An assurance-based model to holistically assess the information security posture

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : Evaluating Information Security Posture within an organization is becoming a very complex task. Currently, the evaluation and assessment of Information Security are commonly performed using frameworks, methodologies and standards which often consider the various aspects of security independently. Unfortunately this is ineffective because it does not take into consideration the necessity of having a global and systemic multidimensional approach to Information Security evaluation. At the same time the overall security level is globally considered to be only as strong as its weakest link. This thesis proposes a model aiming to holistically assess all dimensions of security in order to minimize the likelihood that a given threat will exploit the weakest link. A formalized structure taking into account all security elements is presented; this is based on a methodological evaluation framework in which Information Security is evaluated from a global perspective. This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One: Information Security Evaluation issues consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the purpose of this research purpose and the Model that will be proposed. In this chapter we raise some questions with respect to "traditional evaluation methods" as well as identifying the principal elements to be addressed in this direction. Then we introduce the baseline attributes of our model and set out the expected result of evaluations according to our model. Chapter 2 is focused on the definition of Information Security to be used as a reference point for our evaluation model. The inherent concepts of the contents of a holistic and baseline Information Security Program are defined. Based on this, the most common roots-of-trust in Information Security are identified. Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of the difference and the relationship between the concepts of Information Risk and Security Management. Comparing these two concepts allows us to identify the most relevant elements to be included within our evaluation model, while clearing situating these two notions within a defined framework is of the utmost importance for the results that will be obtained from the evaluation process. Chapter 4 sets out our evaluation model and the way it addresses issues relating to the evaluation of Information Security. Within this Chapter the underlying concepts of assurance and trust are discussed. Based on these two concepts, the structure of the model is developed in order to provide an assurance related platform as well as three evaluation attributes: "assurance structure", "quality issues", and "requirements achievement". Issues relating to each of these evaluation attributes are analysed with reference to sources such as methodologies, standards and published research papers. Then the operation of the model is discussed. Assurance levels, quality levels and maturity levels are defined in order to perform the evaluation according to the model. Part Two: Implementation of the Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) according to the Information Security Domains consists of four chapters. This is the section where our evaluation model is put into a welldefined context with respect to the four pre-defined Information Security dimensions: the Organizational dimension, Functional dimension, Human dimension, and Legal dimension. Each Information Security dimension is discussed in a separate chapter. For each dimension, the following two-phase evaluation path is followed. The first phase concerns the identification of the elements which will constitute the basis of the evaluation: ? Identification of the key elements within the dimension; ? Identification of the Focus Areas for each dimension, consisting of the security issues identified for each dimension; ? Identification of the Specific Factors for each dimension, consisting of the security measures or control addressing the security issues identified for each dimension. The second phase concerns the evaluation of each Information Security dimension by: ? The implementation of the evaluation model, based on the elements identified for each dimension within the first phase, by identifying the security tasks, processes, procedures, and actions that should have been performed by the organization to reach the desired level of protection; ? The maturity model for each dimension as a basis for reliance on security. For each dimension we propose a generic maturity model that could be used by every organization in order to define its own security requirements. Part three of this dissertation contains the Final Remarks, Supporting Resources and Annexes. With reference to the objectives of our thesis, the Final Remarks briefly analyse whether these objectives were achieved and suggest directions for future related research. Supporting resources comprise the bibliographic resources that were used to elaborate and justify our approach. Annexes include all the relevant topics identified within the literature to illustrate certain aspects of our approach. Our Information Security evaluation model is based on and integrates different Information Security best practices, standards, methodologies and research expertise which can be combined in order to define an reliable categorization of Information Security. After the definition of terms and requirements, an evaluation process should be performed in order to obtain evidence that the Information Security within the organization in question is adequately managed. We have specifically integrated into our model the most useful elements of these sources of information in order to provide a generic model able to be implemented in all kinds of organizations. The value added by our evaluation model is that it is easy to implement and operate and answers concrete needs in terms of reliance upon an efficient and dynamic evaluation tool through a coherent evaluation system. On that basis, our model could be implemented internally within organizations, allowing them to govern better their Information Security. RÉSUMÉ : Contexte général de la thèse L'évaluation de la sécurité en général, et plus particulièrement, celle de la sécurité de l'information, est devenue pour les organisations non seulement une mission cruciale à réaliser, mais aussi de plus en plus complexe. A l'heure actuelle, cette évaluation se base principalement sur des méthodologies, des bonnes pratiques, des normes ou des standards qui appréhendent séparément les différents aspects qui composent la sécurité de l'information. Nous pensons que cette manière d'évaluer la sécurité est inefficiente, car elle ne tient pas compte de l'interaction des différentes dimensions et composantes de la sécurité entre elles, bien qu'il soit admis depuis longtemps que le niveau de sécurité globale d'une organisation est toujours celui du maillon le plus faible de la chaîne sécuritaire. Nous avons identifié le besoin d'une approche globale, intégrée, systémique et multidimensionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information. En effet, et c'est le point de départ de notre thèse, nous démontrons que seule une prise en compte globale de la sécurité permettra de répondre aux exigences de sécurité optimale ainsi qu'aux besoins de protection spécifiques d'une organisation. Ainsi, notre thèse propose un nouveau paradigme d'évaluation de la sécurité afin de satisfaire aux besoins d'efficacité et d'efficience d'une organisation donnée. Nous proposons alors un modèle qui vise à évaluer d'une manière holistique toutes les dimensions de la sécurité, afin de minimiser la probabilité qu'une menace potentielle puisse exploiter des vulnérabilités et engendrer des dommages directs ou indirects. Ce modèle se base sur une structure formalisée qui prend en compte tous les éléments d'un système ou programme de sécurité. Ainsi, nous proposons un cadre méthodologique d'évaluation qui considère la sécurité de l'information à partir d'une perspective globale. Structure de la thèse et thèmes abordés Notre document est structuré en trois parties. La première intitulée : « La problématique de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information » est composée de quatre chapitres. Le chapitre 1 introduit l'objet de la recherche ainsi que les concepts de base du modèle d'évaluation proposé. La maniéré traditionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité fait l'objet d'une analyse critique pour identifier les éléments principaux et invariants à prendre en compte dans notre approche holistique. Les éléments de base de notre modèle d'évaluation ainsi que son fonctionnement attendu sont ensuite présentés pour pouvoir tracer les résultats attendus de ce modèle. Le chapitre 2 se focalise sur la définition de la notion de Sécurité de l'Information. Il ne s'agit pas d'une redéfinition de la notion de la sécurité, mais d'une mise en perspectives des dimensions, critères, indicateurs à utiliser comme base de référence, afin de déterminer l'objet de l'évaluation qui sera utilisé tout au long de notre travail. Les concepts inhérents de ce qui constitue le caractère holistique de la sécurité ainsi que les éléments constitutifs d'un niveau de référence de sécurité sont définis en conséquence. Ceci permet d'identifier ceux que nous avons dénommés « les racines de confiance ». Le chapitre 3 présente et analyse la différence et les relations qui existent entre les processus de la Gestion des Risques et de la Gestion de la Sécurité, afin d'identifier les éléments constitutifs du cadre de protection à inclure dans notre modèle d'évaluation. Le chapitre 4 est consacré à la présentation de notre modèle d'évaluation Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) et la manière dont il répond aux exigences de l'évaluation telle que nous les avons préalablement présentées. Dans ce chapitre les concepts sous-jacents relatifs aux notions d'assurance et de confiance sont analysés. En se basant sur ces deux concepts, la structure du modèle d'évaluation est développée pour obtenir une plateforme qui offre un certain niveau de garantie en s'appuyant sur trois attributs d'évaluation, à savoir : « la structure de confiance », « la qualité du processus », et « la réalisation des exigences et des objectifs ». Les problématiques liées à chacun de ces attributs d'évaluation sont analysées en se basant sur l'état de l'art de la recherche et de la littérature, sur les différentes méthodes existantes ainsi que sur les normes et les standards les plus courants dans le domaine de la sécurité. Sur cette base, trois différents niveaux d'évaluation sont construits, à savoir : le niveau d'assurance, le niveau de qualité et le niveau de maturité qui constituent la base de l'évaluation de l'état global de la sécurité d'une organisation. La deuxième partie: « L'application du Modèle d'évaluation de l'assurance de la sécurité de l'information par domaine de sécurité » est elle aussi composée de quatre chapitres. Le modèle d'évaluation déjà construit et analysé est, dans cette partie, mis dans un contexte spécifique selon les quatre dimensions prédéfinies de sécurité qui sont: la dimension Organisationnelle, la dimension Fonctionnelle, la dimension Humaine, et la dimension Légale. Chacune de ces dimensions et son évaluation spécifique fait l'objet d'un chapitre distinct. Pour chacune des dimensions, une évaluation en deux phases est construite comme suit. La première phase concerne l'identification des éléments qui constituent la base de l'évaluation: ? Identification des éléments clés de l'évaluation ; ? Identification des « Focus Area » pour chaque dimension qui représentent les problématiques se trouvant dans la dimension ; ? Identification des « Specific Factors » pour chaque Focus Area qui représentent les mesures de sécurité et de contrôle qui contribuent à résoudre ou à diminuer les impacts des risques. La deuxième phase concerne l'évaluation de chaque dimension précédemment présentées. Elle est constituée d'une part, de l'implémentation du modèle général d'évaluation à la dimension concernée en : ? Se basant sur les éléments spécifiés lors de la première phase ; ? Identifiant les taches sécuritaires spécifiques, les processus, les procédures qui auraient dû être effectués pour atteindre le niveau de protection souhaité. D'autre part, l'évaluation de chaque dimension est complétée par la proposition d'un modèle de maturité spécifique à chaque dimension, qui est à considérer comme une base de référence pour le niveau global de sécurité. Pour chaque dimension nous proposons un modèle de maturité générique qui peut être utilisé par chaque organisation, afin de spécifier ses propres exigences en matière de sécurité. Cela constitue une innovation dans le domaine de l'évaluation, que nous justifions pour chaque dimension et dont nous mettons systématiquement en avant la plus value apportée. La troisième partie de notre document est relative à la validation globale de notre proposition et contient en guise de conclusion, une mise en perspective critique de notre travail et des remarques finales. Cette dernière partie est complétée par une bibliographie et des annexes. Notre modèle d'évaluation de la sécurité intègre et se base sur de nombreuses sources d'expertise, telles que les bonnes pratiques, les normes, les standards, les méthodes et l'expertise de la recherche scientifique du domaine. Notre proposition constructive répond à un véritable problème non encore résolu, auquel doivent faire face toutes les organisations, indépendamment de la taille et du profil. Cela permettrait à ces dernières de spécifier leurs exigences particulières en matière du niveau de sécurité à satisfaire, d'instancier un processus d'évaluation spécifique à leurs besoins afin qu'elles puissent s'assurer que leur sécurité de l'information soit gérée d'une manière appropriée, offrant ainsi un certain niveau de confiance dans le degré de protection fourni. Nous avons intégré dans notre modèle le meilleur du savoir faire, de l'expérience et de l'expertise disponible actuellement au niveau international, dans le but de fournir un modèle d'évaluation simple, générique et applicable à un grand nombre d'organisations publiques ou privées. La valeur ajoutée de notre modèle d'évaluation réside précisément dans le fait qu'il est suffisamment générique et facile à implémenter tout en apportant des réponses sur les besoins concrets des organisations. Ainsi notre proposition constitue un outil d'évaluation fiable, efficient et dynamique découlant d'une approche d'évaluation cohérente. De ce fait, notre système d'évaluation peut être implémenté à l'interne par l'entreprise elle-même, sans recourir à des ressources supplémentaires et lui donne également ainsi la possibilité de mieux gouverner sa sécurité de l'information.

Is There a Crime Drop in Western Europe?

Combining data from police statistics and crime victim surveys, this article analyses the evolution of crime in Western Europe from 1988 to 2007. The results show that there is no general drop in crime. Property offences and homicide have been decreasing since the mid 1990s, while violent and drug offences have increased during the period under study. These trends highlight the limits of the explanations to the crime drop in the United States, which are based on the premise of a correlation in the evolution of all offences. The drop in property offences seems related to changes in the socioeconomic situation in Europe as well as to increases in security measures in households, and the reinforcement of private security. The increase in violent offences can be explained by the combination of several factors, including changes in youth's free time provoked by the development of the Internet, changing demographics, and the rise of episodic heavy alcohol consumption and street gangs.

Is There a Crime Drop in Western Europe?

Combining data from police statistics and crime victim surveys, this article analyses the evolution of crime in Western Europe from 1988 to 2007. The results show that there is no general drop in crime. Property offences and homicide have been decreasing since the mid 1990s, while violent and drug offences have increased during the period under study. These trends highlight the limits of the explanations to the crime drop in the United States, which are based on the premise of a correlation in the evolution of all offences. The drop in property offences seems related to changes in the socioeconomic situation in Europe as well as to increases in security measures in households, and the reinforcement of private security. The increase in violent offences can be explained by the combination of several factors, including changes in youth's free time provoked by the development of the Internet, changing demographics, and the rise of episodic heavy alcohol consumption and street gangs.

Les Neurosciences au Tribunal: de la responsabilité à la dangerosité

In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. During these proceedings, the role of forensic psychiatrists is crucial. In most criminal justice systems, their mission consists in accomplishing two basic tasks: assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender and evaluating their future dangerousness. In the first part of our research, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility, a key concept of law. An initial jurisprudential research leads to conclude that there are significant difficulties and limitations in using neuroscience for the assessment of criminal responsibility. In the current socio-legal context, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness assessments gain increasing importance in the field of forensic psychiatry. In the second part of our research we concentrate on the impact of using neuroscience for the assessment of dangerousness. We argue that in the current policy era of zero tolerance, judges, confronted with the pressure to ensure public security, may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's dangerousness and risk of reoffending, rather than their responsibility. This tendency could be encouraged by a utilitarian approach to punishment, advanced by some recent neuroscientific research which puts into question the existence of free will and responsibility and argues for a rejection of the retributive theory of punishment. Although this shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a consequentialist approach to criminal law is advanced by some authors as a more progressive and humane approach, we believe that it could lead to the instrumentalisation of neuroscience in the interest of public safety, which can run against the proper exercise of justice and civil liberties of the offenders. By advancing a criminal law regime animated by the consequentialist aim of avoiding social harms through rehabilitation, neuroscience promotes a return to a therapeutical approach to crime which can have serious impact on the kind and the length of sentences imposed on the offenders; if neuroscientific data are interpreted as evidence of dangerousness, rather than responsibility, it is highly likely that judges impose heavier sentences, or/and security measures (in civil law systems), which can be indeterminate in length. Errors and epistemic traps of past criminological movements trying to explain the manifestation of a violent and deviant behavior on a biological and deterministic basis stress the need for caution concerning the use of modern neuroscientific methods in criminal proceedings.

Enjeux ethiques de la psychiatrie sous contrainte [Ethical issues in psychiatry under coercion].

Psychiatry is now subject to two apparently contradictory movements. On the one hand, the need to respect the autonomy and rights of patients is reinforced and coercive measures are strictly defined and limited. On the other hand, security concerns in our society leads to prosecution of psychiatric disorders, especially when accompanied by behavioral problems or criminal acts. In these situations of compulsory treatment or care provided in prisons, a number of dilemmas emerge. The place of the healthcare professional in treatments ordered by the Justice and problems related to administrative detention are discussed in more detail.

Sorting out measures and definitions of screening participation to improve comparability: The example of colorectal cancer.

Participation is a key indicator of the potential effectiveness of any population-based intervention. Defining, measuring and reporting participation in cancer screening programmes has become more heterogeneous as the number and diversity of interventions have increased, and the purposes of this benchmarking parameter have broadened. This study, centred on colorectal cancer, addresses current issues that affect the increasingly complex task of comparing screening participation across settings. Reports from programmes with a defined target population and active invitation scheme, published between 2005 and 2012, were reviewed. Differences in defining and measuring participation were identified and quantified, and participation indicators were grouped by aims of measure and temporal dimensions. We found that consistent terminology, clear and complete reporting of participation definition and systematic documentation of coverage by invitation were lacking. Further, adherence to definitions proposed in the 2010 European Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Colorectal Cancer Screening was suboptimal. Ineligible individuals represented 1% to 15% of invitations, and variable criteria for ineligibility yielded differences in participation estimates that could obscure the interpretation of colorectal cancer screening participation internationally. Excluding ineligible individuals from the reference population enhances comparability of participation measures. Standardised measures of cumulative participation to compare screening protocols with different intervals and inclusion of time since invitation in definitions are urgently needed to improve international comparability of colorectal cancer screening participation. Recommendations to improve comparability of participation indicators in cancer screening interventions are made.

Inconsistency between different measures of sexual selection.

Measuring the intensity of sexual selection is of fundamental importance to the study of sexual dimorphism, population dynamics, and speciation. Several indices, pools of individuals, and fitness proxies are used in the literature, yet their relative performances are strongly debated. Using 12 independent common lizard populations, we manipulated the adult sex ratio, a potentially important determinant of the intensity of sexual selection at a particular time and place. We investigated differences in the intensity of sexual selection, as estimated using three standard indices of sexual selection-the standardized selection gradient (β'), the opportunity of selection (I), and the Bateman gradient (βss)--calculated for different pools of individuals and different fitness proxies. We show that results based on estimates of I were the opposite of those derived from the other indices, whereas results based on estimates of β' were consistent with predictions derived from knowledge about the species' mating system. In addition, our estimates of the strength and direction of sexual selection depended on both the fitness proxy used and the pool of individuals included in the analysis. These observations demonstrate inconsistencies in distinct measures of sexual selection and underscore the need for caution when comparing studies and species.

When nightclub security agents assault clients.

In 2006, a medico-legal consultation service devoted to adult victims of interpersonal violence was set up at the Lausanne University Hospital Centre, Switzerland: the Violence Medical Unit. Most patients are referred to the consultation by the Emergency Department. They are received by forensic nurses for support, forensic examination (in order to establish medical report) and community orientation. Between 2007 and 2009, among community violence, aggressions by security agents of nightclubs on clients have increased from 6% to 10%. Most of the victims are young men who had drunk alcohol before the assault. 25.7% presented one or several fractures, all of them in the head area. These findings raise questions about the ability of security agents of nightclubs to deal adequately with obviously risky situations and ensure client security.

Publicizing insecurity, privatizing security: Chinese wholesalers' surveillance cameras in a Paris suburb

Since the early nineties, several hundreds of Chinese immigrants have settled in what has become known as the 'Chinese wholesalers area'. For the past two years, Chinese wholesalers in Aubervilliers have been calling on public authorities to address the problem of street robberies and violent thefts, which they experience on a daily basis. Yet, they have been encouraged by the authorities to ensure their own protection, by - amongst other things - installing surveillance cameras to film the streets. This is illegal according to French legislation on camera surveillance. Knowing this, why have surveillance cameras been adopted as a solution? This question guides the ethnographic analysis presented here of a situation where the installation of surveillance cameras was locally negotiated by the main actors involved - namely, the wholesalers' representatives and the police.

Socioeconomic status, structural and functional measures of social support, and mortality: The British Whitehall II Cohort Study, 1985-2009.

The authors examined the associations of social support with socioeconomic status (SES) and with mortality, as well as how SES differences in social support might account for SES differences in mortality. Analyses were based on 9,333 participants from the British Whitehall II Study cohort, a longitudinal cohort established in 1985 among London-based civil servants who were 35-55 years of age at baseline. SES was assessed using participant's employment grades at baseline. Social support was assessed 3 times in the 24.4-year period during which participants were monitored for death. In men, marital status, and to a lesser extent network score (but not low perceived support or high negative aspects of close relationships), predicted both all-cause and cardiovascular mortality. Measures of social support were not associated with cancer mortality. Men in the lowest SES category had an increased risk of death compared with those in the highest category (for all-cause mortality, hazard ratio = 1.59, 95% confidence interval: 1.21, 2.08; for cardiovascular mortality, hazard ratio = 2.48, 95% confidence interval: 1.55, 3.92). Network score and marital status combined explained 27% (95% confidence interval: 14, 43) and 29% (95% confidence interval: 17, 52) of the associations between SES and all-cause and cardiovascular mortality, respectively. In women, there was no consistent association between social support indicators and mortality. The present study suggests that in men, social isolation is not only an important risk factor for mortality but is also likely to contribute to differences in mortality by SES.