Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Beyond the insiders' circle: disseminating the results of adolescent health surveys.

Adolescent health surveys, like those for other segments of the population, tend to remain in the hands of researchers, where they can have no real impact on the way critical health issues are dealt with by policy makers or other professionals directly connected to young people in their everyday work. This paper reviews important issues concerning the dissemination of survey results among professionals from various fields. The content, length and wording of the messages should be tailored to the audience one wants to reach as well as the type of channels used for their diffusion. Survey data sets can be used to select priorities for interventions: ad hoc presentations, attractive summaries and brochures, or even films expressing young peoples' opinions have been used by European public health professionals to make data sets usable in various local, regional and national contexts. CONCLUSION: The impact of these diffusion strategies is, however, difficult to assess and needs to be refined. The adequate delivery of survey findings as well as advocacy and lobbying activities require specific skills which can be endorsed by specialized professionals. Ultimately, it is the researchers' responsibility to ensure that such tasks are effectively performed.

Workshop: Capacity building for national public health advocacy: case studies from national associations

The first statement of the EUPHA on the Future of Public Health in Europe refers to the need for going 'to policymakers, politicians and practitioners in all sectors of society and advise them on how to promote public health throughout society'. WHO-EURO Director General Marc Danzon, quoted in the second EUPHA statement on the responsibility of policy makers indicates that 'learning is not systematically applied in health policy development in our continent'. Statement 3 calls for the integration of public health into the political agenda in all sectors. The first EUPHA president, Louise Gunning-Schepers, quoted in Statement 10 called on EUPHA to become 'a powerful advocate of the public health community'. In addition to the above, the EU is now actively seeking ways to build capacity to implement its health strategy. Learning and building the capacity to achieve our aims The aims and objectives to promote the public's health as reflected in EUPHA's 10 statements are also mirrored in the national public health associations. However, many of EUPHA's national associations have little or limited experience in promoting public health policy at the national level. To assist in the learning of advocacy for public health policies, case studies presenting experiences of national public health organizations in lobbying for national public health policy will be presented and discussed. In addition to sharing experiences, the presentations will identify successful approaches to public health advocacy as well as lessons learned from unsuccessful attempts.

Acteurs sociaux et politique économique : la Colombie entre 1970 et 2000

Commençant par la compréhension du processus de prise de décisions en politique économique, puis par l'étude de la participation des Acteurs Sociaux (AS), pour aboutir à l'éclaircissement de leur rôle en politique économique. Le choix des AS correspond aux facteurs productifs :¦? Travail : Syndicat, Confédérations¦? Capital : Patronat, Groupes économiques¦? Ressources naturelles - inclus l'Economie clandestine¦? Esprit d'entreprise dans tous les AS¦Méthode : analyse institutionnelle, AS comme protagonistes. Contexte latino-américain et mondial (chapitre I), relation avec les Politiques (chapitre II), identification des positionnements face aux Politiques économiques (chapitre III). Etude sur deux périodes :¦1) Front National (FN) (1958-1986). Pacte de partis traditionnels pour l'obtention (non accomplie) de la paix et du développement. Objectif acquis via des politiques adéquates mais sans amélioration du domaine social (politique de revenu absente).¦En conséquence, développement des Cartels surpassant l'Intégration Andine. Echec des tentatives d'Ouverture précoce grâce aux Centrales syndicales (1977) aux Organisations patronales (1981), confirmant le bipartisme; crise de la dette sans cessations de paiements, ni décennie perdue (Colombie) ; développement des AS profitant d'absence de partis d'opposition.¦2) L'Ouverture (1989-2000) : Nouvelle Constitution avec amplifications de l'Etat, réformes financière, des échanges, sans sélectivité ni gradualité demandées par les AS. Emergence du blanchiment.¦Montée en puissance des Groupes économiques au détriment des Organisations patronales, (excepté les industriels), perte du lobbying syndical. Malgré des résultats positifs macro-économiques, les taux de chômage, secteur informel, et pauvreté, situent¦le pays au 2eme rang en concentration du revenu en Amérique latine et au 5eme rang mondial.¦Conclusion : les AS se sont mis en avant dans l'inflation (30% à 8%) et la dévaluation. Par contre, les taux d'intérêt et de change ont provoqué le crédit clandestin et la réévaluation avec ouverture aux importations ; pas de succès non plus sur le déficit fiscal ni la gestion des booms (café, drogues). La plupart des Politiques ont donc été décidées d'après la Banque centrale et le Ministère des finances confirmant la primauté du gouvernement sur les AS durant la période analysée.

The social disembedding of business theory and practice. A (neo-)institutional analysis of the homo economicus and corporate social responsibility, and the inherent responsibility of business scholars

Aim Structure of the Thesis In the first article, I focus on the context in which the Homo Economicus was constructed - i.e., the conception of economic actors as fully rational, informed, egocentric, and profit-maximizing. I argue that the Homo Economicus theory was developed in a specific societal context with specific (partly tacit) values and norms. These norms have implicitly influenced the behavior of economic actors and have framed the interpretation of the Homo Economicus. Different factors however have weakened this implicit influence of the broader societal values and norms on economic actors. The result is an unbridled interpretation and application of the values and norms of the Homo Economicus in the business environment, and perhaps also in the broader society. In the second article, I show that the morality of many economic actors relies on isomorphism, i.e., the attempt to fit into the group by adopting the moral norms surrounding them. In consequence, if the norms prevailing in a specific group or context (such as a specific region or a specific industry) change, it can be expected that actors with an 'isomorphism morality' will also adapt their ethical thinking and their behavior -for the 'better' or for the 'worse'. The article further describes the process through which corporations could emancipate from the ethical norms prevailing in the broader society, and therefore develop an institution with specific norms and values. These norms mainly rely on mainstream business theories praising the economic actor's self-interest and neglecting moral reasoning. Moreover, because of isomorphism morality, many economic actors have changed their perception of ethics, and have abandoned the values prevailing in the broader society in order to adopt those of the economic theory. Finally, isomorphism morality also implies that these economic actors will change their morality again if the institutional context changes. The third article highlights the role and responsibility of business scholars in promoting a systematic reflection and self-critique of the business system and develops alternative models to fill the moral void of the business institution and its inherent legitimacy crisis. Indeed, the current business institution relies on assumptions such as scientific neutrality and specialization, which seem at least partly challenged by two factors. First, self-fulfilling prophecy provides scholars with an important (even if sometimes undesired) normative influence over practical life. Second, the increasing complexity of today's (socio-political) world and interactions between the different elements constituting our society question the strong specialization of science. For instance, economic theories are not unrelated to psychology or sociology, and economic actors influence socio-political structures and processes, e.g., through lobbying (Dobbs, 2006; Rondinelli, 2002), or through marketing which changes not only the way we consume, but more generally tries to instill a specific lifestyle (Cova, 2004; M. K. Hogg & Michell, 1996; McCracken, 1988; Muniz & O'Guinn, 2001). In consequence, business scholars are key actors in shaping both tomorrow's economic world and its broader context. A greater awareness of this influence might be a first step toward an increased feeling of civic responsibility and accountability for the models and theories developed or taught in business schools.