Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

The development of decision limits for the GH-2000 detection methodology using additional insulin-like growth factor-I and amino-terminal pro-peptide of type III collagen assays.

The GH-2000 and GH-2004 projects have developed a method for detecting GH misuse based on measuring insulin-like growth factor-I (IGF-I) and the amino-terminal pro-peptide of type III collagen (P-III-NP). The objectives were to analyze more samples from elite athletes to improve the reliability of the decision limit estimates, to evaluate whether the existing decision limits needed revision, and to validate further non-radioisotopic assays for these markers. The study included 998 male and 931 female elite athletes. Blood samples were collected according to World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) guidelines at various sporting events including the 2011 International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) World Athletics Championships in Daegu, South Korea. IGF-I was measured by the Immunotech A15729 IGF-I IRMA, the Immunodiagnostic Systems iSYS IGF-I assay and a recently developed mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) method. P-III-NP was measured by the Cisbio RIA-gnost P-III-P, Orion UniQ? PIIINP RIA and Siemens ADVIA Centaur P-III-NP assays. The GH-2000 score decision limits were developed using existing statistical techniques. Decision limits were determined using a specificity of 99.99% and an allowance for uncertainty because of the finite sample size. The revised Immunotech IGF-I - Orion P-III-NP assay combination decision limit did not change significantly following the addition of the new samples. The new decision limits are applied to currently available non-radioisotopic assays to measure IGF-I and P-III-NP in elite athletes, which should allow wider flexibility to implement the GH-2000 marker test for GH misuse while providing some resilience against manufacturer withdrawal or change of assays. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.