Current and future trens in the quality control of pharmaceuticals and biopharmaticals : impacts on Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)

[Summary] 2. Roles of quality control in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. - 2.1. Pharmaceutical industry. - 2.2. Biopharmaceutical industry. - 2.3. Policy and regulatory. - 2.3.1. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). - 2.3.2. The European Medicine Agency (EMEA). - 2.3.3. The Japanese Ministry of Work, Labor and Welfare (MHLW). - 2.3.4. The Swiss Agency for Therapeutic Products (Swissmedic). - 2.3.5. The International Conference on Harmonization (ICH). - - 3. Types of testing. - 3.1. Microbiological purity tests. - 3.2. Physiochemical tests. - 3.3. Critical to quality steps. - 3.3.1. API starting materials and excipients. - 3.3.2. Intermediates. - 3.3.3. APIs (drug substances) and final drug product. - 3.3.4. Primary and secondary packaging materials fro drug products. - - 4. Manufacturing cost and quality control. - 4.1.1. Pharmaceutical manufacturing cost breakdown. - 4.1.2. Biopharmaceutical manufacturing cost breakdown. - 4.2. Batch failure / rejection / rework / recalls. - - 5. Future trends in the quality control of pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals. - 5.1. Rapid and real time testing. - 5.1.1. Physio-chemicals testing. - 5.1.2. Rapid microbiology methods

Mainmise sur l'état social : mobilisation patronale et caisse de compensation en Suisse (1908-1960)

Qui sait qu'en Suisse, les associations patronales mettent en oeuvre l'Etat social ? Qui sait que associations organisent la majorité des caisses de compensation, dont la fonction principale est de collecter les cotisations et de payer les rentes de l'Assurance-vieillesse et survivants ? Qui connaît ces caisses par lesquelles transitent les milliards de l'Etat social ? L'objectif de cette thèse consiste à comprendre les raisons qui ont poussé le patronat helvétique à mettre en oeuvre les politiques de protection sociale, dont il a pourtant toujours essayé de limiter le développement. Résoudre ce paradoxe implique de se pencher sur près d'un siècle d'histoire mêlée du patronat et des politiques sociales. Ce travail retrace, sur la base d'archives privées et publiques souvent inédites, les raisons qui ont poussé les patrons à créer les premières caisses de compensation dans l'entre-deux-guerres, puis à imposer cette forme d'organisation pour l'aide aux soldats mobilisés (autour de 1940) et l'Assurance- vieillesse et survivants (autour de 1948). Il étudie également comment les associations patronales sont parvenues à défendre leurs caisses jusqu'à aujourd'hui, contre ceux qui dénonçaient l'irrationalité de l'existence d'une centaine de caisses de compensation publiques et privées concurrentes pour mettre en oeuvre un seul système d'assurances sociales. Cette recherche amène deux grands résultats. D'une part, elle propose une histoire originale des politiques sociales en Suisse. Le prisme des caisses de compensation patronales contribue en effet à interroger notre compréhension de l'histoire des politiques de protection sociale, dans laquelle on sous-estime parfois l'importance des conflits pour fixer les frontières entre formes de protection publique et privée. D'autre part, ce travail présente une histoire inédite de l'action collective des patrons dans les régulations du travail au sens large. A travers les caisses de compensation, c'est en effet à réaliser une histoire de l'Union centrale des associations patronales suisses que je me suis aussi attelé. Faute de parvenir à empêcher tout développement des politiques sociales, les patrons ont fait en sorte d'acquérir sur ces politiques une forme de mainmise. Entre histoire des politiques sociales et histoire du patronat, ce travail tente d'expliquer comment les caisses de compensation y ont contribué. Who knows that, in Switzerland, employers' associations implement the best known policies constituting the welfare state? Who knows that the equalization funds, (Caisses de compensation / Ausgleichskassen), organized by employers' associations or by the Swiss Cantons, are responsible for pooling payroll deductions and for paying benefits of the Swiss public pay-as-you-go, old-age insurance and many other branches of the welfare policies? Who knows these caisses de compensation that channel the monies dedicated to the financing of the Welfare state ? The main objective of this research is to understand the reasons why Swiss employers do implement such welfare policies that they usually reject for political reasons. In order to solve this puzzle, this research investigates half of a century of the connected histories of welfare policies and employers' collective action. It also investigates, based on public and private archive records, how employers founded the first caisses in the Interwar period, and imposed them to organize the main developments of the Welfare state during the Second World War. The research also underlines how employers defended their caisses de compensation against those questioning the rationality of this fragmented system aiming to implement one single set of public welfare through one hundred competing private and public caisses de compensation. This research highlights two main results. On the one hand, it helps to improve our understanding of the history of the welfare policies in Switzerland. Underlining the role of the caisses de compensation helps to highlight the importance of the interplay of public and private actors regarding social polices. On the other hand, this research charts a pioneering history of Swiss' employers' collective action regarding labor issues. Because they could not prevent all public welfare policy, employers achieved a form of stranglehold (mainmise) on the welfare State. Halfway between social policy and employers' associations' history, this research try to reveal how their caisses de compensation helped them in this objective.

Topics in public finance: social security and taxation

Summary The field of public finance focuses on the spending and taxing activities of governments and their influence on the allocation of resources and distribution of income. This work covers in three parts different topics related to public finance which are currently widely discussed in media and politics. The first two parts deal with issues on social security, which is in general one of the biggest spending shares of governments. The third part looks at the main income source of governments by analyzing the perceived value of tax competition. Part one deals with the current problem of increased early retirement by focusing on Switzerland as a special case. Early retirement is predominantly considered to be the result of incentives set by social security and the tax system. But the Swiss example demonstrates that the incidence of early retirement has dramatically increased even in the absence of institutional changes. We argue that the wealth effect also plays an important role in the retirement decision for middle and high income earners. An actuarially fair, but mandatory funded system with a relatively high replacement rate may thus contribute to a low labor market participation rate of elderly workers. We provide evidence using a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier men, and to a smaller extent women, tend to leave the workforce. The fact that early retirement has become much more prevalent in the last 15 years is a further indicator of the importance of a wealth effect, as the maturing of the Swiss mandatory funded pension system over that period has led to an increase in the effective replacement rates for middle and high income earners. Part two covers the theoretical side of social security. Theories analyzing optimal social security benefits provide important qualitative results, by mainly using one general type of an economy. Economies are however very diverse concerning numerous aspects, one of the most important being the wealth level. This can lead to significant quantitative benefit differences that imply differences in replacement rates and levels of labor supply. We focus on several aspects related to this fact. In a within cohort social security model, we introduce disability insurance with an imperfect screening mechanism. We then vary the wealth level of the model economy and analyze how the optimal social security benefit structure or equivalently, the optimal replacement rates, changes depending on the wealth level of the economy, and if the introduction of disability insurance into a social security system is preferable for all economies. Second, the screening mechanism of disability insurance and the threshold level at which people are defined as disabled can differ. For economies with different wealth levels, we determine for different thresholds the screening level that maximizes social welfare. Finally, part three turns to the income of governments, by adding an element to the controversy on tax competition versus tax harmonization.2 Inter-jurisdictional tax competition can generate at least two potential benefits or costs: On a public level, tax competition may result in a lower or higher efficiency in the production of public services. But there is also a more private benefit in the form of an option for individuals to move to a community with a lower tax rate in the future. To explore the value citizens attach to tax competition we analyze a unique popular vote for a complete tax harmonization between communities in the third largest Swiss canton, Vaud. Although a majority of voters would have seemingly benefited from replacing the current tax rate by a revenue-neutral average tax rate, the proposal was rejected by a large margin. Our estimates suggest that the estimated combined perceived benefit from tax competition is in the range of 10%.

Federalism and Welfare to Work in Switzerland: The Development of Active Social Policies in a Fragmented Welfare State

This article is concerned with the impact that federal structures have on the development of welfare to work or activation policies. More precisely, it argues that the incentives and the risks associated with a division of responsibilities among different jurisdictions may constitute an obstacle to broad reforms that promote labor market participation of nonworking benefit recipients. This argument is illustrated with a case study discussing policy responses to a massive rise in caseloads among social assistance recipients in Switzerland. We conclude that the lack of a fundamental reform was the consequence of the incentives provided by the federal structure of the program. These incentives have both encouraged cost shifting among jurisdictions and discouraged involvement of federal level policy makers in a bigger reform.

Financial Markets and Real Ecinomy: Four Essays in International Trade

Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.

Three Essays on International Trade and the Labor Market

The thesis is made of three independent chapters interested in the impact of globalization on workers in industrialized countries. The dissertation is especially focused on identifying the causal impact of international trade on workers' mobility, wages, and employment with both a short- and medium-term perspective. The first paper explores the relation between intra-industry trade (IIT) expansion and associated worker flows, taking the latter as an indicator of labor-market adjustment costs. Being the first study to combine theoretical simulations and a novel identification strategy, we find that both theoretical and empirical analyses are consistent with the "smooth adjustment hypothesis", according to which IIT expansion is less disruptive than inter-industry trade expansion. The study therefore lends support to the use of IIT indices as first-pass proxies for the adjustment effects of trade expansion. The second chapter contrasts the impact of increased import competition coming from China and the European Union (EU) on workers in the United Kingdom over a 15-year period. The most salient findings show that increased imports from China had significantly negative effects on workers' earnings, wages and employment. In contrast, larger imports from the EU are associated with positive worker-level outcomes, which is largely explained by the fact that increased imports from the EU were mostly offset by increased same-industry exports to the EU. Besides, we find that increased imports from China exert additional pressure on workers through spillovers to employment and wages in downstream industries. Finally, the last chapter is focused on the impact of exposure to trade and real exchange rate shocks on wages for Swiss manufacturing workers. A particular attention is made to consistently estimate the causal effect in using a two-step gravity-type identification strategy. The study shows that the impact of trade and exchange rate movements is concentrated among high-skilled workers almost exclusively.

Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap

I extend Spence's signaling model by assuming that some workers are overconfident-they underestimate their marginal cost of acquiring education-and some are underconfident. Firms cannot observe workers' productive abilities and beliefs but know the fractions of high-ability, overconfident, and underconfident workers. I find that biased beliefs lower the wage spread and compress the wages of unbiased workers. I show that gender differences in self-confidence can contribute to the gender pay gap. If education raises productivity, men are overconfident, and women underconfident, then women will, on average, earn less than men. Finally, I show that biased beliefs can improve welfare.