Privacy-friendly Business Models for Location-Based Mobile Services

This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the privacy issues around location based mobile business models. We report the results of an exploratory field experiment in Switzerland that assessed the factors driving user payoff in mobile business. We found that (1) the personal data disclosed has a negative effect on user payoff; (2) the amount of personalization available has a direct and positive effect, as well as a moderating effect on user payoff; (3) the amount of control over user's personal data has a direct and positive effect, as well as a moderating effect on user payoff. The results suggest that privacy protection could be the main value proposition in the B2C mobile market. From our theoretical model we derive a set of guidelines to design a privacy-friendly business model pattern for third-party services. We discuss four examples to show the mobile platform can play a key role in the implementation of these new business models.

A Legislator under Surveillance: The Creation and Implementation of Swiss Banking Legislation 1910-1934

This paper analyses how banking regulation was introduced in Switzerland - one of the world's most prominent financial centres - which remained in place until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows that the law adopted on 8 November 1934 is a perfect example of capture of the regulator by the regulated. Essentially a political response in the context of the economic crisis of the 1930s, it largely reflected the interests of banking circles by limiting the intervention of the State as much as possible. The introduction of the new legislation was facilitated by the temporary weakness of Swiss banking circles, as they depended on the State to delay or prevent the collapse of many major credit institutions. They did not manage to derail the law as they had two decades earlier when they scuppered the federal bill on banks drawn up between 1914 and 1916. But this time they were better organized and more united, and intervened all the more effectively in the legislative process itself. The 1934 law is thus distinctive in that it made no structural changes to the architecture of the financial centre but merely codified its practices through flexible legislation meant to reassure the public. The law was aimed less at controlling banking activity than at keeping - thanks to skilfully calibrated political concessions - the State from having to intervene more directly in the internal management of banks or in the fixing of interest rates and the export of capital.