Cooperation among selfish individuals in insect societies

Kin selection is the key to understanding the evolution of cooperation in insect societies. However, kin selection also predicts potential kin conflict, and understanding how these conflicts are resolved is a major goal of current research on social insects

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Inter- and intra-individual variation of oxytocin secretion in oestrous mares exposed to stallions

The neuro-peptide hormone oxytocin regulates several reproductive mechanisms in mammals, such as uterine contractions during parturition and milk ejection in the lactating mammary gland. Oxytocin may also influence behavior and behavioral strategies, e.g. pair bonding, social recognition, maternal behavior, trust building, or anxiety. Teasing oestrous mares by a stallion provokes the release of oxytocin. We therefore tested whether such elevated oxytocin levels reveal possible mate preferences as determined in typical preference tests.

Corporate political activity and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis

Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 74 studies, we explore the links between CPA and public policy outcomes, and between CPA and firm outcomes. We find that CPA has at best a weak effect and that it appears to be better at maintaining public policy than changing them.

Expanding to institutionally different countries. Reasons, Firm International Experience, and Entry Mode Choice

We examine entry mode choice and its consequences when a multinational enterprise (MNE) expands into an institutionally different country. We argue that discussions of entry mode should distinguish between informal (e.g., culture) and formal (e.g., laws) institutions, and should take into account not just the home country of the MNE and its distance to the focal host country, but the MNE's overall footprint and experience across the world in general, especially in countries with an institutional structure that is similar to that of the focal host country. Specifically, we argue that firms with experience in countries with different informal institutions will be more likely to enter via acquisitions than firms without such experience, that such experience will not matter as much in the case of formal institutions, and that such firms will exit more quickly when they enter via equity alliances than through full acquisitions. We also distinguish between balanced and unbalanced alliances and argue that balanced alliances will be more enduring, but only when the host country is culturally (not legally) different from the other countries where the MNE has experience. Our arguments suggest that entry mode should be conditioned on a firm's experience in other markets, and that intercountry differences in formal versus informal institutions have distinct influences on entry mode.