Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid ? And Why ? : Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is exogenous. Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

Un partenariat public-privé rigide ou flexible ? Théorie et application aux concessions routières à péage

In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll road concession contracts. We highlight the fact that contracting parties try to sign not only complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt contractual framework to contingencies and to create incentives for cooperative behavior. This gives rise to multiple toll adjustment provisions and to a tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts. Such a tradeoff is formalized using an incomplete contract framework - including ex post maladaptation and renegotiation costs - and propositions are tested using an original database of 71 concession contracts. Our results suggest an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in designing such public-private contracts. Codes JEL : D23, H11, H54, L14, L9.

The politics of contaminated sites management : institutional regime change and actor's mode of participation in the environmental management of the Bonfol Chemical Waste Landfill in Switzerland

By the end of the 1970s, contaminated sites had emerged as one of the most complex and urgent environmental issues affecting industrialized countries. The authors show that small and prosperous Switzerland is no exception to the pervasive problem of sites contamination, the legacy of past practices in waste management having left some 38,000 contaminated sites throughout the country. This book outlines the problem, offering evidence that open and polycentric environmental decision-making that includes civil society actors is valuable. They propose an understanding of environmental management of contaminated sites as a political process in which institutions frame interactions between strategic actors pursuing sometimes conflicting interests. In the opening chapter, the authors describe the influences of politics and the power relationships between actors involved in decision-making in contaminated sites management, which they term a "wicked problem." Chapter Two offers a theoretical framework for understanding institutions and the environmental management of contaminated sites. The next five chapters present a detailed case study on environmental management and contaminated sites in Switzerland, focused on the Bonfol Chemical Landfill. The study and analysis covers the establishment of the landfill under the first generation of environmental regulations, its closure and early remediation efforts, and the gambling on the remediation objectives, methods and funding in the first decade of the 21st Century. The concluding chapter discusses the question of whether the strength of environmental regulations, and the type of interactions between public, private, and civil society actors can explain the environmental choices in contaminated sites management. Drawing lessons from research, the authors debate the value of institutional flexibility for dealing with environmental issues such as contaminated sites.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF PERFORMANCE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTORS

This thesis examines the interplay between state regulation and the way organisations define performance. Performance is generally understood to be a multidimensional concept, but the extent to which its different facets are shaped by regulation remains an understudied question. This thesis aims to address this question and provide at least a partial answer to it. To do so, it examines whether the level of regulation amplifies or abates the multidimensionality of regulated entities' performance definition, i.e. the way they define the concept of performance. The leading question is whether an organisation's performance definition can be associated with the regulatory intensity its environment confronts it with. Moreover, the study explores whether the type of ownership-public or private-plays a role in regard to how a regulated entity defines performance. In order to undertake this investigation, the thesis focuses on the performance definitions of organisations in six different sport betting and lottery regulations. Qualitative data is gathered from primary and secondary documents as well as through semi-structured interviews with chief executive officers (CEO), members of executive management and gambling experts in each of these countries. The thesis concludes that the performance definitions of the organisations under study are indeed multidimensional, as well as clearly influenced by their respective regulatory environments. However, not all performance dimensions identified in the literature are present, nor can they all be estimated to be part of the performance definition. In addition, the public-private difference in defining performance-as conceptualised in the literature- seems to be abated in a regulated environment. The central role played by regulation in regard to the multidimensionality of the performance definition partially outweighs the effect of the nature of ownership.

Les paiements pour services environnementaux de la Fondation Natura Bolivia entre logiques réciprocitaires, redistributives et marchandes

La diffusion internationale des paiements pour services environnementaux (PSE) a été interprétée en 2010 par le gouvernement bolivien d'Evo Morales comme une réponse strictement néolibérale à la nécessité d'assurer une gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Supposée amener à terme à l'éviction de toute régulation autre que marchande - qu'elle s'applique à la nature ou aux rapports entre personnes -, la mise en place de PSE n'a pas été encouragée par les autorités nationales boliviennes. Des projets de PSE ont toutefois été lancés, dont les Acuerdos Reciprocos por el Agua (ARA), issus d'un partenariat public-privé dans le département de Santa Cruz. En analysant leur conception et leur fonctionnement au prisme du référentiel polanyien, nous montrons que, contrairement aux craintes gouvernementales, ces PSE ne font pas abstraction des logiques organisationnelles réciprocitaires et redistributives, ajustant au contexte local un objet global. The international dissemination of payments for ecosystem services (PES) has been interpreted in 2010 by the Bolivian government of Evo Morales as a strictly neo-liberal response to the need to ensure a sustainable management of natural resources. Supposed to contribute to the crowding-out of any other regulation than market - applied to the nature or the relationship between people - the implementation of PES was not encouraged by the Bolivian national authorities. However some PES projects stemming from a public-private partnership have been initiated at local level, as the Acuerdos Reciprocos por el Agua (ARA), in the department of Santa Cruz. Analysing their design and operating through the Polanyian framework, we show that, contrary to the government fears, these PES do not ignore the reciprocal and redistributive organisational logics, adjusting a global object to the local context.

"Public on the outside, private on the inside": the organizational hybridization, sense of belonging and identity strategies of the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland

A number of studies show that New Public Management reforms have altered the current identity benchmarks of public officials, particularly by hybridizing values or management practices. However, existing studies have largely glossed over the sense of belonging of officials when their organization straddles the concerns of public service and private enterprise, so that the boundary between public and private sector is blurred. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore this sense of belonging in the context of organizational hybridization. It does so by drawing on the results of research conducted among the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland. On the one hand, the analysis shows how much their markers of belonging are hybrid, multiple and constructed in negative terms (with regard to the State), while indicating that the working practices of the employees point to an identity that is nevertheless closely bound with the public sector. On the other hand, the analysis shows that the organization plays strategically with its State status, by exploiting either its private or public identity in line with the needs related to its external image. The article concludes with a discussion of the results highlighting the strategic functionality of the hybrid identity of the actors.

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]

Cost-effective utilization of a private facility to perform outpatient surgery in public hospital waiting list patients.

Background: Public hospitals' long waiting lists make outpatient surgery in private facilities very attractive provided a standardized protocol is applied. The aim of this study was to assess this kind of innovative collaboration in abdominal surgery from a clinical and economical perspective. Methods: All consecutive patients operated on in an outpatient basis in a private facility by a public hospital abdominal surgeon and an assistant over a 5-year period (2004-2009) were included. Clinical assessment was carried out from patients' charts and satisfaction questionnaire, and economic assessment from the comparison between the surgeons' charges paid by the private facility and the surgeons' hospital salaries during the days devoted to surgery at the private facility. Results: Over the 5 years, 602 operative procedures were carried out during 190 operative days. All patients could be discharged the same day and only 1% of minor complications occurred. The patients' satisfaction was 98%. The balance between the surgeons' charges paid by the private facility and their hospital salary costs was positive by 25.8% for the senior surgeon and 12.6% for the assistant or, on average, 21.9% for both. Conclusion: Collaboration between an overloaded university hospital surgery department and a private surgical facility was successful, effective, safe, and cost-effective. It could be extended to other surgical specialities. Copyright (C) 2011 S. Karger AG, Basel