Activation of HTLV-I transcription in the presence of Tax is independent of the acetylation of CREB-2 (ATF-4).

We have previously demonstrated that the bZIP transcription factor CREB-2, also called ATF-4, trans-activates, in association with the viral protein Tax, the human T-cell leukemia virus type I (HTLV-I) promoter. In this study, we have examined whether CREB-2 acetylation affects transcriptional activation mediated by Tax. We present evidence that CREB-2 is acetylated in vitro and in vivo. CREB-2 is acetylated in two regions: the basic domain of the bZIP (from amino acid residue 270 to 300) and the short basic domain (from 342 to 351) located downstream from the bZIP. We also demonstrate that CREB-2 is acetylated by p300/CBP but not by p/CAF. Moreover, replacement of lysine by arginine in the basic domains decreases the trans-activating capacity of CREB-2. However, in the presence of Tax, the HTLV-I transcription remains fully activated by these CREB-2 mutants. Although we cannot totally exclude that the mutations could also affect CREB-2 structure and activity independent of acetylation, our results suggest that activation of the viral promoter in the presence of Tax is independent of the CREB-2 acetylation.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the specificity of the Swiss case - already considered a quintessential tax haven at the time - in comparison to other banking centres? The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles.

Clarification of the Meaning of "Beneficial Owner" in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Comment on the April 2011 Discussion Draft

In April 2011, the OECD released an important discussion draft that is intended to clarify the meaning of the term "beneficial ownership" under articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model (2010). This article discusses these proposals and demonstrates that some refinement is necessary.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens is still little known for the decades before World War II. Up to now the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 30s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of four countries, this paper offers therefore a new comparative look on international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: was the Swiss case - already considered as a quintessential tax haven at the time - specific in comparison to other banking centres? This research has two results. On the one hand, the 1920s and 30s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Actually, most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the extremely limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. On the other hand, within this general balance sheet, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the bankers, the British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury and the English business circles.

CREB-2, a cellular CRE-dependent transcription repressor, functions in association with Tax as an activator of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 promoter.

The Tax protein of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 (HTLV-1) has been implicated in human T-cell immortalization. The primary function of Tax is to transcriptionally activate the HTLV-1 promoter, but Tax is also known to stimulate expression of cellular genes. It has been reported to associate with several transcription factors, as well as proteins not involved in transcription. To better characterize potential cellular targets of Tax present in infected cells, a Saccharomyces cerevisiae two-hybrid screening was performed with a cDNA library constructed from the HTLV-1-infected MT2 cell line. From this study, we found 158 positive clones representing seven different cDNAs. We focused our attention on the cDNA encoding the transcription factor CREB-2. CREB-2 is an unconventional member of the ATF/CREB family in that it lacks a protein kinase A (PKA) phosphorylation site and has been reported to negatively regulate transcription from the cyclic AMP response element of the human enkephalin promoter. In this study, we demonstrate that CREB-2 cooperates with Tax to enhance viral transcription and that its basic-leucine zipper C-terminal domain is required for both in vitro and in vivo interactions with Tax. Our results confirm that the activation of the HTLV-1 promoter through Tax and factors of the ATF/CREB family is PKA independent.

Do Nasty and Pleasant Surprises Regarding Tax Revenue Explain Spending Drifts ? : The Case of the Swiss Cantons

This article aims to explain the difference between the expenditure reported in governmental end-of-the-year budgets and the amounts previously forecasted in the approved beginning-of-the-year budgets. We measure how political, financial, and institutional variables affect this spending drift. We focus on two much-debated factors, namely, tax revenue budgeting errors and the stringency of fiscal rules. Our econometric approach uses a panel based on the 26 Swiss cantons covering the period of 1980 to 2011. Results suggest that stringent fiscal rules discourage budget overruns, whereas underestimating tax revenue-i.e., a budgetary "pleasant surprise"-offers the opportunity for some overspending.

Tax simulation in the SHP

This paper describes a simulation package designed to estimate the annual income taxes paid by respondents of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). In Switzerland, the 26 cantons have their own tax system. Additionally, tax levels vary between the over 2000 municipalities and over time. The simulation package takes account of this complexity by building on existing tables on tax levels which are provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Administration Office. Because these are limited to a few types of households and only 812 municipalities, they have to be extended to cover all households and municipalities. A further drawback of these tables is that they neglect several deductions. The tax simulation package fills this gap by taking additionally account of deductions for children, double-earner couples, third pillar and support for dependent persons according to cantonal legislation. The resulting variable on direct taxes not only serves to calculate household income net of taxes, but can also be a variable for analysis by its own account.

Do Agglomeration Economies Reduce the Sensitivity of Firm Location to Tax Differentials?

Recent theoretical work in economic geography has shown that agglomeration forces can mitigate 'race-to-the-bottom' tax competition, by partly or fully offsetting firms' sensitivity to tax differentials. We test this proposition using data on firm births across Swiss municipalities. We find that corporate taxes deter firm births less in more spatially concentrated sectors. Firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity in the top quintile are less than half as responsive to differences in corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity in the bottom quintile. Hence, agglomeration economies do appear to attenuate the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.

Do we fear tax competition among new and old European countries ?

The purpose of this paper is to study both theoretically and empirically tax competition in the enlarged EU and to provide some insights on ongoing reforms concerning business taxation. We support the idea that even if one can observe cuts in "new" members statutory business tax rates, this should not result in fiercer tax competition between the "core" and "the "periphery" since infrastructure endowments and the existence of agglomeration rents in the core of the EU may prevent (at least partially) activities to relocate to the "new" members.