Predicting adverse events in children with fever and chemotherapy-induced neutropenia: the prospective multicenter SPOG 2003 FN study.

PURPOSE To develop a score predicting the risk of adverse events (AEs) in pediatric patients with cancer who experience fever and neutropenia (FN) and to evaluate its performance. PATIENTS AND METHODS Pediatric patients with cancer presenting with FN induced by nonmyeloablative chemotherapy were observed in a prospective multicenter study. A score predicting the risk of future AEs (ie, serious medical complication, microbiologically defined infection, radiologically confirmed pneumonia) was developed from a multivariate mixed logistic regression model. Its cross-validated predictive performance was compared with that of published risk prediction rules. Results An AE was reported in 122 (29%) of 423 FN episodes. In 57 episodes (13%), the first AE was known only after reassessment after 8 to 24 hours of inpatient management. Predicting AE at reassessment was better than prediction at presentation with FN. A differential leukocyte count did not increase the predictive performance. The score predicting future AE in 358 episodes without known AE at reassessment used the following four variables: preceding chemotherapy more intensive than acute lymphoblastic leukemia maintenance (weight = 4), hemoglobin > or = 90 g/L (weight = 5), leukocyte count less than 0.3 G/L (weight = 3), and platelet count less than 50 G/L (weight = 3). A score (sum of weights) > or = 9 predicted future AEs. The cross-validated performance of this score exceeded the performance of published risk prediction rules. At an overall sensitivity of 92%, 35% of the episodes were classified as low risk, with a specificity of 45% and a negative predictive value of 93%. CONCLUSION This score, based on four routinely accessible characteristics, accurately identifies pediatric patients with cancer with FN at risk for AEs after reassessment.

A Legislator under Surveillance: The Creation and Implementation of Swiss Banking Legislation 1910-1934

This paper analyses how banking regulation was introduced in Switzerland - one of the world's most prominent financial centres - which remained in place until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows that the law adopted on 8 November 1934 is a perfect example of capture of the regulator by the regulated. Essentially a political response in the context of the economic crisis of the 1930s, it largely reflected the interests of banking circles by limiting the intervention of the State as much as possible. The introduction of the new legislation was facilitated by the temporary weakness of Swiss banking circles, as they depended on the State to delay or prevent the collapse of many major credit institutions. They did not manage to derail the law as they had two decades earlier when they scuppered the federal bill on banks drawn up between 1914 and 1916. But this time they were better organized and more united, and intervened all the more effectively in the legislative process itself. The 1934 law is thus distinctive in that it made no structural changes to the architecture of the financial centre but merely codified its practices through flexible legislation meant to reassure the public. The law was aimed less at controlling banking activity than at keeping - thanks to skilfully calibrated political concessions - the State from having to intervene more directly in the internal management of banks or in the fixing of interest rates and the export of capital.