Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Adverse effects of industrial multiwalled carbon nanotubes on human pulmonary cells

The aim of this study was to evaluate adverse effects of multiwalled carbon nanotubes (MWCNT), produced for industrial purposes, on the human epithelial cell line A549. MWCNT were dispersed in dipalmitoyl lecithin (DPL), a component of pulmonary surfactant, and the effects of dispersion in DPL were compared to those in two other media: ethanol (EtOH) and phosphate-buffered saline (PBS). Effects of MWCNT were also compared to those of two asbestos fibers (chrysotile and crocidolite) and carbon black (CB) nanoparticles, not only in A549 cells but also in mesothelial cells (MeT5A human cell line), used as an asbestos-sensitive cell type. MWCNT formed agglomerates on top of both cell lines (surface area 15-35 μm2) that were significantly larger and more numerous in PBS than in EtOH and DPL. Whatever the dispersion media, incubation with 100 μg/ml MWCNT induced a similar decrease in metabolic activity without changing cell membrane permeability or apoptosis. Neither MWCNT cellular internalization nor oxidative stress was observed. In contrast, asbestos fibers penetrated into the cells, decreased metabolic activity but not cell membrane permeability, and increased apoptosis, without decreasing cell number. CB was internalized without any adverse effects. In conclusion, this study demonstrates that MWCNT produced for industrial purposes exert adverse effects without being internalized by human epithelial and mesothelial pulmonary cell lines. [Authors]