Phenotypic consequences of copy number variation: insights from Smith-Magenis and Potocki-Lupski syndrome mouse models.

A large fraction of genome variation between individuals is comprised of submicroscopic copy number variation of genomic DNA segments. We assessed the relative contribution of structural changes and gene dosage alterations on phenotypic outcomes with mouse models of Smith-Magenis and Potocki-Lupski syndromes. We phenotyped mice with 1n (Deletion/+), 2n (+/+), 3n (Duplication/+), and balanced 2n compound heterozygous (Deletion/Duplication) copies of the same region. Parallel to the observations made in humans, such variation in gene copy number was sufficient to generate phenotypic consequences: in a number of cases diametrically opposing phenotypes were associated with gain versus loss of gene content. Surprisingly, some neurobehavioral traits were not rescued by restoration of the normal gene copy number. Transcriptome profiling showed that a highly significant propensity of transcriptional changes map to the engineered interval in the five assessed tissues. A statistically significant overrepresentation of the genes mapping to the entire length of the engineered chromosome was also found in the top-ranked differentially expressed genes in the mice containing rearranged chromosomes, regardless of the nature of the rearrangement, an observation robust across different cell lineages of the central nervous system. Our data indicate that a structural change at a given position of the human genome may affect not only locus and adjacent gene expression but also "genome regulation." Furthermore, structural change can cause the same perturbation in particular pathways regardless of gene dosage. Thus, the presence of a genomic structural change, as well as gene dosage imbalance, contributes to the ultimate phenotype.

A Legislator under Surveillance: The Creation and Implementation of Swiss Banking Legislation 1910-1934

This paper analyses how banking regulation was introduced in Switzerland - one of the world's most prominent financial centres - which remained in place until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows that the law adopted on 8 November 1934 is a perfect example of capture of the regulator by the regulated. Essentially a political response in the context of the economic crisis of the 1930s, it largely reflected the interests of banking circles by limiting the intervention of the State as much as possible. The introduction of the new legislation was facilitated by the temporary weakness of Swiss banking circles, as they depended on the State to delay or prevent the collapse of many major credit institutions. They did not manage to derail the law as they had two decades earlier when they scuppered the federal bill on banks drawn up between 1914 and 1916. But this time they were better organized and more united, and intervened all the more effectively in the legislative process itself. The 1934 law is thus distinctive in that it made no structural changes to the architecture of the financial centre but merely codified its practices through flexible legislation meant to reassure the public. The law was aimed less at controlling banking activity than at keeping - thanks to skilfully calibrated political concessions - the State from having to intervene more directly in the internal management of banks or in the fixing of interest rates and the export of capital.