The Europeanisation of the measurement of diversity in education: a soft instrument of public policy

Faced with an increasing number of data and rankings, the author questions the roles of the different groups of actors who were originally involved in questioning the use of statistical indicators as a means of addressing issues of access to higher education. The comparison and nature of these international (UNESCO, OECD, EUROSTAT) and national (Germany, England, France, Switzerland) indicators in matters of inequalities of access to higher education question the tension between the discourses and the indicators they generate, and their recording at the national level. Who says what and with what consequences? What range of actors are involved in this process? What kind of power relations forms them? The author discusses how the issue of inequalities of access to higher education got on to the agendas of European organisations, identifies the policies that were defined, and sets them against an array of indicators, showing the discrepancy between the discourses and what the indicators reveal, the gap between the recommendations and the available tools. Why is there such a contrast? What are the mechanisms at work? Is it a technical or a political problem? What does this discrepancy reveal as far as national specificities within the construction of social inequalities are concerned?

Towards equivalent health care of prisoners: European soft law and public health policy in Geneva.

Prisoners have a right to health care and to be protected against inhumane and degrading treatment. Health care personnel and public policy makers play a central role in the protection of these rights and in the pursuit of public health goals. This article examines the legal framework for prison medicine in the canton of Geneva, Switzerland and provides examples of this framework that has shaped prisoners' medical care, including preventive measures. Geneva constitutes an intriguing example of how the Council of Europe standards concerning prison medicine have acquired a legal role in a Swiss canton. Learning how these factors have influenced implementation of prison medicine standards in Geneva may be helpful to public health managers elsewhere and encourage the use of similar strategies.

Best practice report on policy learning infrastructures in innovative labour market policies

This report synthesizes the findings of 11 country reports on policy learning in labour market and social policies that were conducted as part of WP5 of the INSPIRES project, which is funded by the 7th Framework Program of the EU-Commission. Notably, this report puts forward objectives of policy learning, discusses tools, processes and institutions of policy learning and presents the impacts of various tools and structures of the policy learning infrastructure for the actual policy learning process. The report defines three objectives of policy learning: evaluation and assessment of policy effectiveness, vision building and planning, and consensus building. In the 11 countries under consideration, the tools and processes of the policy learning, infrastructure can be classified into three broad groups: public bodies, expert councils, and parties, interest groups and the private sector. Finally, we develop four recommendations for policy learning: Firstly, learning processes should keep the balance between centralisation and plurality. Secondly, learning processes should be kept stable beyond the usual political business cycles. Thirdly, policy learning tools and infrastructures should be sufficiently independent from political influence or bias. Fourth, Policy learning tools and infrastructures should balance out mere effectiveness, evaluation and vision building.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.