How Much Does It Cost? Optimization of Costs in Sequence Analysis of Social Science Data

One major methodological problem in analysis of sequence data is the determination of costs from which distances between sequences are derived. Although this problem is currently not optimally dealt with in the social sciences, it has some similarity with problems that have been solved in bioinformatics for three decades. In this article, the authors propose an optimization of substitution and deletion/insertion costs based on computational methods. The authors provide an empirical way of determining costs for cases, frequent in the social sciences, in which theory does not clearly promote one cost scheme over another. Using three distinct data sets, the authors tested the distances and cluster solutions produced by the new cost scheme in comparison with solutions based on cost schemes associated with other research strategies. The proposed method performs well compared with other cost-setting strategies, while it alleviates the justification problem of cost schemes.

The evolution of inbred social systems in spiders and other organisms: from short-term gains to long-term evolutionary dead-ends?

The question of why some social systems have evolved close inbreeding is particularly intriguing given expected short- and long-term negative effects of this breeding system. Using social spiders as a case study, we quantitatively show that the potential costs of avoiding inbreeding through dispersal and solitary living could have outweighed the costs of inbreeding depression in the origin of inbred spider sociality. We further review the evidence that despite being favored in the short term, inbred spider sociality may constitute in the long run an evolutionary dead end. We also review other cases, such as the naked mole rats and some bark and ambrosia beetles, mites, psocids, thrips, parasitic ants, and termites, in which inbreeding and sociality are associated and the evidence for and against this breeding system being, in general, an evolutionary dead end.

Fitness, inclusive fitness, and optimization

Individual-as-maximizing agent analogies result in a simple understanding of the functioning of the biological world. Identifying the conditions under which individuals can be regarded as fitness maximizing agents is thus of considerable interest to biologists. Here, we compare different concepts of fitness maximization, and discuss within a single framework the relationship between Hamilton's (J Theor Biol 7: 1-16, 1964) model of social interactions, Grafen's (J Evol Biol 20: 1243-1254, 2007a) formal Darwinism project, and the idea of evolutionary stable strategies. We distinguish cases where phenotypic effects are additive separable or not, the latter not being covered by Grafen's analysis. In both cases it is possible to define a maximand, in the form of an objective function phi(z), whose argument is the phenotype of an individual and whose derivative is proportional to Hamilton's inclusive fitness effect. However, this maximand can be identified with the expression for fecundity or fitness only in the case of additive separable phenotypic effects, making individual-as-maximizing agent analogies unattractive (although formally correct) under general situations of social interactions. We also feel that there is an inconsistency in Grafen's characterization of the solution of his maximization program by use of inclusive fitness arguments. His results are in conflict with those on evolutionary stable strategies obtained by applying inclusive fitness theory, and can be repaired only by changing the definition of the problem.

Simple Heuristics in a Social Game

Simple Heuristics in a Social World invites readers to discover the simple heuristics that people use to navigate the complexities and surprises of environments populated with others. The social world is a terrain where humans and other animals compete with conspecifics for myriad resources, including food, mates, and status, and where rivals grant the decision maker little time for deep thought, protracted information search, or complex calculations. Yet, the social world also encompasses domains where social animals such as humans can learn from one another and can forge alliances with one another to boost their chances of success. According to the book's thesis, the undeniable complexity of the social world does not dictate cognitive complexity as many scholars of rationality argue. Rather, it entails circumstances that render optimization impossible or computationally arduous: intractability, the existence of incommensurable considerations, and competing goals. With optimization beyond reach, less can be more. That is, heuristics--simple strategies for making decisions when time is pressing and careful deliberation an unaffordable luxury--become indispensible mental tools. As accurate as or even more accurate than complex methods when used in the appropriate social environments, these heuristics are good descriptive models of how people make many decisions and inferences, but their impressive performance also poses a normative challenge for optimization models. In short, the Homo socialis may prove to be a Homo heuristicus whose intelligence reflects ecological rather than logical rationality.