On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave's contribution

This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standard textbook definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses on Richard Musgrave's contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and non-excludable - from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson's mathematical definition is generally used in models of public goods, the qualitative understanding of the specificity of pure public goods owes more to Musgrave's emphasis on the impossibility of exclusion. This paper also highlights the importance of the size of the group to which benefits of a public good accrue. This analysis allow for a reassessment of the Summary table of goods which first appeared in Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) textbook.

The interplay between relatedness and horizontal gene transfer drives the evolution of plasmid-carried public goods.

Plasmids carry a wide range of genes that are often involved in bacterial social behaviour. The question of why such genes are frequently mobile has received increasing attention. Here, we use an explicit population genetic approach to model the evolution of plasmid-borne bacterial public goods production. Our findings highlight the importance of both transmission and relatedness as factors driving the evolution of plasmid-borne public goods production. We partition the effects of plasmid transfer of social traits into those of infectivity and the effect of increased relatedness. Our results demonstrate that, owing to its effect on relatedness, plasmid mobility increases the invasion and stability of public goods, in a way not seen in individually beneficial traits. In addition, we show that plasmid transfer increases relatedness when public goods production is rare but this effect declines when production is common, with both scenarios leading to an increase in the frequency of plasmid-borne public goods. Plasmids remain important vectors for the spread of social genes involved in bacterial virulence thus an understanding of their dynamics is highly relevant from a public health perspective.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Evolutionary dynamics of interlinked public goods traits: an experimental study of siderophore production in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

Public goods cooperation is common in microbes, and there is much interest in understanding how such traits evolve. Research in recent years has identified several important factors that shape the evolutionary dynamics of such systems, yet few studies have investigated scenarios involving interactions between multiple public goods. Here, we offer general predictions about the evolutionary trajectories of two public goods traits having positive, negative or neutral regulatory influence on one another's expression, and we report on a test of some of our predictions in the context of Pseudomonas aeruginosa's production of two interlinked iron-scavenging siderophores. First, we confirmed that both pyoverdine and pyochelin siderophores do operate as public goods under appropriate environmental conditions. We then tracked their production in lines experimentally evolved under different iron-limitation regimes known to favour different siderophore expression profiles. Under strong iron limitation, where pyoverdine represses pyochelin, we saw a decline in pyoverdine and a concomitant increase in pyochelin - consistent with expansion of pyoverdine-defective cheats derepressed for pyochelin. Under moderate iron limitation, pyochelin declined - again consistent with an expected cheat invasion scenario - but there was no concomitant shift in pyoverdine because cross-suppression between the traits is unidirectional only. Alternating exposure to strong and moderate iron limitation caused qualitatively similar though lesser shifts compared to the constant-environment regimes. Our results confirm that the regulatory interconnections between public goods traits can significantly modulate the course of evolution, yet also suggest how we can start to predict the impacts such complexities will have on phenotypic divergence and community stability.

Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter?

This article analyzes if, and to what extent, the public service motivation (PSM) construct has an added value to explain work motivation in the public sector. In order to address the specificity of PSM when studying work motivation, the theoretical model underlying this empirical study compares PSM with two other explanatory factors: material incentives, such as performance-related pay, and team relations and support, such as recognition by superiors. This theoretical model is then tested with data collected in a national survey of 3,754 civil servants at the Swiss municipal level. Results of a structural equations model clearly show the relevance of PSM. They also provide evidence for the importance of socio-relational motivating factors, whereas material incentives play an anecdotal role.

Co-evolutionary dynamics between public good producers and cheats in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is cheating - the exploitation of public goods by nonproducing mutants. Here, we examine co-evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron-scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that cooperators managed to co-exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co-existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific adaptions to the co-evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole-genome resequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly pyoverdine-signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we observed parallel evolution, where co-existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions.

Fitness correlates with the extent of cheating in a bacterium.

There is growing awareness of the importance of cooperative behaviours in microbial communities. Empirical support for this insight comes from experiments using mutant strains, termed 'cheats', which exploit the cooperative behaviour of wild-type strains. However, little detailed work has gone into characterising the competitive dynamics of cooperative and cheating strains. We test three specific predictions about the fitness consequences of cheating to different extents by examining the production of the iron-scavenging siderophore molecule, pyoverdin, in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We create a collection of mutants that differ in the amount of pyoverdin that they produce (from 1% to 96% of the production of paired wild types) and demonstrate that these production levels correlate with both gene activity and the ability to bind iron. Across these mutants, we found that (1) when grown in a mixed culture with a cooperative wild-type strain, the relative fitness of a mutant is negatively correlated with the amount of pyoverdin that it produces; (2) the absolute and relative fitness of the wild-type strain in the mixed culture is positively correlated with the amount of pyoverdin that the mutant produces; and (3) when grown in a monoculture, the absolute fitness of the mutant is positively correlated with the amount of pyoverdin that it produces. Overall, we demonstrate that cooperative pyoverdin production is exploitable and illustrate how variation in a social behaviour determines fitness differently, depending on the social environment.