The slow transformation of Swiss federal administrative elites

This article sets out to study the profile of Swiss administrative elites at federal level by showing how their profile has evolved in the light of what has come to be known as the wave of New Public Management (NPM), which has benefited from a very fertile ground in Switzerland. These elites correspond to a specific institutional order, in relation to specific organizational structures and workings, and have specific characteristics in terms of career paths and academic background. However, the administrative reforms that have been rolled out since the 1980s have transformed the institutional order within which executives of the federal administration evolve. This article analyses the extent to which these transformations have had an impact on the characteristics of these elites, through indicators such as academic capital, social capital, and career path within and outside the administration. The results show a slow but significant transformation in the profiles of these elites towards an increasing managerialization, reflecting that of the context in which they evolve.Points for practitioners The relationship between politics and the administration is naturally shaped by individuals but is closely dependent on the profiles of the players. They are currently undergoing a transformation in the wake of administrative reforms, and also of the changing profiles of both the political and administrative players. Gaining an insight into the slow transformation of the profiles of administrative elites therefore sheds light on the political-administrative nexus. The gradual managerialization of the administrative elite highlighted in this article also allows for a better understanding of which professional experiences, qualifications and skills are valued today within the senior civil service in Switzerland.

Doctoral education's reform in Switzerland and Norway : a public management analyis

This doctoral thesis examines a recent phenomenon in European higher education, namely the reform of doctoral education. On the basis of a number of case studies, consisting of Swiss and Norwegian doctoral schools, and their institutional, national and international context, it demonstrates to what extent changes appear in doctoral education and its governance. Findings indicate new practices regarding doctoral students' recruitment, curricular component, supervision, scientific exchange, follow-up and their career. Doctoral education's character is not anymore exclusively determined by individual supervisors, but increasingly by interdisciplinary and interinstitutional colleges of academics. Finally, general governance patterns are identified: according to the type of scientific discipline and higher education institution, the institution's size and national political system, the field of higher education is more or less dominated by New Public Management or Network Governance characteristics.

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.

The policy-making structure of European regulatory networks and the domestic adoption of standards

European regulatory networks (ERNs) constitute the main governance instrument for the informal co-ordination of public regulation at the European Union (EU) level. They are in charge of co-ordinating national regulators and ensuring the implementation of harmonized regulatory policies across the EU, while also offering sector-specific expertise to the Commission. To this aim, ERNs develop 'best practices' and benchmarking procedures in the form of standards, norms and guidelines to be adopted in member states. In this paper, we focus on the Committee of European Securities Regulators and examine the consequences of the policy-making structure of ERNs on the domestic adoption of standards. We find that the regulators of countries with larger financial industries tend to occupy more central positions in the network, especially among newer member states. In turn, network centrality is associated with a more prompt domestic adoption of standards.

Regulatory assessment of in vitro skin corrosion and irritation data within the European framework: Workshop recommendations

Validated in vitro methods for skin corrosion and irritation were adopted by the OECD and by the European Union during the last decade. In the EU, Switzerland and countries adopting the EU legislation, these assays may allow the full replacement of animal testing for identifying and classifying compounds as skin corrosives, skin irritants, and non irritants. In order to develop harmonised recommendations on the use of in vitro data for regulatory assessment purposes within the European framework, a workshop was organized by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health together with ECVAM and the BfR. It comprised stakeholders from various European countries involved in the process from in vitro testing to the regulatory assessment of in vitro data. Discussions addressed the following questions: (1) the information requirements considered useful for regulatory assessment; (2) the applicability of in vitro skin corrosion data to assign the corrosive subcategories as implemented by the EU Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation; (3) the applicability of testing strategies for determining skin corrosion and irritation hazards; and (4) the applicability of the adopted in vitro assays to test mixtures, preparations and dilutions. Overall, a number of agreements and recommendations were achieved in order to clarify and facilitate the assessment and use of in vitro data from regulatory accepted methods, and ultimately help regulators and scientists facing with the new in vitro approaches to evaluate skin irritation and corrosion hazards and risks without animal data.

Control of pancreatic β-cell mass and function by gluco-incretin hormones : identification of novel regulatory mechanisms for the treatment of diabetes

Summary : Control of pancreatic ß-cell mass and function by gluco-incretin hormones: Identification of novel regulatory mechanisms for the treatment of diabetes The ß-cells of islets of Langerhans secrete insulin to reduce hyperglycemia. The number of pancreatic islet ß-cells and their capacity to secrete insulin is modulated in normal physiological conditions to respond to the metabolic demand of the organism. A failure of the endocrine pancreas to maintain an adequate insulin secretory capacity due to a reduced ß-cell number and function underlies the pathogenesis of both type 1 and type 2 diabetes. The molecular mechanisms controlling the glucose competence of mature ß-cells, i.e., the magnitude of their insulin secretion response to glucose, ß-cell replication, their differentiation from precursor cells and protection against apoptosis are poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms, we studied the effects on ß-cells of the gluco-incretin hormones, glucose-dependent insulinotropic polypeptide (GIP) and glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) which are secreted by intestinal endocrine cells after food intake. Besides acutely potentiating glucose-stimulated insulin secretion, these hormones induce ß-cell differentiation from precursor cells, stimulate mature ß-cell replication, and protect them against apoptosis. Therefore, understanding the molecular basis for gluco-incretin action may lead to the uncovering of novel ß-cell regulatory events with potential application for the treatment or prevention of diabetes. Islets from mice with inactivation of both GIP and GLP-1 receptor genes (dK0) present a defect in glucose-induced insulin secretion and are more sensitive than control islets to cytokine-induced apoptosis. To search for regulatory genes, that may control both glucose competence and protection against apoptosis, we performed comparative transcriptomic analysis of islets from control and dK0 mice. We found a strong down-regulation of the IGF1 Rexpression in dK0 islets. We demonstrated in both a mouse insulin-secreting cell line and primary islets, that GLP-1 stimulated IGF-1R expression and signaling. Importantly, GLP-1induced IGF-1R-dependent Akt phosphorylation required active secretion, indicating the presence of an autocrine activation mechanism. We further showed that activation of IGF-1R signaling was dependent on the secretion of IGF-2 and IGF-2 expression was regulated by nutrients. Finally, we demonstrated that the IGF-Z/IGF-1R autocrine loop was required for GLP-1 i) to protect ß-cells against cytokine-induced apoptosis, ii) to enhance their glucose competence and iii) to increase ß-cell proliferation. Résumé : Contrôle de la masse des cellules ß pancréatiques et de leur fonction par les hormones glucoincrétines: Identification de nouveaux mécanismes régulateurs pour le traitement du diabète Les cellules ß des îlots de Langerhans sécrètent l'insuline pour diminuer l'hyperglycémie. Le nombre de cellules ß et leur capacité à sécréter l'insuline sont modulés dans les conditions physiologiques normales pour répondre à la demande métabolique de l'organisme. Un échec du pancréas endocrine à maintenir sa capacité sécrétoire d'insuline dû à une diminution du nombre et de la fonction des cellules ß conduit au diabète de type 1 et de type 2. Les mécanismes moléculaires contrôlant la compétence au glucose des cellules ß matures, tels que, l'augmentation de la sécrétion d'insuline en réponse au glucose, la réplication des cellules ß, leur différentiation à partir de cellules précurseurs et la protection contre l'apoptose sont encore peu connus. Afin d'examiner ces mécanismes, nous avons étudié les effets sur les cellules ß des hormones gluco-incrétines, glucose-dépendent insulinotropic polypeptide (G1P) et glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) qui sont sécrétées par les cellules endocrines de l'intestin après la prise alimentaire. En plus de potentialiser la sécrétion d'insuline induite par le glucose, ces hormones induisent la différentiation de cellules ß à partir de cellules précurseurs, stimulent leur prolifération et les protègent contre l'apoptose. Par conséquent, comprendre les mécanismes d'action des gluco-incrétines permettrait de découvrir de nouveaux processus régulant les cellules ß avec d'éventuelles applications dans le traitement ou la prévention du diabète. Les îlots de souris ayant une double inactivation des gènes pour les récepteurs du GIP et du GLP-1 (dK0) présentent un défaut de sécrétion d'insuline stimulée par le glucose et une sensibilité accrue à l'apoptose induite par les cytokines. Afin de déterminer les gènes régulés, qui pourraient contrôler à la fois la compétence au glucose et la protection contre l'apoptose, nous avons effectué une analyse comparative transcriptomique sur des îlots de souris contrôles et dKO. Nous avons constaté une forte diminution de l'expression d'IGF-1R dans les îlots dKO. Nous avons démontré, à la fois dans une lignée cellulaire murine sécrétant l'insuline et dans îlots primaires, que le GLP-1 stimulait l'expression d'IGF-1R et sa voie de signalisation. Par ailleurs, la phosphorylation d'Akt dépendante d'IGF1-R induite parle GLP-1 nécessite une sécrétion active, indiquant la présence d'un mécanisme d'activation autocrine. Nous avons ensuite montré que l'activation de la voie de signalisation d'IGF-1R était dépendante de la sécrétion d'IGF-2, dont l'expression est régulée par les nutriments. Finalement, nous avons démontré que la boucle autocrine IGF-2/IGF-1R est nécessaire pour le GLP-1 i) pour protéger les cellules ß contre l'apoptose induite par les cytokines, ii) pour améliorer la compétence au glucose et iii) pour augmenter la prolifération des cellules ß. Résumé tout public : Contrôle de la masse des cellules ß pancréatiques et de leur fonction par les hormones gluco-incrétines: Identification de nouveaux mécanismes régulateurs pour le traitement du diabète Chez les mammifères, la concentration de glucose sanguine (glycémie) est régulée et maintenue à une valeur relativement constante d'environ 5 mM. Cette régulation est principalement contrôlée par 2 hormones produites par les îlots pancréatiques de Langerhans: l'insuline sécrétée par les cellules ß et le glucagon sécrété par les cellules a. A la suite d'un repas, l'augmentation de la glycémie entraîne la sécrétion d'insuline ce qui permet le stockage du glucose dans le foie, les muscles et le tissu adipeux afin de diminuer le taux de glucose circulant. Lors d'un jeûne, la diminution de la glycémie permet la sécrétion de glucagon favorisant alors la production de glucose par le foie, normalisant ainsi la glycémie. Le nombre de cellules ß et leur capacité sécrétoire s'adaptent aux variations de la demande métabolique pour assurer une normoglycémie. Une destruction complète ou partielle des cellules ß conduit respectivement au diabète de type 1 et de type 2. Bien que l'augmentation de la glycémie soit le facteur stimulant de la sécrétion d'insuline, des hormones gluco-incrétines, principalement le GLP-1 (glucagon-like peptide-1) et le GIP (glucose-dependent insulinotropic polypeptide) sont libérées par l'intestin en réponse aux nutriments (glucose, acides gras) et agissent au niveau des cellules ß, potentialisant la sécrétion d'insuline induite par le glucose, stimulant leur prolifération, induisant la différentiation de cellules précurseurs en cellules ß matures et les protègent contre la mort cellulaire (apoptose). Afin d'étudier plus en détail ces mécanismes, nous avons généré des souris déficientes pour les récepteurs du GIP et du GLP-l. Les îlots pancréatiques de ces souris présentent un défaut de sécrétion d'insuline stimulée par le glucose et une sensibilité accrue à l'apoptose par rapport aux îlots de souris contrôles. Nous avons donc cherché les gènes régulés pas ces hormones contrôlant la sécrétion d'insuline et la protection contre l'apoptose. Nous avons constaté une forte diminution de l'expression du récepteur à l'IGF-1 (IGF-1R) dans les îlots de souris déficientes pour les récepteurs des gluco-incrétines. Nous avons démontré dans un model de cellules ß en culture et d'îlots que le GLP-1 augmentait l'expression d'IGF-1R et la sécrétion de son ligand (IGF-2) permettant l'activation de la voie de signalisation. Finalement, nous avons montré que l'activation de la boucle IGF-2/IGF-1R induite par le GLP-1 était nécessaire pour la protection contre l'apoptose, l'augmentation de la sécrétion et la prolifération des cellules ß.