Policy Change and the Politics of Expertise. Economic Ideas and immigration Control Reforms in switzerland

This article analyses the varying influence across time of the "epistemic community" of free-market economists on immigration policy making in Switzerland. To this end, a framework for the analysis of the impact of economic expertise is provided, and then used in an historical analysis comparing the 1960s with the 1990s. Whereas this influence can be considered to have been weak in the 1960s, it gained significantly in importance in the 1990s, when a period of economic unrest seriously challenged previous immigration policies. It is argued that economic experts played an important role in framing the reforms undertaken during this latter period, notably by providing a "credible causal story" about the links between the existing immigration policy and the social problems which arose in the country in the 1990s. As compared to the 1960s, economic expertise in the 1990s enjoyed more credibility, more political support and took full advantage of a more uncertain social and economic context

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Evidence-based Economic Policy - Three Essays in Applied Microeconometrics

Over thirty years ago, Leamer (1983) - among many others - expressed doubts about the quality and usefulness of empirical analyses for the economic profession by stating that "hardly anyone takes data analyses seriously. Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else's data analyses seriously" (p.37). Improvements in data quality, more robust estimation methods and the evolution of better research designs seem to make that assertion no longer justifiable (see Angrist and Pischke (2010) for a recent response to Leamer's essay). The economic profes- sion and policy makers alike often rely on empirical evidence as a means to investigate policy relevant questions. The approach of using scientifically rigorous and systematic evidence to identify policies and programs that are capable of improving policy-relevant outcomes is known under the increasingly popular notion of evidence-based policy. Evidence-based economic policy often relies on randomized or quasi-natural experiments in order to identify causal effects of policies. These can require relatively strong assumptions or raise concerns of external validity. In the context of this thesis, potential concerns are for example endogeneity of policy reforms with respect to the business cycle in the first chapter, the trade-off between precision and bias in the regression-discontinuity setting in chapter 2 or non-representativeness of the sample due to self-selection in chapter 3. While the identification strategies are very useful to gain insights into the causal effects of specific policy questions, transforming the evidence into concrete policy conclusions can be challenging. Policy develop- ment should therefore rely on the systematic evidence of a whole body of research on a specific policy question rather than on a single analysis. In this sense, this thesis cannot and should not be viewed as a comprehensive analysis of specific policy issues but rather as a first step towards a better understanding of certain aspects of a policy question. The thesis applies new and innovative identification strategies to policy-relevant and topical questions in the fields of labor economics and behavioral environmental economics. Each chapter relies on a different identification strategy. In the first chapter, we employ a difference- in-differences approach to exploit the quasi-experimental change in the entitlement of the max- imum unemployment benefit duration to identify the medium-run effects of reduced benefit durations on post-unemployment outcomes. Shortening benefit duration carries a double- dividend: It generates fiscal benefits without deteriorating the quality of job-matches. On the contrary, shortened benefit durations improve medium-run earnings and employment possibly through containing the negative effects of skill depreciation or stigmatization. While the first chapter provides only indirect evidence on the underlying behavioral channels, in the second chapter I develop a novel approach that allows to learn about the relative impor- tance of the two key margins of job search - reservation wage choice and search effort. In the framework of a standard non-stationary job search model, I show how the exit rate from un- employment can be decomposed in a way that is informative on reservation wage movements over the unemployment spell. The empirical analysis relies on a sharp discontinuity in unem- ployment benefit entitlement, which can be exploited in a regression-discontinuity approach to identify the effects of extended benefit durations on unemployment and survivor functions. I find evidence that calls for an important role of reservation wage choices for job search be- havior. This can have direct implications for the optimal design of unemployment insurance policies. The third chapter - while thematically detached from the other chapters - addresses one of the major policy challenges of the 21st century: climate change and resource consumption. Many governments have recently put energy efficiency on top of their agendas. While pricing instru- ments aimed at regulating the energy demand have often been found to be short-lived and difficult to enforce politically, the focus of energy conservation programs has shifted towards behavioral approaches - such as provision of information or social norm feedback. The third chapter describes a randomized controlled field experiment in which we discuss the effective- ness of different types of feedback on residential electricity consumption. We find that detailed and real-time feedback caused persistent electricity reductions on the order of 3 to 5 % of daily electricity consumption. Also social norm information can generate substantial electricity sav- ings when designed appropriately. The findings suggest that behavioral approaches constitute effective and relatively cheap way of improving residential energy-efficiency.

Screening primary-care patients forgoing health care for economic reasons.

BACKGROUND: Growing social inequities have made it important for general practitioners to verify if patients can afford treatment and procedures. Incorporating social conditions into clinical decision-making allows general practitioners to address mismatches between patients' health-care needs and financial resources. OBJECTIVES: Identify a screening question to, indirectly, rule out patients' social risk of forgoing health care for economic reasons, and estimate prevalence of forgoing health care and the influence of physicians' attitudes toward deprivation. DESIGN: Multicenter cross-sectional survey. PARTICIPANTS: Forty-seven general practitioners working in the French-speaking part of Switzerland enrolled a random sample of patients attending their private practices. MAIN MEASURES: Patients who had forgone health care were defined as those reporting a household member (including themselves) having forgone treatment for economic reasons during the previous 12 months, through a self-administered questionnaire. Patients were also asked about education and income levels, self-perceived social position, and deprivation levels. KEY RESULTS: Overall, 2,026 patients were included in the analysis; 10.7% (CI95% 9.4-12.1) reported a member of their household to have forgone health care during the 12 previous months. The question "Did you have difficulties paying your household bills during the last 12 months" performed better in identifying patients at risk of forgoing health care than a combination of four objective measures of socio-economic status (gender, age, education level, and income) (R(2) = 0.184 vs. 0.083). This question effectively ruled out that patients had forgone health care, with a negative predictive value of 96%. Furthermore, for physicians who felt powerless in the face of deprivation, we observed an increase in the odds of patients forgoing health care of 1.5 times. CONCLUSION: General practitioners should systematically evaluate the socio-economic status of their patients. Asking patients whether they experience any difficulties in paying their bills is an effective means of identifying patients who might forgo health care.

Reforms of the pre-graduate curriculum for medical students: the Bologna process and beyond.

For several years, all five medical faculties of Switzerland have embarked on a reform of their training curricula for two reasons: first, according to a new federal act issued in 2006 by the administration of the confederation, faculties needed to meet international standards in terms of content and pedagogic approaches; second, all Swiss universities and thus all medical faculties had to adapt the structure of their curriculum to the frame and principles which govern the Bologna process. This process is the result of the Bologna Declaration of June 1999 which proposes and requires a series of reforms to make European Higher Education more compatible and comparable, more competitive and more attractive for Europeans students. The present paper reviews some of the results achieved in the field, focusing on several issues such as the shortage of physicians and primary care practitioners, the importance of public health, community medicine and medical humanities, and the implementation of new training approaches including e-learning and simulation. In the future, faculties should work on several specific challenges such as: students' mobility, the improvement of students' autonomy and critical thinking as well as their generic and specific skills and finally a reflection on how to improve the attractiveness of the academic career, for physicians of both sexes.