAF. Moreover, replacement of lysine by arginine in the basic domains decreases the trans-activating capacity of CREB-2. However, in the presence of Tax, the HTLV-I transcription remains fully activated by these CREB-2 mutants. Although we cannot totally exclude that the mutations could also affect CREB-2 structure and activity independent of acetylation, our results suggest that activation of the viral promoter in the presence of Tax is independent of the CREB-2 acetylation.

A stepwise protocol to coat aAPC beads prevents out-competition of anti-CD3 mAb and consequent experimental artefacts.

Artificial antigen-presenting cells (aAPC) are widely used for both clinical and basic research applications, as cell-based or bead-based scaffolds, combining immune synapse components of interest. Adequate and controlled preparation of aAPCs is crucial for subsequent immunoassays. We reveal that certain proteins such as activatory anti-CD3 antibody can be out-competed by other proteins (e.g. inhibitory receptor ligands such as PDL1:Fc) during the coating of aAPC beads, under the usually performed coating procedures. This may be misleading, as we found that decreased CD8 T cell activity was not due to inhibitory receptor triggering but rather because of unexpectedly low anti-CD3 antibody density on the beads upon co-incubation with inhibitory receptor ligands. We propose an optimized protocol, and emphasize the need to quality-control the coating of proteins on aAPC beads prior to their use in immunoassays.

Social rules govern vocal competition in the barn owl

To resolve the share of limited resources, animals often compete through exchange of signals about their relative motivation to compete. When two competitors are similarly motivated, the resolution of conflicts may be achieved in the course of an interactive process. In barn owls, Tyto alba, in which siblings vocally compete during the prolonged absence of parents over access to the next delivered food item, we investigated what governs the decision to leave or enter a contest, and at which level. Siblings alternated periods during which one of the two individuals vocalized more than the other. Individuals followed turn-taking rules to interrupt each other and momentarily dominate the vocal competition. These social rules were weakly sensitive to hunger level and age hierarchy. Hence, the investment in a conflict is determined not only by need and resource-holding potential, but also by social interactions. The use of turn-taking rules governing individual vocal investment has rarely been shown in a competitive context. We hypothesized that these rules would allow individuals to remain alert to one another's motivation while maintaining the cost of vocalizing at the lowest level.