The politics of contaminated sites management : institutional regime change and actor's mode of participation in the environmental management of the Bonfol Chemical Waste Landfill in Switzerland

By the end of the 1970s, contaminated sites had emerged as one of the most complex and urgent environmental issues affecting industrialized countries. The authors show that small and prosperous Switzerland is no exception to the pervasive problem of sites contamination, the legacy of past practices in waste management having left some 38,000 contaminated sites throughout the country. This book outlines the problem, offering evidence that open and polycentric environmental decision-making that includes civil society actors is valuable. They propose an understanding of environmental management of contaminated sites as a political process in which institutions frame interactions between strategic actors pursuing sometimes conflicting interests. In the opening chapter, the authors describe the influences of politics and the power relationships between actors involved in decision-making in contaminated sites management, which they term a "wicked problem." Chapter Two offers a theoretical framework for understanding institutions and the environmental management of contaminated sites. The next five chapters present a detailed case study on environmental management and contaminated sites in Switzerland, focused on the Bonfol Chemical Landfill. The study and analysis covers the establishment of the landfill under the first generation of environmental regulations, its closure and early remediation efforts, and the gambling on the remediation objectives, methods and funding in the first decade of the 21st Century. The concluding chapter discusses the question of whether the strength of environmental regulations, and the type of interactions between public, private, and civil society actors can explain the environmental choices in contaminated sites management. Drawing lessons from research, the authors debate the value of institutional flexibility for dealing with environmental issues such as contaminated sites.

Making land-use fit to planning goals. Weaknesses and opportunities within the Swiss land management regime

In Switzerland, the issue of land consumption has made it to the front of the political agenda in recent years. Studies conducted on a national level have concluded that there is an excess of land zoned for construction (ARE, 2008), which is seen as contributing to urban sprawl. This situation is looked upon as a failure of the Federal Law on Spatial Planning (LAT, 1979) and there is a political push to change it in order to reinforce zoning regulations. In this article, we look on the issue from a different angle. While there may be large quantities of land zoned for construction, in many urban areas land actually available for development is scarce. Building on the idea that planning's efficiency is linked to its capacity of influencing actual land-use, we focus on how this situation can be dealt with within the current Swiss institutional context.

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur

Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent fora, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes. Regulatory agencies are often considered as independent, yet accountable. This article provides a realistic framework for the study of accountability 'regimes' in which they are embedded. It emphasizes the need to identify the various actors (accountability fora) to which agencies are formally accountable (parliamentary committees, auditing bodies, courts, and so on) and to consider possible relationships between them. It argues that formal accountability 'on paper', as defined in official documents, does not fully account for de facto accountability, which depends on the resources possessed by the fora (mainly information-processing and decision-making capacities) and the credibility of their sanctioning capacities. The article applies this framework to the German Bundesnetzagentur.