Doctoral education's reform in Switzerland and Norway : a public management analyis

This doctoral thesis examines a recent phenomenon in European higher education, namely the reform of doctoral education. On the basis of a number of case studies, consisting of Swiss and Norwegian doctoral schools, and their institutional, national and international context, it demonstrates to what extent changes appear in doctoral education and its governance. Findings indicate new practices regarding doctoral students' recruitment, curricular component, supervision, scientific exchange, follow-up and their career. Doctoral education's character is not anymore exclusively determined by individual supervisors, but increasingly by interdisciplinary and interinstitutional colleges of academics. Finally, general governance patterns are identified: according to the type of scientific discipline and higher education institution, the institution's size and national political system, the field of higher education is more or less dominated by New Public Management or Network Governance characteristics.

Patterns of Subject Mix in Higher Education Institutions : A First Empirical Analysis Using the AQUAMETH Database

Teaching and research are organised differently between subject domains: attempts to construct typologies of higher education institutions, however, often do not include quantitative indicators concerning subject mix which would allow systematic comparisons of large numbers of higher education institutions among different countries, as the availability of data for such indicators is limited. In this paper, we present an exploratory approach for the construction of such indicators. The database constructed in the AQUAMETH project, which includes also data disaggregated at the disciplinary level, is explored with the aim of understanding patterns of subject mix. For six European countries, an exploratory and descriptive analysis of staff composition divided in four large domains (medical sciences, engineering and technology, natural sciences and social sciences and humanities) is performed, which leads to a classification distinguishing between specialist and generalist institutions. Among the latter, a further distinction is made based on the presence or absence of a medical department. Preliminary exploration of this classification and its comparison with other indicators show the influence of long term dynamics on the subject mix of individual higher education institutions, but also underline disciplinary differences, for example regarding student to staff ratios, as well as national patterns, for example regarding the number of PhD degrees per 100 undergraduate students. Despite its many limitations, this exploratory approach allows defining a classification of higher education institutions that accounts for a large share of differences between the analysed higher education institutions.

The Relevance of the Principal-Agent Model for the Analysis of Public Policies : Do the Objectives Conflict ?

This paper aims to provide empirical support for the use of the principal-agent framework in the analysis of public sector and public policies. After reviewing the different conditions to be met for a relevant analysis of the relationship between population and government using the principal-agent theory, our paper focuses on the assumption of conflicting goals between the principal and the agent. A principal-agent analysis assumes in effect that inefficiencies may arise because principal and agent pursue different goals. Using data collected during an amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities, we show the existence of a gap between the goals of the population and those of the government. Consequently, inefficiencies as predicted by the principal-agent model may arise during the implementation of a public policy, i.e. an amalgamation project. In a context of direct democracy where policies are regularly subjected to referendum, the conflict of objectives may even lead to a total failure of the policy at the polls.

Optimal public rationing and price response

We study optimal public rationing of an indivisible good and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and costs of provisions. Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Public rationing determines the characteristics of consumers who seek supply from the private sector, where a firm sets prices based on consumers' cost information and in response to the rationing rule. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information. In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Supplying all poor consumers would leave only rich consumers in the private market, and the firm would react by setting a high price. Rationing some poor consumers is optimal, and implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold. Wealth information is not used. Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium total consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth. [Authors]