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After decades of stability, Switzerland's unions entered a period of turbulence in the early 1990s: their status as junior partner in the corporatist growth pact was challenged by the economic crisis, business organizations' neoliberal turn and an abrupt decline in membership. These challenges put unions under pressure to initiate revitalization efforts. They first responded by investing more resources into political action, using direct democratic instruments to block neoliberal reforms. In parallel, they adopted new means of recruitment, affiliating white-collar unions, targeting private services and resorting more frequently to strikes. Finally, they rationalized their organizational structure through a series of union mergers.

Development of a cross-European virtual sample repository and HIV resistance database

BACKGROUND: Several European HIV observational data bases have, over the last decade, accumulated a substantial number of resistance test results and developed large sample repositories, There is a need to link these efforts together, We here describe the development of such a novel tool that allows to bind these data bases together in a distributed fashion for which the control and data remains with the cohorts rather than classic data mergers.METHODS: As proof-of-concept we entered two basic queries into the tool: available resistance tests and available samples. We asked for patients still alive after 1998-01-01, and between 180 and 195 cm of height, and how many samples or resistance tests there would be available for these patients, The queries were uploaded with the tool to a central web server from which each participating cohort downloaded the queries with the tool and ran them against their database, The numbers gathered were then submitted back to the server and we could accumulate the number of available samples and resistance tests.RESULTS: We obtained the following results from the cohorts on available samples/resistance test: EuResist: not availableI11,194; EuroSIDA: 20,71611,992; ICONA: 3,751/500; Rega: 302/302; SHCS: 53,78311,485, In total, 78,552 samples and 15,473 resistance tests were available amongst these five cohorts. Once these data items have been identified, it is trivial to generate lists of relevant samples that would be usefuI for ultra deep sequencing in addition to the already available resistance tests, Saon the tool will include small analysis packages that allow each cohort to pull a report on their cohort profile and also survey emerging resistance trends in their own cohort,CONCLUSIONS: We plan on providing this tool to all cohorts within the Collaborative HIV and Anti-HIV Drug Resistance Network (CHAIN) and will provide the tool free of charge to others for any non-commercial use, The potential of this tool is to ease collaborations, that is, in projects requiring data to speed up identification of novel resistance mutations by increasing the number of observations across multiple cohorts instead of awaiting single cohorts or studies to reach the critical number needed to address such issues.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Synergy Sources, Target Autonomy and Integration in Acquisitions

Determining the appropriate level of integration is crucial to realizing value from acquisitions. Most prior research assumes that higher integration implies the removal of autonomy from target managers, which in turn undermines the functioning of the target firm if it entails unfamiliar elements for the acquirer. Using a survey of 86 acquisitions to obtain the richness of detail necessary to distinguish integration from autonomy, the authors argue and find that integration and autonomy are not the opposite ends of a single continuum. Certain conditions (e.g., when complementarity rather than similarity is the primary source of synergy) lead to high levels of both integration and autonomy. In addition, similarity negatively moderates the relationship between complementarity and autonomy when the target offers both synergy sources. In contrast, similarity does not moderate the link between complementarity and integration. The authors' findings advance scholarly understanding about the drivers of implementation strategy and in particular the different implementation strategies acquiring managers deploy when they attempt to leverage complementarities, similarities, or both.