Impact of voting advice applications on voters's decision-making

So-called online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become very popular all over Europe. Millions of voters are using them as an assistance to make up their minds for which party they should vote. Despite this popularity there are only very few studies about the impact of these tools on individual electoral choice. On the basis of the Swiss VAA smartvote we present some first findings about the question whether VAAs do have a direct impact on the actual vote of their users. In deed, we find strong evidence that Swiss voters were affected by smartvote. However, our findings are somewhat contrary to the results of previous studies from other countries. Furthermore, the quality of available data for such studies needs to be improved. Future studies should pay attention to both: the improvement of the available data, as well as the explanation of the large variance of findings between the specific European countries.

Do voting advice applications have an effect on electoral participation and voter turnout ? : Evidence from the 2007 Swiss Federal Elections

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) render a valuable platform for tackling one of democracy's central challenges: low voter turnout. Studies indicate that lack of information and cost-benefit considerations cause voters to abstain from voting. VAAs are online voting assistance tools which match own political preferences with those of candidates and parties in elections. By assisting voters in their decision-making process prior to casting their votes, VAAs not only rebut rational choice reasoning against voting but also narrow existing information gaps. In this paper we examine the impact of VAAs on participation and voter turnout. Specifically, we present results on how the Swiss VAA smartvote affected voter turnout in the 2007 federal elections. Our analyses suggest that smartvote does have a mobilizing capacity, especially among young voters who are usually underrepresented at polls. Moreover, the study demonstrates how VAAs such as smartvote do affect citizen's propensity to deal with politics in general.

Missed Opportunities: Evolution of Patients Leaving without Being Seen or against Medical Advice during a Six-Year Period in a Swiss Tertiary Hospital Emergency Department.

Aim. The study aimed at describing the evolution over a 6-year period of patients leaving the emergency department (ED) before being seen ("left without being seen" or LWBS) or against medical advice ("left against medical advice" or LAMA) and at describing their characteristics. Methods. A retrospective database analysis of all adult patients who are admitted to the ED, between 2005 and 2010, and who left before being evaluated or against medical advice, in a tertiary university hospital. Results. During the study period, among the 307,716 patients who were registered in the ED, 1,157 LWBS (0.4%) and 1,853 LAMA (0.9%) patients were identified. These proportions remained stable over the period. The patients had an average age of 38.5 ± 15.9 years for LWBS and 41.9 ± 17.4 years for LAMA. The median time spent in the ED before leaving was 102.4 minutes for the LWBS patients and 226 minutes for LAMA patients. The most frequent reason for LAMA was related to the excessive length of stay. Conclusion. The rates of LWBS and LAMA patients were low and remained stable. The patients shared similar characteristics and reasons for leaving were largely related to the length of stay or waiting time.

Playing Second Fiddle: Expert Advice and Decision-Making in Switzerland

This thesis concerns the role of scientific expertise in the decision-making process at the Swiss federal level of government. It aims to understand how institutional and issue-specific factors influence three things: the distribution of access to scientific expertise, its valuation by participants in policy for- mulation, and the consequence(s) its mobilization has on policy politics and design. The theoretical framework developed builds on the assumption that scientific expertise is a strategic resource. In order to effectively mobilize this resource, actors require financial and organizational resources, as well as the conviction that it can advance their instrumental interests within a particular action situation. Institutions of the political system allocate these financial and organizational resources, influence the supply of scientific expertise, and help shape the venue of its deployment. Issue structures, in turn, condition both interaction configurations and the way in which these are anticipated by actors. This affects the perceived utility of expertise mobilization, mediating its consequences. The findings of this study show that the ability to access and control scientific expertise is strongly concentrated in the hands of the federal administration. Civil society actors have weak capacities to mobilize it, and the autonomy of institutionalized advisory bodies is limited. Moreover, the production of scientific expertise is undergoing a process of professionalization which strengthens the position of the federal administration as the (main) mandating agent. Despite increased political polarization and less inclu- sive decision-making, scientific expertise remains anchored in the policy subsystem, rather than being used to legitimate policy through appeals to the wider population. Finally, the structure of a policy problem matters both for expertise mobilization and for the latter's impact on the policy process, be- cause it conditions conflict structures and their anticipation. Structured problems result in a greater overlap between the principal of expertise mobilization and its intended audience, thereby increasing the chance that expertise shapes policy design. Conversely, less structured problems, especially those that involve conflicts about values and goals, reduce the impact of expertise.

After-hours paediatric telephone triage and advice : the Neuchâtel experience

Résumé Introduction : Plusieurs études américaines et australiennes ont décrit des systèmes de tri téléphonique des urgences pédiatriques. En Europe, les services publics d'urgences pédiatriques ont peu de données épidémiologiques sur lesquelles s'appuyer pour répondre à la demande de soins. Depuis 1996, le département de pédiatrie de l'hôpital Pourtalès, Neuchâtel, offre, en dehors des heures ouvrables, mi tri téléphonique infirmier gratuit. Le présent travail analyse : 1) la situation suisse de l'offre en tri téléphonique infirmier pour les urgences pédiatriques ; 2) une partie des données épidémiologiques de l'expérience neuchâteloise. Méthode : 1) Un questionnaire a été envoyé aux 35 services d'urgences pédiatriques publics de Suisse pour Savoir si un tel tri était utilisé ; 2) une analyse rétrospective de tous les appels reçus, consignés sur fiches standardisées, en 1997 et 2000 a été menée. Résultats : 1) La majorité des services (27/35) ont effectivement un système de tri infirmier. Peu offrent une formation spécifique pour ce travail (14/27) ; 2) Au total, 7870 appels ont été analysés (3242 en 1997; 4628 en 2000, ± 43%). En semaine, la majorité ont été reçus entre 18h et 23h et le week-end en milieu de matinée. Septante-cinq % des appels ont concerné des enfants de 5 ans ou moins. La fièvre, les otalgies et la toux ont représenté 42% des plaintes. Vingt-sept % des appels ont été pris en charge uniquement par les conseils infirmiers, 15 % ont été transmis à l'interne de garde et 50% ont conduit à un rendez-vous dans le service le jour même. Conclusion : Nos données peuvent aider d'autres services d'urgences pédiatriques à planifier au mieux la mise en place d'un tel système de tri téléphonique. Abstract Delivery of paediatric primary care by call centres has emerged as a satisfactory system. It been reported in the literature in the United States and Australia. European public-funded paediatric emergency departments (ED) have little epidemiological data to rely on to match the demand in care. Since 1996, we have run a free nurse-led after-hours paediatric telephone triage and advice (TTA) system, To determine wether other Swiss public paediatric departments practiced formal TTA, we conducted a nation-wide postal survey. To delineate who used our call centre and for what reasons, we embarked on a retrospective study of ail the 1997/2000 calls. Most of the units run a TTA (27/35) but few specifically train their staff (14/27). A 43% increase in call numbers was seen between 1997 (3242) and 2000 (4628). During week-days, most of the calls were between 6 and 11 pm and at weekends, a mid morning activity peak was seen. Some 75% of calls were for children aged 5 years or less. Fever, earache and cough accounted for 42% of the main complaints. Of all calls, 27% were dealt by nurses' advice only. About 15% of the calls were transferred to the on-call resident. About 50% led to a same day ED appointment. Conclusion: Nurse-led paediatric telephone triage and advice is common in Switzerland where training seems to be irregular. Our data can help units to better plan an eventual paediatric telephone triage and advice service. After-hours; Paediatric; Telephone advice; Telephone triage

Why bystanders decline telephone cardiac resuscitation advice.

OBJECTIVES: The aim of this study was to evaluate the rate and reason for refusal of telephone-based cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) instruction by bystanders after the implementation of the dispatch center's systematic telephone CPR protocol. METHODS: Over a 15-month period the authors prospectively collected all case records from the emergency medical services (EMS) dispatch center when CPR had been proposed to the bystander calling in and recorded the reason for declining or not performing that the bystander spontaneously mentioned. All pediatric and adult traumatic and nontraumatic cases were included. Situations when resuscitation had been spontaneously initiated by bystanders were excluded. RESULTS: During the study period, dispatchers proposed CPR on 264 occasions: 232 adult nontraumatic cases, 17 adult traumatic cases, and 15 pediatric (traumatic and nontraumatic) cases. The proposal was accepted in 163 cases (61.7%, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 54.6% to 66.5%), and CPR was eventually performed in 134 cases (51%, 95% CI = 43.2% to 55.3%). In 35 of the cases where resuscitation was not carried out, the condition of the patient or conditions at the scene made this decision medically appropriate. Of the remaining 95 cases, 55 were due to physical limitations of the caller, and 33 were due to emotional distress. CONCLUSIONS: The telephone CPR acceptance rate of 62% in this study is comparable to those of other similar studies. Because bystanders' physical condition is one of the keys to success, the rate may not improve as the population ages.

Computerized advice on drug dosage to improve prescribing practice.

BACKGROUND: Maintaining therapeutic concentrations of drugs with a narrow therapeutic window is a complex task. Several computer systems have been designed to help doctors determine optimum drug dosage. Significant improvements in health care could be achieved if computer advice improved health outcomes and could be implemented in routine practice in a cost effective fashion. This is an updated version of an earlier Cochrane systematic review, by Walton et al, published in 2001. OBJECTIVES: To assess whether computerised advice on drug dosage has beneficial effects on the process or outcome of health care. SEARCH STRATEGY: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group specialized register (June 1996 to December 2006), MEDLINE (1966 to December 2006), EMBASE (1980 to December 2006), hand searched the journal Therapeutic Drug Monitoring (1979 to March 2007) and the Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association (1996 to March 2007) as well as reference lists from primary articles. SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomized controlled trials, controlled trials, controlled before and after studies and interrupted time series analyses of computerized advice on drug dosage were included. The participants were health professionals responsible for patient care. The outcomes were: any objectively measured change in the behaviour of the health care provider (such as changes in the dose of drug used); any change in the health of patients resulting from computerized advice (such as adverse reactions to drugs). DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed study quality. MAIN RESULTS: Twenty-six comparisons (23 articles) were included (as compared to fifteen comparisons in the original review) including a wide range of drugs in inpatient and outpatient settings. Interventions usually targeted doctors although some studies attempted to influence prescriptions by pharmacists and nurses. Although all studies used reliable outcome measures, their quality was generally low. Computerized advice for drug dosage gave significant benefits by:1.increasing the initial dose (standardised mean difference 1.12, 95% CI 0.33 to 1.92)2.increasing serum concentrations (standradised mean difference 1.12, 95% CI 0.43 to 1.82)3.reducing the time to therapeutic stabilisation (standardised mean difference -0.55, 95%CI -1.03 to -0.08)4.reducing the risk of toxic drug level (rate ratio 0.45, 95% CI 0.30 to 0.70)5.reducing the length of hospital stay (standardised mean difference -0.35, 95% CI -0.52 to -0.17). AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: This review suggests that computerized advice for drug dosage has some benefits: it increased the initial dose of drug, increased serum drug concentrations and led to a more rapid therapeutic control. It also reduced the risk of toxic drug levels and the length of time spent in the hospital. However, it had no effect on adverse reactions. In addition, there was no evidence to suggest that some decision support technical features (such as its integration into a computer physician order entry system) or aspects of organization of care (such as the setting) could optimise the effect of computerised advice.

Are Voting Advice Applications (VVAs) more than Toys ? : First findings on Impact and Accountability of VAAs

To what extent do Voting Advice Applications (VAA) have an influence on voting behaviour and to what extent should providers be hold accountable for such tools? This paper puts forward some empirical evidence from the Swiss VAA smartvote. The enormous popularity of smartvote in the last national elections in 2007 and the feedback of users and candidates let us come to the conclusion that smartvote is more than a toy and likely to have an influence on the voting decisions. Since Swiss citizens not only vote for parties but also for candidates, and the voting recommendation of smartvote is based on the political positions of the candidates, smartvote turns out to be particularly helpful. Political scientists must not keep their hands off such tools. Scientific research is needed to understand their functioning and possibilities to manipulate elections. On the bases of a legal study we come to the conclusion, that a science driven way of setting up such tools is essential for their legitimacy. However, we do not believe that there is a single best way of setting up such a tool and rather support a market like solution with different competing tools, provided they meet minimal standards like transparency and equal access for all parties and candidates. Once the process of selecting candidates and parties are directly linked to the act of voting, all these questions will become even more salient.