Playing Second Fiddle: Expert Advice and Decision-Making in Switzerland

This thesis concerns the role of scientific expertise in the decision-making process at the Swiss federal level of government. It aims to understand how institutional and issue-specific factors influence three things: the distribution of access to scientific expertise, its valuation by participants in policy for- mulation, and the consequence(s) its mobilization has on policy politics and design. The theoretical framework developed builds on the assumption that scientific expertise is a strategic resource. In order to effectively mobilize this resource, actors require financial and organizational resources, as well as the conviction that it can advance their instrumental interests within a particular action situation. Institutions of the political system allocate these financial and organizational resources, influence the supply of scientific expertise, and help shape the venue of its deployment. Issue structures, in turn, condition both interaction configurations and the way in which these are anticipated by actors. This affects the perceived utility of expertise mobilization, mediating its consequences. The findings of this study show that the ability to access and control scientific expertise is strongly concentrated in the hands of the federal administration. Civil society actors have weak capacities to mobilize it, and the autonomy of institutionalized advisory bodies is limited. Moreover, the production of scientific expertise is undergoing a process of professionalization which strengthens the position of the federal administration as the (main) mandating agent. Despite increased political polarization and less inclu- sive decision-making, scientific expertise remains anchored in the policy subsystem, rather than being used to legitimate policy through appeals to the wider population. Finally, the structure of a policy problem matters both for expertise mobilization and for the latter's impact on the policy process, be- cause it conditions conflict structures and their anticipation. Structured problems result in a greater overlap between the principal of expertise mobilization and its intended audience, thereby increasing the chance that expertise shapes policy design. Conversely, less structured problems, especially those that involve conflicts about values and goals, reduce the impact of expertise.

Taking "Galton's problem" Seriously : Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion

This article builds on the recent policy diffusion literature and attempts to overcome one of its major problems, namely the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. The literature defines policy diffusion as a process where policy choices are interdependent, and identifies several diffusion mechanisms that specify the link between the policy choices of the various actors. As these mechanisms are grounded in different theories, theoretical accounts of diffusion currently have little internal coherence. In this article we put forward an expected-utility model of policy change that is able to subsume all the diffusion mechanisms. We argue that the expected utility of a policy depends on both its effectiveness and the payoffs it yields, and we show that the various diffusion mechanisms operate by altering these two parameters. Each mechanism affects one of the two parameters, and does so in distinct ways. To account for aggregate patterns of diffusion, we embed our model in a simple threshold model of diffusion. Given the high complexity of the process that results, strong analytical conclusions on aggregate patterns cannot be drawn without more extensive analysis which is beyond the scope of this article. However, preliminary considerations indicate that a wide range of diffusion processes may exist and that convergence is only one possible outcome.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]

Policy Diffusion: An Agent-Based Approach

Methods like Event History Analysis can show the existence of diffusion and part of its nature, but do not study the process itself. Nowadays, thanks to the increasing performance of computers, processes can be studied using computational modeling. This thesis presents an agent-based model of policy diffusion mainly inspired from the model developed by Braun and Gilardi (2006). I first start by developing a theoretical framework of policy diffusion that presents the main internal drivers of policy diffusion - such as the preference for the policy, the effectiveness of the policy, the institutional constraints, and the ideology - and its main mechanisms, namely learning, competition, emulation, and coercion. Therefore diffusion, expressed by these interdependencies, is a complex process that needs to be studied with computational agent-based modeling. In a second step, computational agent-based modeling is defined along with its most significant concepts: complexity and emergence. Using computational agent-based modeling implies the development of an algorithm and its programming. When this latter has been developed, we let the different agents interact. Consequently, a phenomenon of diffusion, derived from learning, emerges, meaning that the choice made by an agent is conditional to that made by its neighbors. As a result, learning follows an inverted S-curve, which leads to partial convergence - global divergence and local convergence - that triggers the emergence of political clusters; i.e. the creation of regions with the same policy. Furthermore, the average effectiveness in this computational world tends to follow a J-shaped curve, meaning that not only time is needed for a policy to deploy its effects, but that it also takes time for a country to find the best-suited policy. To conclude, diffusion is an emergent phenomenon from complex interactions and its outcomes as ensued from my model are in line with the theoretical expectations and the empirical evidence.Les méthodes d'analyse de biographie (event history analysis) permettent de mettre en évidence l'existence de phénomènes de diffusion et de les décrire, mais ne permettent pas d'en étudier le processus. Les simulations informatiques, grâce aux performances croissantes des ordinateurs, rendent possible l'étude des processus en tant que tels. Cette thèse, basée sur le modèle théorique développé par Braun et Gilardi (2006), présente une simulation centrée sur les agents des phénomènes de diffusion des politiques. Le point de départ de ce travail met en lumière, au niveau théorique, les principaux facteurs de changement internes à un pays : la préférence pour une politique donnée, l'efficacité de cette dernière, les contraintes institutionnelles, l'idéologie, et les principaux mécanismes de diffusion que sont l'apprentissage, la compétition, l'émulation et la coercition. La diffusion, définie par l'interdépendance des différents acteurs, est un système complexe dont l'étude est rendue possible par les simulations centrées sur les agents. Au niveau méthodologique, nous présenterons également les principaux concepts sous-jacents aux simulations, notamment la complexité et l'émergence. De plus, l'utilisation de simulations informatiques implique le développement d'un algorithme et sa programmation. Cette dernière réalisée, les agents peuvent interagir, avec comme résultat l'émergence d'un phénomène de diffusion, dérivé de l'apprentissage, où le choix d'un agent dépend en grande partie de ceux faits par ses voisins. De plus, ce phénomène suit une courbe en S caractéristique, poussant à la création de régions politiquement identiques, mais divergentes au niveau globale. Enfin, l'efficacité moyenne, dans ce monde simulé, suit une courbe en J, ce qui signifie qu'il faut du temps, non seulement pour que la politique montre ses effets, mais également pour qu'un pays introduise la politique la plus efficace. En conclusion, la diffusion est un phénomène émergent résultant d'interactions complexes dont les résultats du processus tel que développé dans ce modèle correspondent tant aux attentes théoriques qu'aux résultats pratiques.

Conceiving Comparative Policy Analysis : Implementing Air Quality Improvement Programs

The comparative analysis of air quality control policies provides an interesting field for studies of comparative policy analysis including program formulation and implementation processes. In European countries, the problem is comparable, whereas implementation structures, programs and policy impacts vary to a considerable extent. Analysis testing possibilities and constraints of air control policies under varying conditions are likely to contribute to a further development of a theory of policy analysis. This paper presents the analytical framework applied in a continuing empirical study explaining program formulation and implementation processes with respect to the different actors involved. Concrete emitter behavior can be explained by interaction processes at the very local level, by program elements of national legislation, and by structural constraints under which such programs are produced.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

Assimilation process in a psychotherapy with a client presenting schizoid personality disorder

The assimilation of problematic experiences has been studied as change processes in psychotherapies of different client populations. Several theory-building case studies using the assimilation model have shown how important a meaning bridge is in such change processes. In a client presenting schizoid personality disorder the creation of meaning as an affect-evoking process may be a particularly important stage in the change process. The present case study aims to apply the assimilation model to a psychotherapy process with a highly disturbed client and focuses on the creation of a meaning bridge in the process. Moreover, the assimilation analysis focuses on the effect of an external person, i.e. the partner or the therapist, when responding to the client's unassimilated problematic experiences. Their effects on the client's assimilation processes are discussed.