On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave's contribution

This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standard textbook definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses on Richard Musgrave's contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and non-excludable - from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson's mathematical definition is generally used in models of public goods, the qualitative understanding of the specificity of pure public goods owes more to Musgrave's emphasis on the impossibility of exclusion. This paper also highlights the importance of the size of the group to which benefits of a public good accrue. This analysis allow for a reassessment of the Summary table of goods which first appeared in Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) textbook.

The interplay between relatedness and horizontal gene transfer drives the evolution of plasmid-carried public goods.

Plasmids carry a wide range of genes that are often involved in bacterial social behaviour. The question of why such genes are frequently mobile has received increasing attention. Here, we use an explicit population genetic approach to model the evolution of plasmid-borne bacterial public goods production. Our findings highlight the importance of both transmission and relatedness as factors driving the evolution of plasmid-borne public goods production. We partition the effects of plasmid transfer of social traits into those of infectivity and the effect of increased relatedness. Our results demonstrate that, owing to its effect on relatedness, plasmid mobility increases the invasion and stability of public goods, in a way not seen in individually beneficial traits. In addition, we show that plasmid transfer increases relatedness when public goods production is rare but this effect declines when production is common, with both scenarios leading to an increase in the frequency of plasmid-borne public goods. Plasmids remain important vectors for the spread of social genes involved in bacterial virulence thus an understanding of their dynamics is highly relevant from a public health perspective.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Evolutionary dynamics of interlinked public goods traits: an experimental study of siderophore production in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

Public goods cooperation is common in microbes, and there is much interest in understanding how such traits evolve. Research in recent years has identified several important factors that shape the evolutionary dynamics of such systems, yet few studies have investigated scenarios involving interactions between multiple public goods. Here, we offer general predictions about the evolutionary trajectories of two public goods traits having positive, negative or neutral regulatory influence on one another's expression, and we report on a test of some of our predictions in the context of Pseudomonas aeruginosa's production of two interlinked iron-scavenging siderophores. First, we confirmed that both pyoverdine and pyochelin siderophores do operate as public goods under appropriate environmental conditions. We then tracked their production in lines experimentally evolved under different iron-limitation regimes known to favour different siderophore expression profiles. Under strong iron limitation, where pyoverdine represses pyochelin, we saw a decline in pyoverdine and a concomitant increase in pyochelin - consistent with expansion of pyoverdine-defective cheats derepressed for pyochelin. Under moderate iron limitation, pyochelin declined - again consistent with an expected cheat invasion scenario - but there was no concomitant shift in pyoverdine because cross-suppression between the traits is unidirectional only. Alternating exposure to strong and moderate iron limitation caused qualitatively similar though lesser shifts compared to the constant-environment regimes. Our results confirm that the regulatory interconnections between public goods traits can significantly modulate the course of evolution, yet also suggest how we can start to predict the impacts such complexities will have on phenotypic divergence and community stability.

Co-evolutionary dynamics between public good producers and cheats in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is cheating - the exploitation of public goods by nonproducing mutants. Here, we examine co-evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron-scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that cooperators managed to co-exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co-existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific adaptions to the co-evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole-genome resequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly pyoverdine-signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we observed parallel evolution, where co-existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions.

Fitness correlates with the extent of cheating in a bacterium.

There is growing awareness of the importance of cooperative behaviours in microbial communities. Empirical support for this insight comes from experiments using mutant strains, termed 'cheats', which exploit the cooperative behaviour of wild-type strains. However, little detailed work has gone into characterising the competitive dynamics of cooperative and cheating strains. We test three specific predictions about the fitness consequences of cheating to different extents by examining the production of the iron-scavenging siderophore molecule, pyoverdin, in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We create a collection of mutants that differ in the amount of pyoverdin that they produce (from 1% to 96% of the production of paired wild types) and demonstrate that these production levels correlate with both gene activity and the ability to bind iron. Across these mutants, we found that (1) when grown in a mixed culture with a cooperative wild-type strain, the relative fitness of a mutant is negatively correlated with the amount of pyoverdin that it produces; (2) the absolute and relative fitness of the wild-type strain in the mixed culture is positively correlated with the amount of pyoverdin that the mutant produces; and (3) when grown in a monoculture, the absolute fitness of the mutant is positively correlated with the amount of pyoverdin that it produces. Overall, we demonstrate that cooperative pyoverdin production is exploitable and illustrate how variation in a social behaviour determines fitness differently, depending on the social environment.

Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Reservoir compensation releases : impact on the macroinvertebrate community of the Derwent River, Northumberland, UK-A longitudinal

River regulation for the purposes of public water supply causes the flow regime downstream of a dam to change. Traditionally, in the UK, such regulation was accompanied by requirements for reservoir releases to compensate downstream water users (e.g. industry) for the loss of natural flow (compensation flows). In this article, we compare a unique pre-impoundment macroinvertebrate data set for a regulated upland river with survey data post-impoundment. This allows a longitudinal assessment of the response of the system to regulation. The Derwent River, Northumberland, was impounded in 1966. Impacts on the hydrological regime were quantified by comparing long-term hydrographs, flow duration curves, flow ranges and flashiness indices for the pre-impoundment and post-impoundment periods. The comparison of changes in macroinvertebrate richness and diversity post-impoundment showed that the change in flow regime has had limited effect on the ecological community structure. The flow regime of the Derwent River has become less flashy with fewer extreme events, and the richness and the diversity of macroinvertebrates have, in some cases, increased and at worst have not deteriorated. We suggest that this reflects the strict compensation regime, which has guaranteed minimum flows at all times. Copyright (c) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations.

Many models proposed to study the evolution of collective action rely on a formalism that represents social interactions as n-player games between individuals adopting discrete actions such as cooperate and defect. Despite the importance of spatial structure in biological collective action, the analysis of n-player games games in spatially structured populations has so far proved elusive. We address this problem by considering mixed strategies and by integrating discrete-action n-player games into the direct fitness approach of social evolution theory. This allows to conveniently identify convergence stable strategies and to capture the effect of population structure by a single structure coefficient, namely, the pairwise (scaled) relatedness among interacting individuals. As an application, we use our mathematical framework to investigate collective action problems associated with the provision of three different kinds of collective goods, paradigmatic of a vast array of helping traits in nature: "public goods" (both providers and shirkers can use the good, e.g., alarm calls), "club goods" (only providers can use the good, e.g., participation in collective hunting), and "charity goods" (only shirkers can use the good, e.g., altruistic sacrifice). We show that relatedness promotes the evolution of collective action in different ways depending on the kind of collective good and its economies of scale. Our findings highlight the importance of explicitly accounting for relatedness, the kind of collective good, and the economies of scale in theoretical and empirical studies of the evolution of collective action.

Health care supply, payment system and medical practice : evidence from obstetric practice

ABSTRACTA significant share of deliveries are performed by Cesarian section (C-section) in Europe and in many developed and developing countries. The aims of this thesis are to highlight the non medical, especially economic and financial, incentives that explain the use of C-section, as well as the medical consequences of C-section on women's health, in regard with other factors of ob¬stetrical care quality such as hospital concentration. Those diagnoses enable us to exhibit ways of improvement of obstetrical care quality in France. Our analysis focus on two countries, France and Switzerland. In the first part of the thesis, we show the influence of two non medical factors on the C-section use, namely the hospital payment system on the one hand and the obstetricians behaviour, especially their demand for leisure, on the other hand. With French data on the year 2003, we show firstly that the fee-for-service payment system of private for profit hospitals induces a higher probability of using C-section. Obstetricians play also a preeminent role in the decision to use a C-section, as the probability of a C-section rises with the number of obstetricians. We then focus on a French reform introduced in 2004, to investigate the impact of Prospective Payment System on obstetric practise. We show that the rise of C-section rate between 2003 and 2006 is mainly caused by changes in hospitals and patients features. Obstetricians practises do not vary a lot for patients with the same risk code. In the mean time however, the number of women coded with a high risk rises. This can be caused by improvements in the quality of coding, obstetricians chosing codes that match better the real health state of their patients. Yet, it can also show that obstetricians change their coding practises to justify the use of certain practises, such as C-section, with no regard to the health state of patients. Financial factors are not the only non medical fac¬tors that can influence the resort to C-section. Using Shelton Brown ΠΙ identification strategy, we focus on the potential impact of obstetricians leisure preference on the use of C-section. We use the distributions of days and hours of delivering and the types of C-section - planned or emergency C-sections - to show that the obstetricians demand for leisure has a significant impact on the resort to C-section, but only in emergency situations. The second part of the thesis deals with some ways to improve obstetric care quality. We use on the one hand swiss and french data to study the impact of C-section on the patients' probability of having an obstetric complication and on the other hand the influence of hospital concentration on the quality of obstetric care. We find the same results as former medical studies about the risks entailed by C-section on obstetric complications.These results prove women ought to be better informed of the medical consequences of C-section and that the slowing of C-section use should be a priority of public health policy. We finally focus on another way to improve obstetric care quality, that is hospital lmarket concentration. We investigate the impact of hospital concentration by integrating the Herfindahl-Hirschman index in our model, on health care quality, measured by the HCUP indicator. We find that hospital concentration has a negative impact on obstetric care quality, which undermines today's policy of hospital closings in France.JEL classification: 112; 118Keywords: Hospital; C-section; Payment System; Counterfactual Estimation; Quality of Care.RÉSUMÉUne part importante des accouchements sont réalisés par césarienne en Europe et dans de nom¬breux pays développés ou en développement. Les objectifs de cette thèse sont de mettre en évidence les déterminants non médicaux, notamment économiques et financiers, expliquant le développe¬ment de cette pratique, ainsi que ses conséquences sur la santé des femmes après Γ accouchement, en lien avec d'autres facteurs comme la concentration locale des structures hospitalières. Les résul¬tats exposés dans cette thèse éclairent les perspectives et voies d'amélioration de la qualité des soins en obstétriques.Notre analyse se concentre sur deux pays : la France et la Suisse. Dans la première partie de la thèse, nous mettons en évidence l'influence de deux déterminants non médicaux sur l'emploi de la césarienne : le système de paiement des hôpitaux d'une part, et le comportement des médecins obstétriciens d'autre part. En étudiant des données françaises de 2003, nous montrons d'abord que le financement à l'acte des établissements privés engendre une hausse de la proba¬bilité de pratiquer une césarienne. Le rôle de l'obstrétricien paraît également déterminant dans la décision d'opérer une césarienne, la probabilité d'employer cette technique augmentant avec le nombre d'obstétriciens. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à l'impact de la mise en place en 2004 du système de paiement prospectif sur l'évolution des pratiques obstétricales entre 2003 et 2006 en France. La hausse du taux de recours à la césarienne entre 2004 et 2006 peut ainsi être principa¬lement imputée aux évolutions des caractéristiques des hôpitaux et des patients, les pratiques des obstétriciens, pour un même codage de la situation du patient, variant peu. Dans le même temps cependant, les pratiques de codage des patients parles obstétriciens évoluent fortement, les femmes étant de plus en plus nombreuses à porter des codes correspondant à des situations à risques. Cette évolution peut indiquer que la qualité du codage en 2006 s'est améliorée par rapport à 2004, le codage correspondant de plus en plus à la situation réelle des patientes. H peut aussi indiquer que les pratiques de codage évoluent pour justifier un recours accru à la césarienne, sans lien avec l'état réel des patientes. Les facteurs financiers ne sont pas les seuls facteurs non médicaux à pouvoir expliquer le recours à la césarienne : nous nous intéressons, en suivant la stratégie d'identifica¬tion de Shelton Brown m, à l'impact potentiel de la demande de loisir des médecins obstétriciens sur la pratique de la césarienne. En utilisant la distribution des jours et heures d'accouchement, et en distinguant les césariennes planifiées de celles effectuées en urgence, nous constatons que la demande de loisir des obstétriciens influence significativement le recours à la césarienne, mais uni¬quement pour les interventions d'urgence. La deuxième partie de la thèse est consacrée à l'étude de la qualité des soins en obstétriques. Nous utilisons des données suisses et françaises pour analyser d'une part l'impact de la césarienne sur la survenue de complications obstétricales et d'autre part l'impact de la concentration des soins sur la qualité des soins en obstétrique. Nons confirmons les résultats antérieurs de la littérature médicale sur la dangerosité de la césarienne comme facteur de complications obstétricales. Ces conclusions montrent que les femmes ont besoin d'être informées des conséquences de la césarienne sur leur santé et que le ralentissement de l'augmentation de la pratique de la césarienne devrait être un objectif de la politique publique de santé. Nous nous in¬téressons à un autre facteur d'amélioration des soins en obstrétique, l'organisation des hôpitaux et particulièrement leur concentration. Nous estimons ainsi l'effet de la concentration sur la qualité des soins obstétriques en intégrant l'indice de Herfindahl-Hirschman dans notre modèle, la qualité des soins étant mesurée à l'aide de l'indicateur HCUP. Nous constatons que la concentration des naissances a un impact négatif sur la qualité des soins en obstétrique, résultat qui va dans le sens contraire des politiques de fermeture d'hôpitaux menées actuellement en France. JEL classification : 112 ; 118Mots-clés : Hôpital ; Césarienne ; Système de paiement ; Contrefactuels ; Qualité des soins, sur la qualité des soins en obstétrique.

Turnaround across diverse global supply chains using shared metrics and change methodology: The Case of Amer Sports Corporation

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to document the outcome of a global three-year long supply chain improvement initiative at a multi-national producer of branded sporting goods that is transforming from a holding structure to an integrated company. The case company is comprised of seven internationally well-known sport brands, which form a diverse set of independent sub-cases, on which the same supply chain metrics and change project approach was applied to improve supply chain performance. Design/methodology/approach - By using in-depth case study and statistical analysis the paper analyzes across the brands how supply chain complexity (SKU count), supply chain type (make or buy) and seasonality affect completeness and punctuality of deliveries, and inventory as the change project progresses. Findings - Results show that reduction in supply chain complexity improves delivery performance, but has no impact on inventory. Supply chain type has no impact on service level, but brands with in-house production are better in improving inventory than those with outsourced production. Non-seasonal business units improve service faster than seasonal ones, yet there is no impact on inventory. Research limitations/implications - The longitudinal data used for the analysis is biased with the general business trend, yet the rich data from different cases and three-years of data collection enables generalizations to a certain level. Practical implications - The in-depth case study serves as an example for other companies on how to initiate a supply chain improvement project across business units with tangible results. Originality/value - The seven sub-cases with their different characteristics on which the same improvement initiative was applied sets a unique ground for longitudinal analysis to study supply chain complexity, type and seasonality.

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]