Neuroscience, quantum indeterminism and the Cartesian soul.

Quantum indeterminism is frequently invoked as a solution to the problem of how a disembodied soul might interact with the brain (as Descartes proposed), and is sometimes invoked in theories of libertarian free will even when they do not involve dualistic assumptions. Taking as example the Eccles-Beck model of interaction between self (or soul) and brain at the level of synaptic exocytosis, I here evaluate the plausibility of these approaches. I conclude that Heisenbergian uncertainty is too small to affect synaptic function, and that amplification by chaos or by other means does not provide a solution to this problem. Furthermore, even if Heisenbergian effects did modify brain functioning, the changes would be swamped by those due to thermal noise. Cells and neural circuits have powerful noise-resistance mechanisms, that are adequate protection against thermal noise and must therefore be more than sufficient to buffer against Heisenbergian effects. Other forms of quantum indeterminism must be considered, because these can be much greater than Heisenbergian uncertainty, but these have not so far been shown to play a role in the brain.

La psychologie d'Aristote chez Freud : essai de psychologie comparée

VEsquisse (1895) ainsi que le chapitre VII de L'interprétation du rêve (1900) de Freud offrent un modèle psychologique - sous-jacent à toute la psychanalyse élaborée par la suite - qui présente des analogies frap¬pantes avec les conceptions aristotéliciennes sur la psyché, principalement développées dans le De l'âme et les Petits traités d'histoire naturelle. Ceci peut se comprendre entre autres par le fait que les seuls cours uni¬versitaires de psychologie et de philosophie que Freud fréquenta, parallèlement à ses études de médecine, furent ceux du théologien, psychologue et philosophe Franz Brentano, grand spécialiste d'Aristote, dont l'impact de l'enseignement sur le jeune Freud est aujourd'hui mieux connu grâce à son échange épistolaire, au début de ses études, avec son ancien ami de gymnase Eduard Silberstein. En effet, plus d'un élément du paradigme psychologique aristotélicien, qui chez cet auteur s'ancre dans la biologie, semblent trouver écho chez Freud : ainsi, la génération de diverses sortes de représentation au sein de l'appareil psychique par l'investissement des traces mnésiques, chez Freud, fait penser à la production ât phantâsmata dans l'âme, par le travail de la phantasîa sur les mouvements résiduels de la perception sensorielle, chez Aristote. De là, ce sont autant le fonctionnement mnésique, que l'explication des phénomènes du rêve et de l'hallucination, que la compréhension du désir dans sa capacité de mettre en mouvement le vivant animé (c'est-à-dire un être doté d'une âme) qui vont représenter les points d'articulation de cette comparaison. -- The Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) as well as Chapter VII of Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (1900) offer a psychological model - underlying the entire psychoanalysis developed hereafter - which is strikingly similar to Aristotelian conceptions of the psyche in On the Soul and Little Physical Treatises. One explanation may be that the only lectures in psychology and philosophy that Freud attended at university, alongside lectures in medicine, were given by the theologist, psychologist, and philosopher Franz Brentano, who had a deep knowledge of Aristotle. Because of young Freud's correspondence with his high school friend Eduard Silberstein at the beginning of his studies, the influence of Brentano's teachings on Freud is now better known. Indeed, much of the Aristotelian psychological paradigm - rooted in biology - seems to echo in Freud's writings. Thus, the production of various sorts of representations within the psychic apparatus by means of the investment in memory traces in Freud's model evokes the phantâsmata generated in the soul by the action of phantasîa on the residual movements of the sensory perception in Aristotle's psychology. From there, this comparison will hinge as much on the operation of memory as on the explanation of the phenomena of dreams and hallucinations, as on the understanding of desire in its ability to set the animated living being (i.e. a being with a soul) in motion.

Infancy Gospels. Stories and Identities

Even though the canonical Jesus' infancy stories have always provoked great interest in popular culture and in the arts, they have been neglected in research during the last decades due to the relatively late date of their redaction. Since the monograph by Raymond Brown, The Birth of the Messiah , the researchers working on this topic have not attempted to consider its historical impact. In this volume, an international team of scholars proposes firstly a reconsideration of the historical background of these stories in terms of early Jewish and Christian identity quests. Secondly, they deal with early Christian questions on Jesus' infancy and childhood through canonical and apocryphal Gospels including information from Patristic and documentary literature. On the theological level, this volume illustrates the impact that these apocryphal texts, recognized as "useful for the soul" (a phrase coined by François Bovon), have had on the Christian faith.