Développement de l'irrigation et évolution des régimes fonciers dans la région de Gaya (Niger)

Since the mid 90's, international actors as well as governmental actors have raised their interest into the development of irrigation's potential that is still largely unexploited in Niger. It seems all the more interesting as it could answer the needs of a fast growing population (3.3% per year). However, if everyone agrees on the need to development this system, the current implementation triggers questions on the process itself and its side effects. National and international policies on this matter were build upon an historical process through colonial, post-colonial and then the late 1980's neoliberal structures, leading to a business model that reveals a discrepancy between the state logic and the farming one. This business model asks for a high capacity of mobilization of resources unachievable for many, especially when they want to address small-scale irrigation (area loan or lease agreement and all those for whom it was difficult to obtain a title of ownership. However, this new interest for small-scale irrigation exerted by the project and the new players triggered the commoditization of land. As a matter of fact, the demographic constraints and the fragmentation of the familial land ownership led to a more individual production system, where the customary relation to land tenure is weakened or even overcome. This makes it easier for the new players who need to settle their small-scale irrigation projects to purchase land. When there are only few areas available for selling, the. purchasing processes are undermining the farmers with insecure rights. If the withdrawal of lands is supposed to be smoothened by social measures, such as replacement of the land and primary offers to purchase the land, those measures are often not attractive. The proposed land of replacement is frequently too far away located or lesser fertile to be of any use and the economic capacity of purchasing is too little, eventually leading the farmers to leave their terroirs. Those in charge of the application of the Rural Code have succeeding in answering the need of written secured land tenure, but have difficulty to meet the challenge of doing the same to secure rights for farmers with loans or lease agreements. The small-scale irrigation could bring an answer for their financial needs to buy the land, but it would require mobilizing resources to invest or an easier access to supportive projects. The economic benefice from small-scale irrigation is now widely recognized, but we have to take also into account the risks of marginalization of part of the small farmers. For a more widely spread exploitation of small-scale irrigation, the mechanism of land regulation as well as the process to access the financial and technical support of projects must be revised in order to reach more small farmers. Développement de l'irrigation et évolution des régimes fonciers dans la région de Gaya (Niger) - Le secteur de l'irrigation a bénéficié d'un regain d'intérêt de la part des acteurs internationaux du développement et de l'Etat nigérien depuis le milieu des années 1990. Cet intérêt est à la hauteur du potentiel en terres irrigables (300Ό00 ha environ) du pays, largement sous-exploité alors que les besoins alimentaires sont grandissants, la population augmentant de 3.3% par an. Si le diagnostic est correct, les stratégies mises en oeuvre en matière d'irrigation posent question. Les interventions, aussi bien publiques qu'internationales, reposent sur un modèle entrepreneurial qui parachève une longue trajectoire historique. Initiée par l'Etat colonial, poursuivie par l'Etat post-colonial et transformé par les politiques néolibérales des années 1980, elle se caractérise par un hiatus constant entre logiques étatiques et logiques paysannes. En matière de petite irrigation privée (surfaces < 1-2 ha, technologies à faible coût), ce modèle présuppose une mobilisation de ressources (économiques, sociales, éducationnelles et foncières) inégalement réparties au sein de la population rurale. Cette recherche s'est intéressée à expliciter les liens qui existent entre le développement de la petite irrigation privée et l'évolution des régimes fonciers. Les trois questionnements qui ont guidé l'analyse empirique portent sur la sécurisation foncière, les dynamiques de marchandisation de la terre et l'accès à la terre pour tous les producteurs. Le Département de Gaya dispose d'un potentiel très important en ressources hydriques, facilement mobilisables. Les productions maraîchères et fruitières ont connu un essor très important à partir des années 1980. Initialement pratiquées par les cultivateurs, elles ont progressivement attiré l'attention d'acteurs externes au monde rural (fonctionnaires, commerçants), du fait de leur haute valeur ajoutée. La Banque mondiale a fortement soutenu cette dynamique à travers un projet à vocation entrepreneuriale, qui s'est pourtant révélé hors de portée de la majorité des petits paysans et a principalement bénéficié à ces acteurs extra-ruraux ainsi qu'à certaines élites locales. Au plan foncier, il a en particulier exclu tous les emprunteurs des terres, qui ne sont pas à même de produire des documents écrits confirmant leurs droits sur la terre. Ce projet, et plus largement l'intérêt que les acteurs extra-ruraux portent à la petite irrigation, ont contribué à alimenter la marchandisation de la terre. Sans ancrage familial dans les terroirs villageois, ces acteurs sont obligés d'acheter la terre pour faire de l'irrigation. Leur demande vient s'inscrire dans un contexte général où la pression démographique et le morcellement successif des capitaux fonciers familiaux ont progressivement individualisé la relation entre les producteurs et la terre, au point d'affaiblir ou de faire tomber les interdits coutumiers en matière de vente. Dans les espaces disposant de faibles réserves foncières, les ventes se font principalement au détriment des acteurs qui, comme les emprunteurs, disposent de droits fonciers peu stables et sécurisés. Si le retrait de la terre est socialement encadré (terre en remplacement, possibilité d'acheter la terre qui va être vendue), il pose également des contraintes agronomiques (sols de moindre qualité) et économiques (nécessité de disposer des liquidités pour racheter la terre) qui peuvent, en dernier ratio, obligent les acteurs concernés à quitter les terroirs. Les instances du Code rural, qui ont su apporter des réponses satisfaisantes à la demande de sécurisation foncière par l'établissement de documents écrits, rencontrent aujourd'hui de grandes difficultés à en faire de même pour les droits de prêt. Dans ce contexte, l'irrigation peut apporter les sommes nécessaires à l'achat des terres. Encore faut-il que ces emprunteurs disposent des ressources financières propres pour la développer ou qu'ils puissent y avoir accès grâce à l'appui d'un projet. Si l'intérêt économique de la petite irrigation privée est indiscutable, les risques de marginalisation d'une partie de producteurs ruraux qu'elle peut produire sont bien réels. Pour en faire une activité accessible au plus grand nombre, il faut revoir les mécanismes de régulation foncière, ainsi que les montages techniques et financiers qui supportent le développement de ce secteur d'activité très prometteur.

Financial Markets and Real Ecinomy: Four Essays in International Trade

Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.

Le prêt à intérêt dans l'Antiquité préchrétienne : Jérusalem, Athènes, Rome : étude juridique, philosophique et historiographique

Le prêt à intérêt était pratiqué par tous les peuples de l'Antiquité préchrétienne, à l'exception du peuple d'Israël. L'auteur examine d'abord l'interdiction du prêt à intérêt dans l'Ancien Testament. Il expose ensuite la pratique du prêt à intérêt en Grèce, avant de détailler les critiques d'Aristote. Enfin, l'auteur retrace l'évolution du prêt (mutuum) et de la réglementation de l'intérêt à Rome, des origines à Constantin. Il met l'accent sur trois grandes controverses parmi les romanistes modernes (XVIe - XXIe s.) : sur le nexum, sur la centesima et, surtout, sur le mystérieux fenus unciarium, le taux d'intérêt fixé par les Douze Tables, pour lequel l'éventail des interprétations va de 1 à 100 % par an ! L'auteur recense les opinions de plus de 400 juristes et historiens, discute les plus importantes et propose sa conclusion. The loan at interest was used by all the peoples of pre-Christian Antiquity, excepting the people of Israel. The author first focuses on the prohibition of lending at interest in the Old Testament. He then explores the use of loans at interest in Greece before examining Aristotle's criticism. Eventually, the author follows the evolution of loan (mutuum) and interest regulation in Rome, from the origins to Constantine. Three great controversies among modern Roman law scholars (16th - 21th) are considered: nexum, centesima and above all, the mysterious fenus unciarium, the interest rate defined by the Twelve Tables, for which the range of interpretations varies between 1 and 100% per year! The author gives an inventory of more than 400 opinions expressed by jurists and historians, discusses the most important ones and suggests a solution.