Effort, reward and self-reported mental health: a simulation study on negative affectivity bias.

Background : In the present article, we propose an alternative method for dealing with negative affectivity (NA) biases in research, while investigating the association between a deleterious psychosocial environment at work and poor mental health. First, we investigated how strong NA must be to cause an observed correlation between the independent and dependent variables. Second, we subjectively assessed whether NA can have a large enough impact on a large enough number of subjects to invalidate the observed correlations between dependent and independent variables.Methods : We simulated 10,000 populations of 300 subjects each, using the marginal distribution of workers in an actual population that had answered the Siegrist's questionnaire on effort and reward imbalance (ERI) and the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ).Results : The results of the present study suggested that simulated NA has a minimal effect on the mean scores for effort and reward. However, the correlations between the effort and reward imbalance (ERI) ratio and the GHQ score might be important, even in simulated populations with a limited NA.Conclusions : When investigating the relationship between the ERI ratio and the GHQ score, we suggest the following rules for the interpretation of the results: correlations with an explained variance of 5% and below should be considered with caution; correlations with an explained variance between 5% and 10% may result from NA, although this effect does not seem likely; and correlations with an explained variance of 10% and above are not likely to be the result of NA biases. [Authors]

Raising the Level of Moral Thinking among Managers Will Not Help. Kohlberg's Conventionality and Systemic Ethical Flaws in Business

Business ethicists often assume that unethical behavior arises when individuals deviate from the norms and responsibilities that are institutionalized to frame economic activities. People's greed motivates them to violate the rules of the game. In Kohlberg's terms, it is assumed that such actors make decisions in a preconventional way and act opportunistically. In this article, we propose an alternative interpretation of deviant behavior, arguing that such behavior does not result from a lack of conventional moral guidance but rather from the fact that characteristics attributed to preconventional morality by Kohlberg - the purely incentive and punishment driven opportunistic morality - have become the conventionalized morality. The prevailing norms that economic actors have internalized as their yardstick are those of the preconventional Homo economicus. Not the deviation from, but the compliance with the rules of the game explains many forms of harmful and illegal decisions made in corporations.

The Original Risk: Over-Theologizing Ethics and Under-Theologizing Sin

The project of articulating a theological ethics on the basis of liturgical anthropology is bound to fail if the necessary consequence is that one has to quit the forum of critical modern rationality. The risk of Engelhardt's approach is to limit rationality to a narrow vision of reason. Sin is not to be understood as the negation of human holiness, but as the negation of divine holiness. The only way to renew theological ethics is to understand sin as the anthropological and ethical expression of the biblical message of the justification by faith only. Sin is therefore a secondary category, which can only by interpreted in light of the positive manifestation of liberation, justification, and grace. The central issue of Christian ethics is not ritual purity or morality, but experience, confession and recognition of our own injustice in our dealing with God and men.

The social disembedding of business theory and practice. A (neo-)institutional analysis of the homo economicus and corporate social responsibility, and the inherent responsibility of business scholars

Aim Structure of the Thesis In the first article, I focus on the context in which the Homo Economicus was constructed - i.e., the conception of economic actors as fully rational, informed, egocentric, and profit-maximizing. I argue that the Homo Economicus theory was developed in a specific societal context with specific (partly tacit) values and norms. These norms have implicitly influenced the behavior of economic actors and have framed the interpretation of the Homo Economicus. Different factors however have weakened this implicit influence of the broader societal values and norms on economic actors. The result is an unbridled interpretation and application of the values and norms of the Homo Economicus in the business environment, and perhaps also in the broader society. In the second article, I show that the morality of many economic actors relies on isomorphism, i.e., the attempt to fit into the group by adopting the moral norms surrounding them. In consequence, if the norms prevailing in a specific group or context (such as a specific region or a specific industry) change, it can be expected that actors with an 'isomorphism morality' will also adapt their ethical thinking and their behavior -for the 'better' or for the 'worse'. The article further describes the process through which corporations could emancipate from the ethical norms prevailing in the broader society, and therefore develop an institution with specific norms and values. These norms mainly rely on mainstream business theories praising the economic actor's self-interest and neglecting moral reasoning. Moreover, because of isomorphism morality, many economic actors have changed their perception of ethics, and have abandoned the values prevailing in the broader society in order to adopt those of the economic theory. Finally, isomorphism morality also implies that these economic actors will change their morality again if the institutional context changes. The third article highlights the role and responsibility of business scholars in promoting a systematic reflection and self-critique of the business system and develops alternative models to fill the moral void of the business institution and its inherent legitimacy crisis. Indeed, the current business institution relies on assumptions such as scientific neutrality and specialization, which seem at least partly challenged by two factors. First, self-fulfilling prophecy provides scholars with an important (even if sometimes undesired) normative influence over practical life. Second, the increasing complexity of today's (socio-political) world and interactions between the different elements constituting our society question the strong specialization of science. For instance, economic theories are not unrelated to psychology or sociology, and economic actors influence socio-political structures and processes, e.g., through lobbying (Dobbs, 2006; Rondinelli, 2002), or through marketing which changes not only the way we consume, but more generally tries to instill a specific lifestyle (Cova, 2004; M. K. Hogg & Michell, 1996; McCracken, 1988; Muniz & O'Guinn, 2001). In consequence, business scholars are key actors in shaping both tomorrow's economic world and its broader context. A greater awareness of this influence might be a first step toward an increased feeling of civic responsibility and accountability for the models and theories developed or taught in business schools.

No Evidence for moral reward and punishment in an anonymous context.

Human social interactions are regulated by moral norms that define individual obligations and rights. These norms are enforced by punishment of transgressors and reward of followers. Yet, the generality and strength of this drive to punish or reward is unclear, especially when people are not personally involved in the situation and when the actual impact of their sanction is only indirect, i.e., when it diminishes or promotes the social status of the punished or rewarded individual. In a real-life study, we investigated if people are inclined to anonymously punish or reward a person for her past deeds in a different social context. Participants from three socio-professional categories voted anonymously for early career violinists in an important violin competition. We found that participants did not punish an immoral violin candidate, nor did they reward another hyper-moral candidate. On the contrary, one socio-professional category sanctioned hyper-morality. Hence, salient moral information about past behavior did not elicit punishment or reward in an impersonal situation where the impact of the sanction was indirect. We conclude that contextual features play an important role in human motivation to enforce moral norms.