Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]

Physiotherapy practice in the private sector: organizational characteristics and models.

BACKGROUND: Even if a large proportion of physiotherapists work in the private sector worldwide, very little is known of the organizations within which they practice. Such knowledge is important to help understand contexts of practice and how they influence the quality of services and patient outcomes. The purpose of this study was to: 1) describe characteristics of organizations where physiotherapists practice in the private sector, and 2) explore the existence of a taxonomy of organizational models. METHODS: This was a cross-sectional quantitative survey of 236 randomly-selected physiotherapists. Participants completed a purpose-designed questionnaire online or by telephone, covering organizational vision, resources, structures and practices. Organizational characteristics were analyzed descriptively, while organizational models were identified by multiple correspondence analyses. RESULTS: Most organizations were for-profit (93.2%), located in urban areas (91.5%), and within buildings containing multiple businesses/organizations (76.7%). The majority included multiple providers (89.8%) from diverse professions, mainly physiotherapy assistants (68.7%), massage therapists (67.3%) and osteopaths (50.2%). Four organizational models were identified: 1) solo practice, 2) middle-scale multiprovider, 3) large-scale multiprovider and 4) mixed. CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study provide a detailed description of the organizations where physiotherapists practice, and highlight the importance of human resources in differentiating organizational models. Further research examining the influences of these organizational characteristics and models on outcomes such as physiotherapists' professional practices and patient outcomes are needed.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Interprofessional practices of physiotherapists working with adults with low back pain in Québec's private sector: results of a qualitative study.

BACKGROUND: Collaboration and interprofessional practices are highly valued in health systems, because they are thought to improve outcomes of care for persons with complex health problems, such as low back pain. Physiotherapists, like all health providers, are encouraged to take part in interprofessional practices. However, little is known about these practices, especially for private sector physiotherapists. This study aimed to: 1) explore how physiotherapists working in the private sector with adults with low back pain describe their interprofessional practices, 2) identify factors that influence their interprofessional practices, and 3) identify their perceived effects. METHODS: Participants were 13 physiotherapists, 10 women/3 men, having between 3 and 21 years of professional experience. For this descriptive qualitative study, we used face-to-face semi-structured interviews and conducted content analysis encompassing data coding and thematic regrouping. RESULTS: Physiotherapists described interprofessional practices heterogeneously, including numerous processes such as sharing information and referring. Factors that influenced physiotherapists' interprofessional practices were related to patients, providers, organizations, and wider systems (e.g. professional system). Physiotherapists mostly viewed positive effects of interprofessional practices, including elements such as gaining new knowledge as a provider and being valued in one's own role, as well as improvements in overall treatment and outcome. CONCLUSIONS: This qualitative study offers new insights into the interprofessional practices of physiotherapists working with adults with low back pain, as perceived by the physiotherapists' themselves. Based on the results, the development of strategies aiming to increase interprofessionalism in the management of low back pain would most likely require taking into consideration factors associated with patients, providers, the organizations within which they work, and the wider systems.

Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid ? And Why ? : Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is exogenous. Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

"Public on the outside, private on the inside": the organizational hybridization, sense of belonging and identity strategies of the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland

A number of studies show that New Public Management reforms have altered the current identity benchmarks of public officials, particularly by hybridizing values or management practices. However, existing studies have largely glossed over the sense of belonging of officials when their organization straddles the concerns of public service and private enterprise, so that the boundary between public and private sector is blurred. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore this sense of belonging in the context of organizational hybridization. It does so by drawing on the results of research conducted among the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland. On the one hand, the analysis shows how much their markers of belonging are hybrid, multiple and constructed in negative terms (with regard to the State), while indicating that the working practices of the employees point to an identity that is nevertheless closely bound with the public sector. On the other hand, the analysis shows that the organization plays strategically with its State status, by exploiting either its private or public identity in line with the needs related to its external image. The article concludes with a discussion of the results highlighting the strategic functionality of the hybrid identity of the actors.

Prevalence of overweight and underweight in public and private schools in the Seychelles.

Abstract Objective. We compared the prevalence of body weight categories between public and private schools in the Seychelles, a rapidly developing small island state in the African region. Methods. In 2004-2006, weight and height were measured and self-reported information on physical activity collected in children of three selected grades in all schools in the country. Overweight, obesity and thinness were defined according to standard criteria. Results. Based on 8 462 students (377 in private schools), the prevalence of overweight (including obesity) was markedly higher in private than public schools (boys: 37% [95% CI: 31-44] vs. 15% [14-16]; girls: 33% [26-41] vs. 20% [19-22]). The prevalence of thinness grade 1 was lower in private than public schools (boys: 9% [5-13] vs. 20% [19-21]; girls: 13% [8-18] vs. 19% [18-20]). Students in private schools reported more physical activity at leisure time while students in public schools reported larger weekly walking time. Conclusions. Our findings suggest that school type may be a useful indicator for assessing the association between socio-economic status and overweight in children, and that overweight affects wealthy children more often than others in developing countries.

Optimal public rationing and price response

We study optimal public rationing of an indivisible good and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and costs of provisions. Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Public rationing determines the characteristics of consumers who seek supply from the private sector, where a firm sets prices based on consumers' cost information and in response to the rationing rule. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information. In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Supplying all poor consumers would leave only rich consumers in the private market, and the firm would react by setting a high price. Rationing some poor consumers is optimal, and implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold. Wealth information is not used. Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium total consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth. [Authors]

Optimal public rationing and price response.

We study optimal public health care rationing and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and illness severity (defined as treatment cost). Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Rationed consumers may purchase from a monopolistic private market. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information (means testing). In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Rationing some poor consumers implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold (cost effectiveness). Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth.

Cultural Biases in Public Service Delivery : Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Approach

What determines the share of public employment, at a given size of the State, in countries of similar levels of economic development? While the theoretical and empirical literature on this issue has mostly considered technical dimensions (efficiency and political considerations), this paper emphasizes the role of culture and quantifies it. We build a representative database for contracting choices of municipalities in Switzerland and exploit the discontinuity at the Swiss language border at identical actual set of policies and institutions to analyze the causal e↵ect of culture on the choice of how public services are provided. We find that French-speaking border municipalities are 50% less likely to contract with the private sector than their German-speaking adjacent municipalities. Technical dimensions are much smaller by comparison. This result points out that culture is a source of a potential bias that distorts the optimal choice for public service delivery. Systematic differences in the level of confidence in public administration and private companies potentially explain this discrepancy in private sector participation in public services provision.

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The use of the Internet now has a specific purpose: to find information. Unfortunately, the amount of data available on the Internet is growing exponentially, creating what can be considered a nearly infinite and ever-evolving network with no discernable structure. This rapid growth has raised the question of how to find the most relevant information. Many different techniques have been introduced to address the information overload, including search engines, Semantic Web, and recommender systems, among others. Recommender systems are computer-based techniques that are used to reduce information overload and recommend products likely to interest a user when given some information about the user's profile. This technique is mainly used in e-Commerce to suggest items that fit a customer's purchasing tendencies. The use of recommender systems for e-Government is a research topic that is intended to improve the interaction among public administrations, citizens, and the private sector through reducing information overload on e-Government services. More specifically, e-Democracy aims to increase citizens' participation in democratic processes through the use of information and communication technologies. In this chapter, an architecture of a recommender system that uses fuzzy clustering methods for e-Elections is introduced. In addition, a comparison with the smartvote system, a Web-based Voting Assistance Application (VAA) used to aid voters in finding the party or candidate that is most in line with their preferences, is presented.

Un partenariat public-privé rigide ou flexible ? Théorie et application aux concessions routières à péage

In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll road concession contracts. We highlight the fact that contracting parties try to sign not only complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt contractual framework to contingencies and to create incentives for cooperative behavior. This gives rise to multiple toll adjustment provisions and to a tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts. Such a tradeoff is formalized using an incomplete contract framework - including ex post maladaptation and renegotiation costs - and propositions are tested using an original database of 71 concession contracts. Our results suggest an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in designing such public-private contracts. Codes JEL : D23, H11, H54, L14, L9.

Financial protection of patients through compensation of providers: the impact of Health Equity Funds in Cambodia

Public providers have no financial incentive to respect their legal obligation to exempt the poor from user fees. Health Equity Funds (HEFs) aim to make exemptions effective by giving NGOs responsibility for assessing eligibility and compensating providers for lost revenue. We use the geographic spread of HEFs over time in Cambodia to identify their impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. Among households with some OOP payment, HEFs reduce the amount paid by 35%, on average. The effect is larger for households that are poorer and mainly use public health care. Reimbursement of providers through a government operated scheme also reduces household OOP payments but the effect is not as well targeted on the poor. Both compensation models raise household non-medical consumption but have no impact on health-related debt. HEFs reduce the probability of primarily seeking care in the private sector.