The philosophical foundations of classical "rDzogs chen" in Tibet : investigating the distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes)

While the syncretistic Tibetan tradition known as rDzogs chen ("Great Perfection") has attracted considerable attention over the past few decades, its philosophical foundations remain largely unknown to those unacquainted with its primary sources. This thesis looks at the essentials of rDzogs chen philosophy through the lens of two principal distinctions that the tradition has considered indispensable for understanding its distinctive views and practices: dualistic mind (sems) versus primordial knowing (ye shes) and dharmakâya versus the 'ground of all' (kun gzhi) conditioned experience. Arguing that the distinctions provided classical rDzogs chen scholars with a crucial framework for (a) articulating the necessary conditions of nondual primordial knowing, the conditio sine qua non of rNying ma soteriology, and (b) schematizing the relationship between the exoteric and esoteric vehicles of Indian Buddhism within a unifying conception of the Buddhist path as the progressive disclosure of primordial knowing, the thesis shows how the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind has been integral to the tradition's complex soteriology. The thesis consists of two parts: (1) a detailed philosophical investigation of the distinctions and (2) an anthology of previously untranslated Tibetan materials on the distinctions accompanied by critical editions and introductions. The first part systematically invesigates the nature and scope of the distinctions and traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Buddhist Cittamâtra, Madhyamaka, Pramàriavàda, and Vajrayâna views. It concludes with an exploration of some soteriological implications of the mind/primordial knowing distinction that became central to rDzogs chen path hermeneutics in the classical period as authors of rDzogs chen path summaries used this distinction to reconcile progressivist sutric and non-progressivist tantric models of the Buddhist path. The translations and texts included in part two of the thesis consist of (a) a short treatise from Klong chen pa's Miscellaneous Writings entitled Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan (Reply to Questions Concerning Mind and Primordial Knowing), (b) selected passages on the distinctions from this author's monumental summary of the rDzogs chen snying thig system, the Theg mchog mdzod (Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle), and (c) an excerpt on rDzogs chen distinctions taken from 'Jigs med gling pa's (1729-1798) 18th century Klong chen sNying thig path summary entitled Treasury of Qualities (Yon tan mdzod) along with a word-by- word commentary by Yon tan rgya mtsho (b. 19th c.).

Argumentation and education. Theoretical foundations and practices

During the last decade, argumentation has attracted growing attention as a means to elicit processes (linguistic, logical, dialogical, psychological, etc.) that can sustain or provoke reasoning and learning. Constituting an important dimension of daily life and of professional activities, argumentation plays a special role in democracies and is at the heart of philosophical reasoning and scientific inquiry. Argumentation, as such, requires specific intellectual and social skills. Hence, argumentation will have an increasing importance in education, both because it is a critical competence that has to be learned, and because argumentation can be used to foster learning in philosophy, history, sciences and in many other domains. Argumentation and Education answers these and other questions by providing both theoretical backgrounds, in psychology, education and theory of argumentation, and concrete examples of experiments and results in school contexts in a range of domains. It reports on existing innovative practices in education settings at various levels.

On the applicability of mathematics : philosophical and historical perspectives

The present thesis is a contribution to the debate on the applicability of mathematics; it examines the interplay between mathematics and the world, using historical case studies. The first part of the thesis consists of four small case studies. In chapter 1, I criticize "ante rem structuralism", proposed by Stewart Shapiro, by showing that his so-called "finite cardinal structures" are in conflict with mathematical practice. In chapter 2, I discuss Leonhard Euler's solution to the Königsberg bridges problem. I propose interpreting Euler's solution both as an explanation within mathematics and as a scientific explanation. I put the insights from the historical case to work against recent philosophical accounts of the Königsberg case. In chapter 3, I analyze the predator-prey model, proposed by Lotka and Volterra. I extract some interesting philosophical lessons from Volterra's original account of the model, such as: Volterra's remarks on mathematical methodology; the relation between mathematics and idealization in the construction of the model; some relevant details in the derivation of the Third Law, and; notions of intervention that are motivated by one of Volterra's main mathematical tools, phase spaces. In chapter 4, I discuss scientific and mathematical attempts to explain the structure of the bee's honeycomb. In the first part, I discuss a candidate explanation, based on the mathematical Honeycomb Conjecture, presented in Lyon and Colyvan (2008). I argue that this explanation is not scientifically adequate. In the second part, I discuss other mathematical, physical and biological studies that could contribute to an explanation of the bee's honeycomb. The upshot is that most of the relevant mathematics is not yet sufficiently understood, and there is also an ongoing debate as to the biological details of the construction of the bee's honeycomb. The second part of the thesis is a bigger case study from physics: the genesis of GR. Chapter 5 is a short introduction to the history, physics and mathematics that is relevant to the genesis of general relativity (GR). Chapter 6 discusses the historical question as to what Marcel Grossmann contributed to the genesis of GR. I will examine the so-called "Entwurf" paper, an important joint publication by Einstein and Grossmann, containing the first tensorial formulation of GR. By comparing Grossmann's part with the mathematical theories he used, we can gain a better understanding of what is involved in the first steps of assimilating a mathematical theory to a physical question. In chapter 7, I introduce, and discuss, a recent account of the applicability of mathematics to the world, the Inferential Conception (IC), proposed by Bueno and Colyvan (2011). I give a short exposition of the IC, offer some critical remarks on the account, discuss potential philosophical objections, and I propose some extensions of the IC. In chapter 8, I put the Inferential Conception (IC) to work in the historical case study: the genesis of GR. I analyze three historical episodes, using the conceptual apparatus provided by the IC. In episode one, I investigate how the starting point of the application process, the "assumed structure", is chosen. Then I analyze two small application cycles that led to revisions of the initial assumed structure. In episode two, I examine how the application of "new" mathematics - the application of the Absolute Differential Calculus (ADC) to gravitational theory - meshes with the IC. In episode three, I take a closer look at two of Einstein's failed attempts to find a suitable differential operator for the field equations, and apply the conceptual tools provided by the IC so as to better understand why he erroneously rejected both the Ricci tensor and the November tensor in the Zurich Notebook.

Altruism - a philosophical analysis

Altruism is a malleable notion that is understood differently in various disciplines. The common denominator of most definitions of altruism is the idea of unidirectional helping behaviour. However, a closer examination reveals that the term altruism sometimes refers to the outcomes of a helping behaviour for the agent and its neighbours - i.e. reproductive altruism - and sometimes to what motivates the agent to help others - i.e. psychological altruism. Since these perspectives on altruism are crucially different, it is important to use a clear terminology to avoid confusion. In particular, we show that the notion of altruism used by biologists profoundly differs from the ones used by philosophers, psychologists and economists in cross-disciplinary debates about human altruism.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

This article studies the diffusion of the main institutional feature of regulatory capitalism, namely, independent regulatory agencies. While only a few such authorities existed in Europe in the early 1980s, by the end of the twentieth century they had spread impressively across countries and sectors. The analysis finds that three classes of factors (bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal) explain this trend. First, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies was an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power. Second, Europeanization favored the creation of independent regulators. Third, individual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of independent regulators mattered more than the functions they performed.

Identification concept and the use of probabilities in forensic odontology--an approach by philosophical discussion.

This paper questions the practitioners' deterministic approach(es) in forensic identification and notes the limits of their conclusions in order to encourage a discussion to question current practices. With this end in view, a hypothetical discussion between an expert in dentistry and an enthusiastic member of a jury, eager to understand the scientific principles of evidence interpretation, is presented. This discussion will lead us to regard any argument aiming at identification as probabilistic.

Dispersal (Entropy) and Recognition (Information) as Foundations of Emergence and Dissolvence

The objective of this essay is to reflect on a possible relation between entropy and emergence. A qualitative, relational approach is followed. We begin by highlighting that entropy includes the concept of dispersal, relevant to our enquiry. Emergence in complex systems arises from the coordinated behavior of their parts. Coordination in turn necessitates recognition between parts, i.e., information exchange. What will be argued here is that the scope of recognition processes between parts is increased when preceded by their dispersal, which multiplies the number of encounters and creates a richer potential for recognition. A process intrinsic to emergence is dissolvence (aka submergence or top-down constraints), which participates in the information-entropy interplay underlying the creation, evolution and breakdown of higher-level entities.