The metaphysics of quantum gravity : a causal approach

The dissertation investigates some relevant metaphysical issues arising in the context of spacetime theories. In particular, the inquiry focuses on general relativity and canonical quantum gravity. A formal definition of spacetime theory is proposed and, against this framework, an analysis of the notions of general covariance, symmetry and background independence is performed. It is argued that many conceptual issues in general relativity and canonical quantum gravity derive from putting excessive emphasis on general covariance as an ontological prin-ciple. An original metaphysical position grounded in scientific essential- ism and causal realism (weak essentialism) is developed and defended. It is argued that, in the context of general relativity, weak essentialism supports spacetime substantivalism. It is also shown that weak essentialism escapes arguments from metaphysical underdetermination by positing a particular kind of causation, dubbed geometric. The proposed interpretive framework is then applied to Bohmian mechanics, pointing out that weak essentialism nicely fits into this theory. In the end, a possible Bohmian implementation of loop quantum gravity is considered, and such a Bohmian approach is interpreted in a geometric causal fashion. Under this interpretation, Bohmian loop quantum gravity straightforwardly commits us to an ontology of elementary extensions of space whose evolution is described by a non-local law. The causal mechanism underlying this evolution clarifies many conceptual issues related to the emergence of classical spacetime from the quantum regime. Although there is as yet no fully worked out physical theory of quantum gravity, it is argued that the proposed approach sets up a standard that proposals for a serious ontology in this field should meet.

Space-time within general relativity : a structural realist understanding

ABSTRACT This dissertation investigates the, nature of space-time as described by the theory of general relativity. It mainly argues that space-time can be naturally interpreted as a physical structure in the precise sense of a network of concrete space-time relations among concrete space-time points that do not possess any intrinsic properties and any intrinsic identity. Such an interpretation is fundamentally based on two related key features of general relativity, namely substantive general covariance and background independence, where substantive general covariance is understood as a gauge-theoretic invariance under active diffeomorphisms and background independence is understood in the sense that the metric (or gravitational) field is dynamical and that, strictly speaking, it cannot be uniquely split into a purely gravitational part and a fixed purely inertial part or background. More broadly, a precise notion of (physical) structure is developed within the framework of a moderate version of structural realism understood as a metaphysical claim about what there is in the world. So, the developement of this moderate structural realism pursues two main aims. The first is purely metaphysical, the aim being to develop a coherent metaphysics of structures and of objects (particular attention is paid to the questions of identity and individuality of these latter within this structural realist framework). The second is to argue that moderate structural realism provides a convincing interpretation of the world as described by fundamental physics and in particular of space-time as described by general relativity. This structuralist interpretation of space-time is discussed within the traditional substantivalist-relationalist debate, which is best understood within the broader framework of the question about the relationship between space-time on the one hand and matter on the other. In particular, it is claimed that space-time structuralism does not constitute a 'tertium quid' in the traditional debate. Some new light on the question of the nature of space-time may be shed from the fundamental foundational issue of space-time singularities. Their possible 'non-local' (or global) feature is discussed in some detail and it is argued that a broad structuralist conception of space-time may provide a physically meaningful understanding of space-time singularities, which is not plagued by the conceptual difficulties of the usual atomsitic framework. Indeed, part of these difficulties may come from the standard differential geometric description of space-time, which encodes to some extent this atomistic framework; it raises the question of the importance of the mathematical formalism for the interpretation of space-time.

Schizophrenic delusions: a phenomenological approach.

The issue of specificity of delusions in schizophrenia is still a matter of debate. The authors analyze the delusion formation in schizophrenia from a prototypical, phenomenological point of view, focusing on the subject's experience. This perspective links delusion formation to the autistic predisposition, which is considered here as the elementary phenotypic expression of the vulnerability to schizophrenia. Autism is viewed as a defective preconceptual (i.e., before language) attunement to the world. It impedes the individual's sharing of "common sense" with others and impairs the ability to project into the future. The development of delusions is illustrated, in part, by Klaus Conrad's work on the onset of paranoid schizophrenia. Delusions are viewed as transformations of the structure of experiencing. When threatened in future ability to be, the autistic, vulnerable person looks for the clues to becoming by attributing significance to disparate elements of the environment, which become self-referential. The link established between these disparate elements is based on universal characteristics that give the schizophrenic delusion a metaphysical quality. The transitivistic experience in delusions of control and omnipotence points to a specific way of crossing the border between "mine" and "yours" (disturbances of the experiencing "I"). What strikes a clinician in these delusions is that the normally tacit link between the sense of being and the sense of acting becomes quite apparent. The authors also propose a specificity in the themes of schizophrenic delusions. Delusions acquire a schizophrenic quality when ontological (i.e., universal) elements of the discourse between the locutor and the Other dominate at the expense of the worldly elements. It is emphasized that delusional content and form are dialectically related and hardly distinguishable. The authors consider the delusion formation as a phenomenon of emergence, a situation in which a new qualitative order arises from the reorganization of essentially unchanged elements. To consider schizophrenia as an emergent, particular way of experiencing, related to the autistic defect, has important consequences for research and for treatment. A dialectic exchange is needed between prototypical models generated by phenomenological inquiry and empirical, operational validation of testable aspects of such models.

Causal explanations and scientific realism in particle physics

Particle physics studies highly complex processes which cannot be directly observed. Scientific realism claims that we are nevertheless warranted in believing that these processes really occur and that the objects involved in them really exist. This dissertation defends a version of scientific realism, called causal realism, in the context of particle physics. I start by introducing the central theses and arguments in the recent philosophical debate on scientific realism (chapter 1), with a special focus on an important presupposition of the debate, namely common sense realism. Chapter 2 then discusses entity realism, which introduces a crucial element into the debate by emphasizing the importance of experiments in defending scientific realism. Most of the chapter is concerned with Ian Hacking's position, but I also argue that Nancy Cartwright's version of entity realism is ultimately preferable as a basis for further development. In chapter 3,1 take a step back and consider the question whether the realism debate is worth pursuing at all. Arthur Fine has given a negative answer to that question, proposing his natural ontologica! attitude as an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the debate (in particular the realist side of it) is in fact less vicious than Fine presents it. The second part of my work (chapters 4-6) develops, illustrates and defends causal realism. The key idea is that inference to the best explanation is reliable in some cases, but not in others. Chapter 4 characterizes the difference between these two kinds of cases in terms of three criteria which distinguish causal from theoretical warrant. In order to flesh out this distinction, chapter 5 then applies it to a concrete case from the history of particle physics, the discovery of the neutrino. This case study shows that the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant is crucial for understanding what it means to "directly detect" a new particle. But the distinction is also an effective tool against what I take to be the presently most powerful objection to scientific realism: Kyle Stanford's argument from unconceived alternatives. I respond to this argument in chapter 6, and I illustrate my response with a discussion of Jean Perrin's experimental work concerning the atomic hypothesis. In the final part of the dissertation, I turn to the specific challenges posed to realism by quantum theories. One of these challenges comes from the experimental violations of Bell's inequalities, which indicate a failure of locality in the quantum domain. I show in chapter 7 how causal realism can further our understanding of quantum non-locality by taking account of some recent experimental results. Another challenge to realism in quantum mechanics comes from delayed-choice experiments, which seem to imply that certain aspects of what happens in an experiment can be influenced by later choices of the experimenter. Chapter 8 analyzes these experiments and argues that they do not warrant the antirealist conclusions which some commentators draw from them. It pays particular attention to the case of delayed-choice entanglement swapping and the corresponding question whether entanglement is a real physical relation. In chapter 9,1 finally address relativistic quantum theories. It is often claimed that these theories are incompatible with a particle ontology, and this calls into question causal realism's commitment to localizable and countable entities. I defend the commitments of causal realism against these objections, and I conclude with some remarks connecting the interpretation of quantum field theory to more general metaphysical issues confronting causal realism.

Pôle céphalique et pôle caudal chez les oiseaux et les mammifères:sStructures expressives et signification

Dans le cadre du XVe colloque annuel du Groupe d'Etude Pratiques sociales et théories de l'Université de Lausanne consacré au thème de l'animalité et de l'humanité en référence à A. Portmann, l'A. étudie l'analyse des structures particulières du pôle céphalique et caudal chez les vertébrés supérieurs, développée par le biologiste suisse dans son ouvrage intitulé «La forme animale» (1959), d'une part, et examine quelques nouveaux paradigmes concernant les couleurs des robes et les testicules chez les oiseaux et les mammifères, qui ont été établis depuis à leur sujet, d'autre part

Delayed-Choice Experiments and the Metaphysics of Entanglement

Delayed-choice experiments in quantum mechanics are often taken to undermine a realistic interpretation of the quantum state. More specifically, Healey has recently argued that the phenomenon of delayed-choice entanglement swapping is incompatible with the view that entanglement is a physical relation between quantum systems. This paper argues against these claims. It first reviews two paradigmatic delayed-choice experiments and analyzes their metaphysical implications. It then applies the results of this analysis to the case of entanglement swapping, showing that such experiments pose no threat to realism about entanglement.

"Voyage through death/to life upon these shores": the living dead of the Middle Passage

While historical studies of the Atlantic slave trade have amply demonstrated the magnitude of slave mortality during the Middle Passage, only recently have they started to examine how the captives might have endured and coped with this traumatic experience. Although it constitutes a major topos in African diasporic culture, the Middle Passage has only occasionally been represented directly and in details in novels and in films. This article examines three recent narratives of the Middle Passage, Fred D'Aguiar's novel Feeding the Ghosts (1998), Guy Deslauriers's film Passage du milieu (2000), and Stephanie Smallwood's historical study Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora (2007). Beyond their individual poetic, aesthetic, and scholarly qualities, what is most striking about these three texts is that they all use the figure of the living dead in order to explore the captives' experience of the transatlantic journey. If the ghastly quality of the living dead powerfully captures the life-threatening material and physical conditions the captives endured on the voyage, its dual, liminal character also allows D'Aguiar, Deslauriers, and Smallwood to represent the metaphysical, psychological, social, and cultural journey they were forced to undertake. Through their use of the trope of the living dead, these three texts show that if death is indeed a central aspect of the experience of the Middle Passage, it impacts the captives in ways that go well beyond the issue of mortality.