Covariation between colony social structure and immune defences of workers in the ant Formica selysi

Several ant species vary in the number of queens per colony, yet the causes and consequences of this variation remain poorly understood. In previous experiments, we found that Formica selysi workers originating from multiple-queen (=polygyne) colonies had a lower resistance to a fungal pathogen than workers originating from single-queen (=monogyne) colonies. In contrast, group diversity improved disease resistance in experimental colonies. This discrepancy between field and experimental colonies suggested that variation in social structure in the field had antagonistic effects on worker resistance, possibly through a down-regulation of the immune system balancing the positive effect of genetic diversity. Here, we examined if workers originating from field colonies with alternative social structure differed in three major components of their immune system. We found that workers from polygyne colonies had a lower bacterial growth inhibitory activity than workers from monogyne colonies. In contrast, workers from the two types of colonies did not differ significantly in bacterial cell wall lytic activity and prophenoloxidase activity. Overall, the presence of multiple queens in a colony correlated with a slight reduction in one inducible component of the immune system of individual workers. This reduced level of immune defence might explain the lower resistance of workers originating from polygyne colonies despite the positive effect of genetic diversity. More generally, these results indicate that social changes at the group level can modulate individual immune defences.

The social disembedding of business theory and practice. A (neo-)institutional analysis of the homo economicus and corporate social responsibility, and the inherent responsibility of business scholars

Aim Structure of the Thesis In the first article, I focus on the context in which the Homo Economicus was constructed - i.e., the conception of economic actors as fully rational, informed, egocentric, and profit-maximizing. I argue that the Homo Economicus theory was developed in a specific societal context with specific (partly tacit) values and norms. These norms have implicitly influenced the behavior of economic actors and have framed the interpretation of the Homo Economicus. Different factors however have weakened this implicit influence of the broader societal values and norms on economic actors. The result is an unbridled interpretation and application of the values and norms of the Homo Economicus in the business environment, and perhaps also in the broader society. In the second article, I show that the morality of many economic actors relies on isomorphism, i.e., the attempt to fit into the group by adopting the moral norms surrounding them. In consequence, if the norms prevailing in a specific group or context (such as a specific region or a specific industry) change, it can be expected that actors with an 'isomorphism morality' will also adapt their ethical thinking and their behavior -for the 'better' or for the 'worse'. The article further describes the process through which corporations could emancipate from the ethical norms prevailing in the broader society, and therefore develop an institution with specific norms and values. These norms mainly rely on mainstream business theories praising the economic actor's self-interest and neglecting moral reasoning. Moreover, because of isomorphism morality, many economic actors have changed their perception of ethics, and have abandoned the values prevailing in the broader society in order to adopt those of the economic theory. Finally, isomorphism morality also implies that these economic actors will change their morality again if the institutional context changes. The third article highlights the role and responsibility of business scholars in promoting a systematic reflection and self-critique of the business system and develops alternative models to fill the moral void of the business institution and its inherent legitimacy crisis. Indeed, the current business institution relies on assumptions such as scientific neutrality and specialization, which seem at least partly challenged by two factors. First, self-fulfilling prophecy provides scholars with an important (even if sometimes undesired) normative influence over practical life. Second, the increasing complexity of today's (socio-political) world and interactions between the different elements constituting our society question the strong specialization of science. For instance, economic theories are not unrelated to psychology or sociology, and economic actors influence socio-political structures and processes, e.g., through lobbying (Dobbs, 2006; Rondinelli, 2002), or through marketing which changes not only the way we consume, but more generally tries to instill a specific lifestyle (Cova, 2004; M. K. Hogg & Michell, 1996; McCracken, 1988; Muniz & O'Guinn, 2001). In consequence, business scholars are key actors in shaping both tomorrow's economic world and its broader context. A greater awareness of this influence might be a first step toward an increased feeling of civic responsibility and accountability for the models and theories developed or taught in business schools.

Topics in public finance: social security and taxation

Summary The field of public finance focuses on the spending and taxing activities of governments and their influence on the allocation of resources and distribution of income. This work covers in three parts different topics related to public finance which are currently widely discussed in media and politics. The first two parts deal with issues on social security, which is in general one of the biggest spending shares of governments. The third part looks at the main income source of governments by analyzing the perceived value of tax competition. Part one deals with the current problem of increased early retirement by focusing on Switzerland as a special case. Early retirement is predominantly considered to be the result of incentives set by social security and the tax system. But the Swiss example demonstrates that the incidence of early retirement has dramatically increased even in the absence of institutional changes. We argue that the wealth effect also plays an important role in the retirement decision for middle and high income earners. An actuarially fair, but mandatory funded system with a relatively high replacement rate may thus contribute to a low labor market participation rate of elderly workers. We provide evidence using a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier men, and to a smaller extent women, tend to leave the workforce. The fact that early retirement has become much more prevalent in the last 15 years is a further indicator of the importance of a wealth effect, as the maturing of the Swiss mandatory funded pension system over that period has led to an increase in the effective replacement rates for middle and high income earners. Part two covers the theoretical side of social security. Theories analyzing optimal social security benefits provide important qualitative results, by mainly using one general type of an economy. Economies are however very diverse concerning numerous aspects, one of the most important being the wealth level. This can lead to significant quantitative benefit differences that imply differences in replacement rates and levels of labor supply. We focus on several aspects related to this fact. In a within cohort social security model, we introduce disability insurance with an imperfect screening mechanism. We then vary the wealth level of the model economy and analyze how the optimal social security benefit structure or equivalently, the optimal replacement rates, changes depending on the wealth level of the economy, and if the introduction of disability insurance into a social security system is preferable for all economies. Second, the screening mechanism of disability insurance and the threshold level at which people are defined as disabled can differ. For economies with different wealth levels, we determine for different thresholds the screening level that maximizes social welfare. Finally, part three turns to the income of governments, by adding an element to the controversy on tax competition versus tax harmonization.2 Inter-jurisdictional tax competition can generate at least two potential benefits or costs: On a public level, tax competition may result in a lower or higher efficiency in the production of public services. But there is also a more private benefit in the form of an option for individuals to move to a community with a lower tax rate in the future. To explore the value citizens attach to tax competition we analyze a unique popular vote for a complete tax harmonization between communities in the third largest Swiss canton, Vaud. Although a majority of voters would have seemingly benefited from replacing the current tax rate by a revenue-neutral average tax rate, the proposal was rejected by a large margin. Our estimates suggest that the estimated combined perceived benefit from tax competition is in the range of 10%.

Social structure varies with elevation in an Alpine ant.

Insect societies vary greatly in social organization, yet the relative roles of ecological and genetic factors in driving this variation remain poorly understood. Identifying how social structure varies along environmental gradients can provide insights into the ecological conditions favouring alternative social organizations. Here, we investigate how queen number variation is distributed along elevation gradients within a socially polymorphic ant, the Alpine silver ant Formica selysi. We sampled low- and high-elevation populations in multiple Alpine valleys. We show that populations belonging to different drainage basins are genetically differentiated. In contrast, there is little genetic divergence between low- and high-elevation populations within the same drainage basin. Thus, elevation gradients in each of the drainage basins represent independent contrasts. Whatever the elevation, all well-sampled populations are socially polymorphic, containing both monogynous (= one queen) and polygynous (= multiple queen) colonies. However, the proportion of monogynous colonies per population increases at higher elevation, while the effective number of queens in polygynous colonies decreases, and this pattern is replicated in each drainage basin. The increased prevalence of colonies with a single queen at high elevation is correlated with summer and winter average temperature, but not with precipitation. The colder, unpredictable and patchy environment encountered at higher elevations may favour larger queens with the ability to disperse and establish incipient monogynous colonies independently, while the stable and continuous habitat in the lowlands may favour large, fast-growing polygynous colonies. By highlighting differences in the environmental conditions favouring monogynous or polygynous colonies, this study sheds light on the ecological factors influencing the distribution and maintenance of social polymorphism.

Impact of social structure variation on population genetics, social conflicts and life histories in ants

Summary The evolution of social structures and breeding systems in animals is a complex process that combines ecological, genetical and social factors. This thesis sheds light on important changes in population genetics, life-history and social behavior that are associated with variation in social structure in ants. The socially polymorphic ant Formica selysi was chosen as the model organism because single- and multiple-queen colonies occur in close proximity within a single large population. The shift from single- to multiple-queen colonies is generally associated with profound changes in dispersal behavior and mode of colony founding. In chapter 1, we examine the genetic consequences of variation in social structure at both the colony and population levels. A detailed microsatellite analysis reveals that both colony types have similar mating systems, with few or no queen turnover. Furthermore, the complete lack of genetic differentiation observed between single- and multiple-queen colonies provides no support to the hypothesis that change in queen number leads to restricted gene flow between social forms. Besides changes in the genetic composition of the colony, the variation in the number of queens per colony is associated with changes in a network of behavioral and life-history traits that have been described as forming a "polygyny syndrome". In chapter 2, we demonstrate that multiple-queen colonies profoundly differ from single-queen ones in terms of size, nest density and lifespan of colonies, in weight of queens produced, as well as in allocation to reproductive individuals relative to workers. These multifaceted changes in life-history traits can provide various fitness benefits to members of multiple-queen colonies. Increasing the number of queens in a colony usually results in a decreased level of aggression towards non-nestmates. The phenotype matching hypothesis predicts that, compared to single-queen colonies, multiple-queen colonies have more diverse genetically-derived cues used for recognition, resulting in a lower ability to discriminate non-nestmates. In sharp contrast to this hypothesis, we show in chapter 3 that single- and multiple-queen colonies exhibit on average similar levels of aggression. Moreover, stronger aggression is recorded between colonies of different social structure than between colonies of the same social structure. Several hypotheses propose that the evolution of multiple-queen colonies is at least partly due to benefits resulting from an increase in colony genetic diversity. The task-efficiency hypothesis holds that genetic variation improves task performance due to a more complete or more sensitive expression of the genetically-based division of labor. In .chapter 4, we evaluate if higher colony genetic diversity increases worker size polymorphism and thus may improve division of labor. We show that despite the fact that worker size has a heritable component, higher levels of genetic diversity do not result in more polymorphic workers. The smaller size and lower polymorphism levels of workers of multiple-queen colonies compared to single-queen ones further indicate that an increase in colony genetic diversity does not increase worker size polymorphism but might improve colony homeostasis. In chapter 5, we provide clear evidence for an ongoing conflict between queens and workers on sex allocation, as predicted by kin selection theory. Our data show that queens of F. selysi strongly influence colony sex allocation by biasing the sex ratio of their eggs. However, there is also evidence that workers eliminated some male brood, resulting in a population sex-investment ratio that is between the queens' and workers' equilibria. Résumé L'évolution des structures sociales et systèmes d'accouplement chez les animaux est un processus complexe combinant à la fois des facteurs écologiques, génétiques et sociaux. Cette thèse met en lumière des changements importants dans la génétique des populations, les traits d'histoire de vie et les comportements sociaux qui sont associés à des variations de structure sociale chez les fourmis. Durant ce travail, nous avons étudié une population de Formica selysi composée à la fois de colonies à une reine et de colonies à plusieurs reines. La transition de colonie à une reine à colonie à plusieurs reines est généralement associée à des changements profonds dans le comportement de dispersion ainsi que le mode de fondation des sociétés. Dans le chapitre 1, nous examinons les conséquences génétiques de la variation de structure sociale tant au niveau de la colonie qu'au niveau de la population. Une analyse détaillée à l'aide de marqueurs microsatellites nous révèle que les deux types de colonies ont des systèmes d'accouplements similaires avec peu ou pas de renouvellement de reines. L'absence totale de différenciation génétique entre les colonies à une et à plusieurs reines n'apporte aucun support à l'hypothèse selon laquelle un changement dans le nombre de reines conduit à un flux de gènes restreint entre les deux formes sociales. A côté de changements dans la composition génétique de la colonie, la variation du nombre de reines dans une colonie est associée à une multitude de changements comportementaux et de traits d'histoire de vie qui ont été décrits comme formant un "syndrome polygyne". Dans le chapitre 2, nous démontrons que les colonies à plusieurs reines diffèrent profondément des colonies à une reine en terme de taille, densité de nids, longévité des colonies, poids des nouvelles reines produites ainsi que dans l'allocation entre les individus reproducteurs et les ouvrières. Ces changements multiples dans les traits d'histoire de vie peuvent apporter des bénéfices variés en terme de fitness aux colonies à plusieurs reines. L'augmentation du nombre de reines dans une colonie est généralement associée à une baisse du degré d'agressivité envers les fourmis étrangères au nid. L'hypothèse "phénotype matching" prédit que les colonies à plusieurs reines ont une plus grande diversité dans les facteurs d'origine génétique utilisés pour la reconnaissance, résultant en une capacité diminuée à discriminer une fourmi étrangère au nid. Contrairement à cette hypothèse, nous montrons dans le chapitre 3 que les colonies à une et à plusieurs reines ont des niveaux d'agressivité similaires. De plus, une agressivité accrue est observée entre colonies de structures sociales différentes comparée à des colonies de même structure sociale. Plusieurs hypothèses ont proposé que l'évolution de colonies ä plusieurs reines soit en partie due aux bénéfices résultant d'une augmentation de la diversité génétique dans la colonie. L'hypothèse "task efficiency" prédit que la diversité génétique améliore l'efficacité à effectuer certaines tâches grâce à une expression plus complète et plus souple d'une division du travail génétiquement déterminée. Nous évaluons dans le chapitre 4 si un accroissement de la diversité génétique augmente le polymorphisme de taille des ouvrières, d'où peut ainsi découler une meilleure division du travail. Nous montrons qu'en dépit du fait que la taille des ouvrières soit un caractère héritable, une forte diversité génétique ne se traduit pas par un plus fort polymorphisme chez les ouvrières. Les ouvrières de colonies à plusieurs reines sont plus petites et moins polymorphes que celles des colonies à une seule reine. Dans le chapitre 5, nous démontrons l'existence d'un conflit ouvert entre reines et ouvrières à propos de l'allocation dans les sexes, comme le prédit la théorie de la sélection de parentèle. Nos données révèlent que les reines de F. selysi influencent fortement l'allocation dans les sexes en biaisant la sexe ratio des oeufs. Cependant, certains indices indiquent que les ouvrières éliminent une partie du couvain mâle, ce qui a pour effet d'avoir un investissement dans les sexes au niveau de la population intermédiaire entre les intérêts des reines et des ouvrières.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.