Ethnic minority-majority asymmetry in national attitudes around the world: A multilevel analysis

Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, this research investigated asymmetric attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities towards their country and explored the impact of human development, ethnic diversity, and social inequality as country-level moderators of national attitudes. In line with the general hypothesis of ethnic asymmetry, we found that ethnic, linguistic, and religious majorities were more identified with the nation and more strongly endorsed nationalist ideology than minorities (H1, 33 countries). Multilevel analyses revealed that this pattern of asymmetry was moderated by country-level characteristics: the difference between minorities and majorities was greatest in ethnically diverse countries and in egalitarian, low inequality contexts. We also observed a larger positive correlation between ethnic subgroup identification and both national identification and nationalism for majorities than for minorities (H2, 20 countries). A stronger overall relationship between ethnic and national identification was observed in countries with a low level of human development. The greatest minority-majority differences in the relationship between ethnic identification and national attitudes were found in egalitarian countries with a strong welfare state tradition.

Identity, immigration, and prejudice in Europe: a recognition approach

Social identity is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, identifying with a social group is a prerequisite for the sharing of common norms and values, solidarity, and collective action. On the other hand, in-group identification often goes together with prejudice and discrimination. Today, these two sides of social identification underlie contradictory trends in the way European nations and European nationals relate to immigrants and immigration. Most European countries are becoming increasingly multicultural, and anti-discrimination laws have been adopted throughout the European Union, demonstrating a normative shift towards more social inclusion and tolerance. At the same time, racist and xenophobic attitudes still shape social relations, individual as well as collective behaviour (both informal and institutional), and political positions throughout Europe. The starting point for this chapter is Sanchez-Mazas' (2004) interactionist approach to the study of racism and xenophobia, which in turn builds on Axel Honneth's (1996) philosophical theory of recognition. In this view, the origin of attitudes towards immigrants cannot be located in one or the other group, but in a dynamic of mutual influence. Sanchez-Mazas' approach is used as a general framework into which we integrate social psychological approaches of prejudice and recent empirical findings examining minority-majority relations. We particularly focus on the role of national and European identities as antecedents of anti-immigrant attitudes held by national majorities. Minorities' reactions to denials of recognition are also examined. We conclude by delineating possible social and political responses to prejudice towards immigrants.

The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities

Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.