The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Workgroup climates and employees' counterproductive work behaviors: A social-cognitive perspective

This research examines employees' anticipation of social and self-sanctions as a self-regulatory mechanism linking workgroup climates and counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) and personality as a limit to these effects. A cross-level study with 158 employees from 26 workgroups demonstrated that in groups with a high compliance climate-a climate emphasizing the importance of complying with organizational rules-employees anticipate more social and self-sanctions, leading those low in conscientiousness and low in agreeableness to engage less frequently in CWBs. In contrast, a high relational climate-a climate emphasizing the importance of positive social relations over self-interest-indirectly unbridles the CWBs of these employees by alleviating the social and self-sanctions they anticipate for CWBs. Climates did not have indirect effects for employees high in agreeableness and high in conscientiousness. These findings elucidate why workgroup climates do not affect the CWBs of all members in the same way.