Business research, self-fulfilling prophecy, and the inherent responsibility of scholars.

Business research and teaching institutions play an important role in shaping the way businesses perceive their relations to the broader society and its moral expectations. Hence, as ethical scandals recently arose in the business world, questions related to the civic responsibilities of business scholars and to the role business schools play in society have gained wider interest. In this article, I argue that these ethical shortcomings are at least partly resulting from the mainstream business model with its taken-for granted basic assumptions such as specialization or the value-neutrality of business research. Redefining the roles and civic responsibilities of business scholars for business practice implies therefore a thorough analysis of these assumptions if not their redefinition. The takenforgrantedness of the mainstream business model is questioned by the transformation of the societal context in which business activities are embedded. Its value-neutrality in turn is challenged by self-fulfilling prophecy effects, which highlight the normative influence of business schools. In order to critically discuss some basic assumptions of mainstream business theory, I propose to draw parallels with the corporate citizenship concept and the stakeholder theory. Their integrated approach of the relation between business practice and the broader society provides interesting insights for the social reembedding of business research and teaching.

The philosophical foundations of classical "rDzogs chen" in Tibet : investigating the distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes)

While the syncretistic Tibetan tradition known as rDzogs chen ("Great Perfection") has attracted considerable attention over the past few decades, its philosophical foundations remain largely unknown to those unacquainted with its primary sources. This thesis looks at the essentials of rDzogs chen philosophy through the lens of two principal distinctions that the tradition has considered indispensable for understanding its distinctive views and practices: dualistic mind (sems) versus primordial knowing (ye shes) and dharmakâya versus the 'ground of all' (kun gzhi) conditioned experience. Arguing that the distinctions provided classical rDzogs chen scholars with a crucial framework for (a) articulating the necessary conditions of nondual primordial knowing, the conditio sine qua non of rNying ma soteriology, and (b) schematizing the relationship between the exoteric and esoteric vehicles of Indian Buddhism within a unifying conception of the Buddhist path as the progressive disclosure of primordial knowing, the thesis shows how the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind has been integral to the tradition's complex soteriology. The thesis consists of two parts: (1) a detailed philosophical investigation of the distinctions and (2) an anthology of previously untranslated Tibetan materials on the distinctions accompanied by critical editions and introductions. The first part systematically invesigates the nature and scope of the distinctions and traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Buddhist Cittamâtra, Madhyamaka, Pramàriavàda, and Vajrayâna views. It concludes with an exploration of some soteriological implications of the mind/primordial knowing distinction that became central to rDzogs chen path hermeneutics in the classical period as authors of rDzogs chen path summaries used this distinction to reconcile progressivist sutric and non-progressivist tantric models of the Buddhist path. The translations and texts included in part two of the thesis consist of (a) a short treatise from Klong chen pa's Miscellaneous Writings entitled Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan (Reply to Questions Concerning Mind and Primordial Knowing), (b) selected passages on the distinctions from this author's monumental summary of the rDzogs chen snying thig system, the Theg mchog mdzod (Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle), and (c) an excerpt on rDzogs chen distinctions taken from 'Jigs med gling pa's (1729-1798) 18th century Klong chen sNying thig path summary entitled Treasury of Qualities (Yon tan mdzod) along with a word-by- word commentary by Yon tan rgya mtsho (b. 19th c.).

The modal nature of structures in ontic structural realism

Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality amounts to. This paper proposes to fill this lacuna by arguing that the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers. Applying the debate about causal vs. categorical properties in analytic metaphysics to ontic structural realism, I show that the standard argument against categorical and for causal properties holds for structures as well. Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it can provide for a complete and coherent view of the world that includes all domains of empirical science.

The structural nature of perceptual experiences

Intuitively, we think of perception as providing us with direct cognitive access to physical objects and their properties. But this common sense picture of perception becomes problematic when we notice that perception is not always veridical. In fact, reflection on illusions and hallucinations seems to indicate that perception cannot be what it intuitively appears to be. This clash between intuition and reflection is what generates the puzzle of perception. The task and enterprise of unravelling this puzzle took, and still takes, centre stage in the philosophy of perception. The goal of my dissertation is to make a contribution to this enterprise by formulating and defending a new structural approach to perception and perceptual consciousness. The argument for my structural approach is developed in several steps. Firstly, I develop an empirically inspired causal argument against naïve and direct realist conceptions of perceptual consciousness. Basically, the argument says that perception and hallucination can have the same proximal causes and must thus belong to the same mental kind. I emphasise that this insight gives us good reasons to abandon what we are instinctively driven to believe - namely that perception is directly about the outside physical world. The causal argument essentially highlights that the information that the subject acquires in perceiving a worldly object is always indirect. To put it another way, the argument shows that what we, as perceivers, are immediately aware of, is not an aspect of the world but an aspect of our sensory response to it. A view like this is traditionally known as a Representative Theory of Perception. As a second step, emphasis is put on the task of defending and promoting a new structural version of the Representative Theory of Perception; one that is immune to some major objections that have been standardly levelled at other Representative Theories of Perception. As part of this defence and promotion, I argue that it is only the structural features of perceptual experiences that are fit to represent the empirical world. This line of thought is backed up by a detailed study of the intriguing phenomenon of synaesthesia. More precisely, I concentrate on empirical cases of synaesthetic experiences and argue that some of them provide support for a structural approach to perception. The general picture that emerges in this dissertation is a new perspective on perceptual consciousness that is structural through and through.