Corruption and decentralization : what economists have to say about it

This paper deals with both theoretical and empirical aspects of the link between corruption and decentralization in both developing and emerging countries. Only mixed results can be drawn from the literature. Decentralization can help discipline "predative" governments, but only under certain conditions. Indeed, it depends on fiscal arrangements and political features that are likely to be different between countries. The way incentives to local governments are designed by the central governments also plays an essential role.

Do we fear tax competition among new and old European countries ?

The purpose of this paper is to study both theoretically and empirically tax competition in the enlarged EU and to provide some insights on ongoing reforms concerning business taxation. We support the idea that even if one can observe cuts in "new" members statutory business tax rates, this should not result in fiercer tax competition between the "core" and "the "periphery" since infrastructure endowments and the existence of agglomeration rents in the core of the EU may prevent (at least partially) activities to relocate to the "new" members.