The puzzles of the prokineticin 2 pathway in human reproduction.

Prokineticin, 1 (PROK1) and prokineticin 2 (PROK2), are two closely related proteins that were identified as the mammalian homologs of their two amphibian homologs, mamba intestinal toxin (MIT-1) and Bv8. MIT-1 was initially identified as a non-toxic constituent in the venom of the black mamba snake (Dendroaspis polylepis) (Joubert and Strydom, 1980) while Bv8 was identified in the skin secretion of the toad, Bombina variegate (Mollay et al., 1999). All three homologs stimulate gastrointestinal motility thus accounting for their family name "prokineticins" (Schweitz et al., 1990, 1999). However, since its initial description, both PROK1 and PROK2 have been found to regulate a dazzling array of biological functions throughout the body. In particular, PROK1 acts as a potent angiogenic mitogen on endocrine vascular epithelium, thus earning its other name, Endocrine gland-vascular endothelial factor (EG-VEGF) (LeCouter et al., 2002). In contrast, the PROK2 signaling pathway is a critical regulator of olfactory bulb morphogenesis and sexual maturation in mammals and this function is the focus of this review.

Essays in banking and corporate finance

Abstract This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk-averse and has specific knowledge -knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and provides a rationale for a number of unresolved puzzles in executive compensation. Notably, we find that relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the quality of specific knowledge is low. We also show (1) why some common risk components are not filtered out of executives' pay, (2) why performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements, and (3) why executives with higher perceived abilities are given stronger incentives. Finally, we demonstrate that the relation between risk and incentives may be positive or negative, depending on the quality of the executive's specific knowledge.

Essays in general equilibrium asset pricing

ABSTRACT : Research in empirical asset pricing has pointed out several anomalies both in the cross section and time series of asset prices, as well as in investors' portfolio choice. This dissertation aims to discover the forces driving some of these "puzzling" asset pricing dynamics and portfolio decisions observed in the financial market. Through the dissertation I construct and study dynamic general equilibrium models of heterogeneous investors in the presence of frictions and evaluate quantitatively their implications for financial-market asset prices and portfolio choice. I also explore the potential roots of puzzles in international finance. Chapter 1 shows that, by introducing jointly endogenous no-default type of borrowing constraints and heterogeneous beliefs in a dynamic general-equilibrium economy, many empirical features of stock return volatility can be reproduced. While most of the research on stock return volatility is empirical, this paper provides a theoretical framework that is able to reproduce simultaneously the cross section and time series stylized facts concerning stock returns and their volatility. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature related to stock return volatility, I don't impose persistence or regimes in any of the exogenous state variables or in preferences. Volatility clustering, asymmetry in the stock return-volatility relationship, and pricing of multi-factor volatility components in the cross section all arise endogenously as a consequence of the feedback between the binding of no-default constraints and heterogeneous beliefs. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the implications of differences of opinion across investors in different countries for international asset pricing anomalies. Chapter 2 demonstrates that several international finance "puzzles" can be reproduced by a single risk factor which captures heterogeneous beliefs across international investors. These puzzles include: (i) home equity preference; (ii) the dependence of firm returns on local and foreign factors; (iii) the co-movement of returns and international capital flows; and (iv) abnormal returns around foreign firm cross-listing events in the local market. These are reproduced in a setup with symmetric information and in a perfectly integrated world with multiple countries and independent processes producing the same good. Chapter 3 shows that by extending this framework to multiple goods and correlated production processes; the "forward premium puzzle" arises naturally as a compensation for the heterogeneous expectations about the depreciation of the exchange rate held by international investors. Chapters 2 and 3 propose differences of opinion across international investors as the potential resolution of several international finance `puzzles'. In a globalized world where both capital and information flow freely across countries, this explanation seems more appealing than existing asymmetric information or segmented markets theories aiming to explain international finance puzzles.

Bacterial sensors: synthetic design and application principles

Bacterial reporters are live, genetically engineered cells with promising application in bioanalytics. They contain genetic circuitry to produce a cellular sensing element, which detects the target compound and relays the detection to specific synthesis of so-called reporter proteins (the presence or activity of which is easy to quantify). Bioassays with bacterial reporters are a useful complement to chemical analytics because they measure biological responses rather than total chemical concentrations. Simple bacterial reporter assays may also replace more costly chemical methods as a first line sample analysis technique. Recent promising developments integrate bacterial reporter cells with microsystems to produce bacterial biosensors. This lecture presents an in-depth treatment of the synthetic biological design principles of bacterial reporters, the engineering of which started as simple recombinant DNA puzzles, but has now become a more rational approach of choosing and combining sensing, controlling and reporting DNA 'parts'. Several examples of existing bacterial reporter designs and their genetic circuitry will be illustrated. Besides the design principles, the lecture also focuses on the application principles of bacterial reporter assays. A variety of assay formats will be illustrated, and principles of quantification will be dealt with. In addition to this discussion, substantial reference material is supplied in various Annexes.

Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of control challenges of 2-7% on average (.8-5% at median). The estimates of the agency costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial incentives. In addition, these costs are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Finally, the analysis shows that governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and firms' financing decisions. The third essay is concerned with the documented time trend in corporate cash holdings by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS,2003). BKS find that firms' cash holdings double from 10% to 20% over the 1980 to 2005 period. This essay provides an explanation of this phenomenon by examining the effects of product market competition on firms' cash holdings in the presence of financial constraints. It develops a real options model in which cash holdings may be used to cover unexpected operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The model generates new predictions relating cash holdings to firm and industry characteristics such as the intensity of competition, cash flow volatility, or financing constraints. The empirical examination of the model shows strong support of model's predictions. In addition, it shows that the time trend in cash holdings documented by BKS can be at least partly attributed to a competition effect.