7 resultados para Revolving funds
em Université de Lausanne, Switzerland
Resumo:
Public providers have no financial incentive to respect their legal obligation to exempt the poor from user fees. Health Equity Funds (HEFs) aim to make exemptions effective by giving NGOs responsibility for assessing eligibility and compensating providers for lost revenue. We use the geographic spread of HEFs over time in Cambodia to identify their impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. Among households with some OOP payment, HEFs reduce the amount paid by 35%, on average. The effect is larger for households that are poorer and mainly use public health care. Reimbursement of providers through a government operated scheme also reduces household OOP payments but the effect is not as well targeted on the poor. Both compensation models raise household non-medical consumption but have no impact on health-related debt. HEFs reduce the probability of primarily seeking care in the private sector.
Resumo:
Public providers have no financial incentive to respect their legal obligation to exempt the poor from user fees. Health Equity Funds (HEFs) aim to make exemptions effective by giving NGOs responsibility for assessing eligibility and compensating providers for lost revenue. We use the geographic spread of HEFs in Cambodia to identify their impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. Among households with some OOP payment, HEFs reduce the amount by 29%, on average. The effect is larger for households that are poorer, mainly use public health care and live closer to a district hospital. HEFs are more effective in reducing OOP payments when they are operated by a NGO, rather than the government, and when they operate in conjunction with the contracting of public health services. HEFs reduce households' health-related debt by around 25%, on average. There is no significant impact on non-medical consumption and health care utilisation
Resumo:
ABSTRACT This dissertation focuses on new technology commercialization, innovation and new business development. Industry-based novel technology may achieve commercialization through its transfer to a large research laboratory acting as a lead user and technical partner, and providing the new technology with complementary assets and meaningful initial use in social practice. The research lab benefits from the new technology and innovation through major performance improvements and cost savings. Such mutually beneficial collaboration between the lab and the firm does not require any additional administrative efforts or funds from the lab, yet requires openness to technologies and partner companies that may not be previously known to the lab- Labs achieve the benefits by applying a proactive procurement model that promotes active pre-tender search of new technologies and pre-tender testing and piloting of these technological options. The collaboration works best when based on the development needs of both parties. This means that first of all the lab has significant engineering activity with well-defined technological needs and second, that the firm has advanced prototype technology yet needs further testing, piloting and the initial market and references to achieve the market breakthrough. The empirical evidence of the dissertation is based on a longitudinal multiple-case study with the European Laboratory for Particle Physics. The key theoretical contribution of this study is that large research labs, including basic research, play an important role in product and business development toward the end, rather than front-end, of the innovation process. This also implies that product-orientation and business-orientation can contribute to basic re-search. The study provides practical managerial and policy guidelines on how to initiate and manage mutually beneficial lab-industry collaboration and proactive procurement.
Resumo:
Summary The field of public finance focuses on the spending and taxing activities of governments and their influence on the allocation of resources and distribution of income. This work covers in three parts different topics related to public finance which are currently widely discussed in media and politics. The first two parts deal with issues on social security, which is in general one of the biggest spending shares of governments. The third part looks at the main income source of governments by analyzing the perceived value of tax competition. Part one deals with the current problem of increased early retirement by focusing on Switzerland as a special case. Early retirement is predominantly considered to be the result of incentives set by social security and the tax system. But the Swiss example demonstrates that the incidence of early retirement has dramatically increased even in the absence of institutional changes. We argue that the wealth effect also plays an important role in the retirement decision for middle and high income earners. An actuarially fair, but mandatory funded system with a relatively high replacement rate may thus contribute to a low labor market participation rate of elderly workers. We provide evidence using a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier men, and to a smaller extent women, tend to leave the workforce. The fact that early retirement has become much more prevalent in the last 15 years is a further indicator of the importance of a wealth effect, as the maturing of the Swiss mandatory funded pension system over that period has led to an increase in the effective replacement rates for middle and high income earners. Part two covers the theoretical side of social security. Theories analyzing optimal social security benefits provide important qualitative results, by mainly using one general type of an economy. Economies are however very diverse concerning numerous aspects, one of the most important being the wealth level. This can lead to significant quantitative benefit differences that imply differences in replacement rates and levels of labor supply. We focus on several aspects related to this fact. In a within cohort social security model, we introduce disability insurance with an imperfect screening mechanism. We then vary the wealth level of the model economy and analyze how the optimal social security benefit structure or equivalently, the optimal replacement rates, changes depending on the wealth level of the economy, and if the introduction of disability insurance into a social security system is preferable for all economies. Second, the screening mechanism of disability insurance and the threshold level at which people are defined as disabled can differ. For economies with different wealth levels, we determine for different thresholds the screening level that maximizes social welfare. Finally, part three turns to the income of governments, by adding an element to the controversy on tax competition versus tax harmonization.2 Inter-jurisdictional tax competition can generate at least two potential benefits or costs: On a public level, tax competition may result in a lower or higher efficiency in the production of public services. But there is also a more private benefit in the form of an option for individuals to move to a community with a lower tax rate in the future. To explore the value citizens attach to tax competition we analyze a unique popular vote for a complete tax harmonization between communities in the third largest Swiss canton, Vaud. Although a majority of voters would have seemingly benefited from replacing the current tax rate by a revenue-neutral average tax rate, the proposal was rejected by a large margin. Our estimates suggest that the estimated combined perceived benefit from tax competition is in the range of 10%.
Resumo:
In this article, we analyze the rationale for introducing outlier payments into a prospective payment system for hospitals under adverse selection and moral hazard. The payer has only two instruments: a fixed price for patients whose treatment cost is below a threshold and a cost-sharing rule for outlier patients. We show that a fixed-price policy is optimal when the hospital is sufficiently benevolent. When the hospital is weakly benevolent, a mixed policy solving a trade-off between rent extraction, efficiency, and dumping deterrence must be preferred. We show how the optimal combination of fixed price and partially cost-based payment depends on the degree of benevolence of the hospital, the social cost of public funds, and the distribution of patients severity. [Authors]
Resumo:
International conservation organisations have identified priority areas for biodiversity conservation. These global-scale prioritisations affect the distribution of funds for conservation interventions. As each organisation has a different focus, each prioritisation scheme is determined by different decision criteria and the resultant priority areas vary considerably. However, little is known about how the priority areas will respond to the impacts of climate change. In this paper, we examined the robustness of eight global-scale prioritisations to climate change under various climate predictions from seven global circulation models. We developed a novel metric of the climate stability for 803 ecoregions based on a recently introduced method to estimate the overlap of climate envelopes. The relationships between the decision criteria and the robustness of the global prioritisation schemes were statistically examined. We found that decision criteria related to level of endemism and landscape fragmentation were strongly correlated with areas predicted to be robust to a changing climate. Hence, policies that prioritise intact areas due to the likely cost efficiency, and assumptions related to the potential to mitigate the impacts of climate change, require further examination. Our findings will help determine where additional management is required to enable biodiversity to adapt to the impacts of climate change
Resumo:
Qui sait qu'en Suisse, les associations patronales mettent en oeuvre l'Etat social ? Qui sait que associations organisent la majorité des caisses de compensation, dont la fonction principale est de collecter les cotisations et de payer les rentes de l'Assurance-vieillesse et survivants ? Qui connaît ces caisses par lesquelles transitent les milliards de l'Etat social ? L'objectif de cette thèse consiste à comprendre les raisons qui ont poussé le patronat helvétique à mettre en oeuvre les politiques de protection sociale, dont il a pourtant toujours essayé de limiter le développement. Résoudre ce paradoxe implique de se pencher sur près d'un siècle d'histoire mêlée du patronat et des politiques sociales. Ce travail retrace, sur la base d'archives privées et publiques souvent inédites, les raisons qui ont poussé les patrons à créer les premières caisses de compensation dans l'entre-deux-guerres, puis à imposer cette forme d'organisation pour l'aide aux soldats mobilisés (autour de 1940) et l'Assurance- vieillesse et survivants (autour de 1948). Il étudie également comment les associations patronales sont parvenues à défendre leurs caisses jusqu'à aujourd'hui, contre ceux qui dénonçaient l'irrationalité de l'existence d'une centaine de caisses de compensation publiques et privées concurrentes pour mettre en oeuvre un seul système d'assurances sociales. Cette recherche amène deux grands résultats. D'une part, elle propose une histoire originale des politiques sociales en Suisse. Le prisme des caisses de compensation patronales contribue en effet à interroger notre compréhension de l'histoire des politiques de protection sociale, dans laquelle on sous-estime parfois l'importance des conflits pour fixer les frontières entre formes de protection publique et privée. D'autre part, ce travail présente une histoire inédite de l'action collective des patrons dans les régulations du travail au sens large. A travers les caisses de compensation, c'est en effet à réaliser une histoire de l'Union centrale des associations patronales suisses que je me suis aussi attelé. Faute de parvenir à empêcher tout développement des politiques sociales, les patrons ont fait en sorte d'acquérir sur ces politiques une forme de mainmise. Entre histoire des politiques sociales et histoire du patronat, ce travail tente d'expliquer comment les caisses de compensation y ont contribué. Who knows that, in Switzerland, employers' associations implement the best known policies constituting the welfare state? Who knows that the equalization funds, (Caisses de compensation / Ausgleichskassen), organized by employers' associations or by the Swiss Cantons, are responsible for pooling payroll deductions and for paying benefits of the Swiss public pay-as-you-go, old-age insurance and many other branches of the welfare policies? Who knows these caisses de compensation that channel the monies dedicated to the financing of the Welfare state ? The main objective of this research is to understand the reasons why Swiss employers do implement such welfare policies that they usually reject for political reasons. In order to solve this puzzle, this research investigates half of a century of the connected histories of welfare policies and employers' collective action. It also investigates, based on public and private archive records, how employers founded the first caisses in the Interwar period, and imposed them to organize the main developments of the Welfare state during the Second World War. The research also underlines how employers defended their caisses de compensation against those questioning the rationality of this fragmented system aiming to implement one single set of public welfare through one hundred competing private and public caisses de compensation. This research highlights two main results. On the one hand, it helps to improve our understanding of the history of the welfare policies in Switzerland. Underlining the role of the caisses de compensation helps to highlight the importance of the interplay of public and private actors regarding social polices. On the other hand, this research charts a pioneering history of Swiss' employers' collective action regarding labor issues. Because they could not prevent all public welfare policy, employers achieved a form of stranglehold (mainmise) on the welfare State. Halfway between social policy and employers' associations' history, this research try to reveal how their caisses de compensation helped them in this objective.