Selection methods regulate evolution of cooperation in digital evolution.

A key, yet often neglected, component of digital evolution and evolutionary models is the 'selection method' which assigns fitness (number of offspring) to individuals based on their performance scores (efficiency in performing tasks). Here, we study with formal analysis and numerical experiments the evolution of cooperation under the five most common selection methods (proportionate, rank, truncation-proportionate, truncation-uniform and tournament). We consider related individuals engaging in a Prisoner's Dilemma game where individuals can either cooperate or defect. A cooperator pays a cost, whereas its partner receives a benefit, which affect their performance scores. These performance scores are translated into fitness by one of the five selection methods. We show that cooperation is positively associated with the relatedness between individuals under all selection methods. By contrast, the change in the performance benefit of cooperation affects the populations' average level of cooperation only under the proportionate methods. We also demonstrate that the truncation and tournament methods may introduce negative frequency-dependence and lead to the evolution of polymorphic populations. Using the example of the evolution of cooperation, we show that the choice of selection method, though it is often marginalized, can considerably affect the evolutionary dynamics.

Evolutionary Games in Networked Populations: Models and Experiments

Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Detection of nandrolone metabolites in urine after a football game in professional and amateur players: a Bayesian comparison.

Nandrolone (19-nortestosterone) is a widely used anabolic steroid in sports where strength plays an essential role. Once nandrolone has been metabolised, two major metabolites are excreted in urine, 19-norandrosterone (NA) and 19-noretiocholanolone (NE). In 1997, in France, quite a few sportsmen had concentrations of 19-norandrosterone very close to the IOC cut off limit (2ng/ml). At that time, a debate took place about the capability of the human male body to produce by itself these metabolites without any intake of nandrolone or related compounds. The International Football Federation (FIFA) was very concerned with this problematic, especially because the World Cup was about to start in France. In this respect, a statistical study was held with all football players from the first and second divisions of the Swiss Football National League. All players gave a urine sample after effort and around 6% of them showed traces of 19-norandrosterone. These results were compared with amateur football players (control group) and around 6% of them had very small amounts of 19-norandrosterone and/or 19-noretiocholanolone in urine after effort, whereas none of them had detectable traces of one or the other metabolite before effort. The origin of these compounds in urine after a strenuous physical activity is still unknown, but three hypotheses can be put forward. First, an endogenous production of nandrolone metabolites takes place. Second, nandrolone metabolites are released from the fatty tissues after an intake of nandrolone, some related compounds or some contaminated nutritive supplements. Finally, the sportsmen may have taken something during or just before the football game.

"Michael's Game," a card game for the treatment of psychotic symptoms.

Objective: "Michael's Game" is a card game which aims at familiarizing healthcare professionals and patients with cognitive therapy of psychotic symptoms. The present study tests the feasibility and the impact of the intervention in naturalistic settings.Methods: 135 patients were recruited in 11 centres. They were assessed pre- and post-tests with the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) and the Peters Delusion Inventory-21 items (PDI-21).Results: Data about 107 patients were included in the entire analyses. Significant improvements were observed on BCIS subscales as well as a reduction of severity of conviction and preoccupation scores on the PDI-21. The intervention has a moderate effect on the PDI-21 preoccupation and conviction as well as the BCIS subscales. Patients who benefit the most from the program are patients who have a low degree of self-reflectiveness and patients who are concomitantly preoccupied by their symptoms.Conclusion: The present study supports the feasibility and effectiveness of "Michael's Game" in naturalistic settings.Practical implications: The game seems to be a useful tool for patients with psychotic disorders. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Une nouvelle situation pour évaluer le fonctionnement familial: le jeu du pique-nique = A new situation to evaluate a family system's fuctioning: the picnic game.

Cet article présente une nouvelle situation, le Jeu du Pique-Nique, qui permet l'évaluation du fonctionnement familial, pris dans son ensemble, quel que soit le nombre d'enfants, âgés de quelques semaines à une douzaine d'années. L'évaluation est macroscopique, selon différentes dimensions comme le coparentage, la chaleur familiale, la dimension ludique, l'autonomie des enfants, etc. Pour illustrer la richesse des observations qu'offre cette situation, les jeux de trois familles contrastées sont présentés ainsi que leur codage. L'utilité en recherche ainsi qu'en clinique, et en particulier l'apport de la vision du film avec la famille, est discutée.

Coevolution of adaptive technology, maladaptive culture and population size in a producer-scrounger game.

Technology (i.e. tools, methods of cultivation and domestication, systems of construction and appropriation, machines) has increased the vital rates of humans, and is one of the defining features of the transition from Malthusian ecological stagnation to a potentially perpetual rising population growth. Maladaptations, on the other hand, encompass behaviours, customs and practices that decrease the vital rates of individuals. Technology and maladaptations are part of the total stock of culture carried by the individuals in a population. Here, we develop a quantitative model for the coevolution of cumulative adaptive technology and maladaptive culture in a 'producer-scrounger' game, which can also usefully be interpreted as an 'individual-social' learner interaction. Producers (individual learners) are assumed to invent new adaptations and maladaptations by trial-and-error learning, insight or deduction, and they pay the cost of innovation. Scroungers (social learners) are assumed to copy or imitate (cultural transmission) both the adaptations and maladaptations generated by producers. We show that the coevolutionary dynamics of producers and scroungers in the presence of cultural transmission can have a variety of effects on population carrying capacity. From stable polymorphism, where scroungers bring an advantage to the population (increase in carrying capacity), to periodic cycling, where scroungers decrease carrying capacity, we find that selection-driven cultural innovation and transmission may send a population on the path of indefinite growth or to extinction.

Ageing Prisoners' Disease Burden: Is Being Old a Better Predictor than Time Served in Prison?

Background: The number of older prisoners entering and ageing in prison has increased in the last few decades. Ageing prisoners pose unique challenges to the prison administration as they have differentiated social, custodial and healthcare needs than prisoners who are younger and relatively healthier. Objective: The goal of this study was to explore and compare the somatic disease burden of old and young prisoners, and to examine whether it can be explained by age group and/or time served in prison. Methods: Access to prisoner medical records was granted to extract disease and demographic information of older (>50 years) and younger (≤49 years) prisoners in different Swiss prisons. Predictor variables included the age group and the time spent in prison. The dependent variable was the total number of somatic diseases as reported in the medical records. Results were analysed using descriptive statistics and a negative binomial model. Results: Data of 380 male prisoners from 13 different prisons in Switzerland reveal that the mean ages of older and younger prisoners were 58.78 and 34.26 years, respectively. On average, older prisoners have lived in prison for 5.17 years and younger prisoners for 2.49 years. The average total number of somatic diseases reported by older prisoners was 2.26 times higher than that of prisoners below 50 years of age (95% CI 1.77-2.87, p < 0.001). Conclusion: This study is the first of its kind to capture national disease data of prisoners with a goal of comparing the disease burden of older and younger prisoners. Study findings indicate that older inmates suffer from more somatic diseases and that the number of diseases increases with age group. Results clearly illustrate the poorer health conditions of those who are older, their higher healthcare burden, and raises questions related to the provision of healthcare for inmates growing old in prison. © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel.

Ageing prisoners' health care: analysing the legal settings in Europe and the United States.

BACKGROUND: Relatively little is known about the current health care situation and the legal rights of ageing prisoners worldwide. To date, only a few studies have investigated their rights to health care. However, elderly prisoners need special attention. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this article is to critically review the health care situation of older prisoners by analysing the relevant national and international legal frameworks with a particular focus on Switzerland, England and Wales, and the United States (U.S.). METHODS: Publications on legal frameworks were searched using Web of Science, PubMed, MEDLINE, HeinOnline, and the National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Searches utilizing combinations of keywords relating to ageing prisoners were performed. Relevant reports and policy documents were obtained in order to understand the legal settings in Switzerland, England and Wales, and the U.S. All articles, reports, and policy documents published in English and German between 1774 to June 2012 were included for analysis. Using a comparative approach, an outline was completed to distinguish positive policies in this area. Regulatory approaches were investigated through evaluations of soft laws applicable in Europe and U.S. Supreme Court judgements. RESULTS: Even though several documents could be interpreted as guaranteeing adequate health care for ageing prisoners, there is no specific regulation that addresses this issue completely. The Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing contributes the most by providing an in-depth analysis of the health care needs of older persons. Still, critical analysis of retrieved documents reveals the lack of specific legislation regarding the health care for ageing prisoners. CONCLUSION: No consistent regulation delineates the provision of health care for ageing prisoners. Neither national nor international institutions have enforceable laws that secure the precarious situation of older adults in prisons. To initiate a change, this work presents critical issues that must be addressed to protect the right to health care and well-being of ageing prisoners. Additionally, it is important to design legal structures and guidelines which acknowledge and accommodate the needs of ageing prisoners.

Building energy saving techniques and indoor air quality : a dilemma

In European countries and North America, people spend 80 to 90% of time inside buildings and thus breathe indoor air. In Switzerland, special attention has been devoted to the 16 stations of the national network of observation of atmospheric pollutants (NABEL). The results indicate a reduction in outdoor pollution over the last ten years. With such a decrease in pollution over these ten years the question becomes: how can we explain an increase of diseases? Indoor pollution can be the cause. Indoor contaminants that may create indoor air quality (IAQ) problems come from a variety of sources. These can include inadequate ventilation, temperature and humidity dysfunction, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). The health effects from these contaminants are varied and can range from discomfort, irritation and respiratory diseases to cancer. Among such contaminants, environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) could be considered the most important in terms of both health effects and engineering controls of ventilation. To perform indoor pollution monitoring, several selected ETS tracers can be used including carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), respirable particles (RSP), condensate, nicotine, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), nitrosamines, etc. In this paper, some examples are presented of IAQ problems that have occurred following the renewal of buildings and energy saving concerns. Using industrial hygiene sampling techniques and focussing on selected priority pollutants used as tracers, various problems have been identified and solutions proposed. [Author]