Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid ? And Why ? : Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is exogenous. Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

Un partenariat public-privé rigide ou flexible ? Théorie et application aux concessions routières à péage

In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll road concession contracts. We highlight the fact that contracting parties try to sign not only complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt contractual framework to contingencies and to create incentives for cooperative behavior. This gives rise to multiple toll adjustment provisions and to a tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts. Such a tradeoff is formalized using an incomplete contract framework - including ex post maladaptation and renegotiation costs - and propositions are tested using an original database of 71 concession contracts. Our results suggest an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in designing such public-private contracts. Codes JEL : D23, H11, H54, L14, L9.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Structure du temps de travail des infirmières de santé publique: effets de l'âge des patients, de la nature des prestations fournies et du lieu du contact. [Structure of work times of public health nurses: effect of the age of patients, nature of care given and location of contact].

In the framework of health services research sponsored by the Swiss National Science Foundation, a research was undertaken of the activity of the large majority of the public health nurses working in the Swiss cantons of Vaud and Fribourg (total population 700,000). During one week, 130 nurses gathered, with a specially devised instrument, data on 4165 patient visits. Studying the duration of the contacts, one has distinguished contact duration per se (DC), duration of the travel time preceding the contact (DD), and total duration in relation with the contact (DTC-addition of the first two). It was noted that the three durations increased significantly with patient age (as regard travel time, this is explained by the higher proportion of home visits in higher age groups, as compared with visits at a health center). Examined according to location of the visit, contact duration per se (without travel) is higher for visits at home and in nursing homes than for those taking place at a health center. Looked at in respect to the care given (technical care, or basic nursing care, or both simultaneously), our data show that the provision of basic nursing care (alone or with technical care) doubles contact duration (from 20 to 42-45'). The analyses according to patient age shows that, at an advanced age (beyond 80 years particularly), there is an important increase of the visits where both types of care are given. However, contact duration per se shows a significant raise with age only for the group "technical care only"; it can be demonstrated that this is due to the fact that older patients require more complex technical acts (e.g., bladder care, as compared with simpler acts such as injection). A model of the relationships between patient age and contact duration is proposed: it is because of the increase in the proportions of home visits, of visits including basic nursing care, and of more complex technical acts that older persons require more of the working time of public health nurses.

"Public on the outside, private on the inside": the organizational hybridization, sense of belonging and identity strategies of the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland

A number of studies show that New Public Management reforms have altered the current identity benchmarks of public officials, particularly by hybridizing values or management practices. However, existing studies have largely glossed over the sense of belonging of officials when their organization straddles the concerns of public service and private enterprise, so that the boundary between public and private sector is blurred. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore this sense of belonging in the context of organizational hybridization. It does so by drawing on the results of research conducted among the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland. On the one hand, the analysis shows how much their markers of belonging are hybrid, multiple and constructed in negative terms (with regard to the State), while indicating that the working practices of the employees point to an identity that is nevertheless closely bound with the public sector. On the other hand, the analysis shows that the organization plays strategically with its State status, by exploiting either its private or public identity in line with the needs related to its external image. The article concludes with a discussion of the results highlighting the strategic functionality of the hybrid identity of the actors.

Paper 2: EUROCAT public health indicators for congenital anomalies in Europe.

OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this article is to present the specific public health indicators recently developed by EUROCAT that aim to summarize important aspects of the public health impact of congenital anomalies in a few quantitative measures. METHODS: The six indicators are: (1) congenital anomaly perinatal mortality, (2) congenital anomaly prenatal diagnosis prevalence, (3) congenital anomaly termination of pregnancy, (4) Down syndrome livebirth prevalence, (5) congenital anomaly pediatric surgery, and (6) neural tube defects (NTD) total prevalence. Data presented for this report pertained to all cases (livebirths, fetal deaths, or stillbirths after 20 weeks of gestation and terminations of pregnancy for fetal anomaly [TOPFA]) of congenital anomaly from 27 full member registries of EUROCAT that could provide data for at least 3 years during the period 2004 to 2008. Prevalence of anomalies, prenatal diagnosis, TOPFA, pediatric surgery, and perinatal mortality were calculated per 1000 births. RESULTS: The overall perinatal mortality was approximately 1.0 per 1000 births for EUROCAT registries with almost half due to fetal and the other half due to first week deaths. There were wide variations in perinatal mortality across the registries with the highest rates observed in Dublin and Malta, registries in countries where TOPFA are illegal, and in Ukraine. The overall perinatal mortality across EUROCAT registries slightly decreased between 2004 and 2008 due to a decrease in first week deaths. The prevalence of TOPFA was fairly stable at about 4 per 1000 births. There were variations in livebirth prevalence of cases typically requiring surgery across the registries; however, for most registries this prevalence was between 3 and 5 per 1000 births. Prevalence of NTD decreased by about 10% from 1.05 in 2004 to 0.94 per 1000 in 2008. CONCLUSION: It is hoped that by publishing the data on EUROCAT indicators, the public health importance of congenital anomalies can be clearly summarized to policy makers, the need for accurate data from registries emphasized, the need for primary prevention and treatment services highlighted, and the impact of current services measured.