Social rationality and scales of action: inter-ethnic relations in cockfighting and game-fishing, Raiatea, French Polynesia

This article challenges the notion of economic rationality as a criterion for explaining ethnic boundary maintenance. It offers an ethnographic analysis of inter-ethnic relations in the context of games (cockfights and game-fishing contests) in the island of Raiatea (French Polynesia). Although all players engage in the same basic gambling practices, money is differentially scaled and mobilized by the Tahitian and Chinese participants. Building on recent pragmatic approaches to rationality, it is shown that the players' rationalities differ not from the point of view of economic maximization, but only in so far as they participate in social relations at different scales.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Decision making in a human population living sustainably

The Tiwi people of northern Australia have managed natural resources continuously for 6000-8000 years. Tiwi management objectives and outcomes may reflect how they gather information about the environment. We qualitatively analyzed Tiwi documents and management techniques to examine the relation between the social and physical environment of decision makers and their decision-making strategies. We hypothesized that principles of bounded rationality, namely, the use of efficient rules to navigate complex decision problems, explain how Tiwi managers use simple decision strategies (i.e., heuristics) to make robust decisions. Tiwi natural resource managers reduced complexity in decision making through a process that gathers incomplete and uncertain information to quickly guide decisions toward effective outcomes. They used management feedback to validate decisions through an information loop that resulted in long-term sustainability of environmental use. We examined the Tiwi decision-making processes relative to management of barramundi (Lates calcarifer) fisheries and contrasted their management with the state government's management of barramundi. Decisions that enhanced the status of individual people and their attainment of aspiration levels resulted in reliable resource availability for Tiwi consumers. Different decision processes adopted by the state for management of barramundi may not secure similarly sustainable outcomes.

The Original Risk: Over-Theologizing Ethics and Under-Theologizing Sin

The project of articulating a theological ethics on the basis of liturgical anthropology is bound to fail if the necessary consequence is that one has to quit the forum of critical modern rationality. The risk of Engelhardt's approach is to limit rationality to a narrow vision of reason. Sin is not to be understood as the negation of human holiness, but as the negation of divine holiness. The only way to renew theological ethics is to understand sin as the anthropological and ethical expression of the biblical message of the justification by faith only. Sin is therefore a secondary category, which can only by interpreted in light of the positive manifestation of liberation, justification, and grace. The central issue of Christian ethics is not ritual purity or morality, but experience, confession and recognition of our own injustice in our dealing with God and men.

A conceptual framework to assess the effectiveness of HIV prevention

Aim: The relative effectiveness of different methods of prevention of HIV transmission is a subject of debate that is renewed with the integration of each new method. The relative weight of values and evidence in decision-making is not always clearly defined. Debate is often confused, as the proponents of different approaches address the issue at different levels of implementation. This paper defines and delineates the successive levels of analysis of effectiveness, and proposes a conceptual framework to clarify debate. Method / Issue: Initially inspired from work on contraceptive effectiveness, a first version of the conceptual framework was published in 1993 with definition of the Condom Effectiveness Matrix (Spencer, 1993). The framework has since integrated and further developed thinking around distinctions made between efficacy and effectiveness and has been applied to HIV prevention in general. Three levels are defined: theoretical effectiveness (ThE), use-effectiveness (UseE) and population use-effectiveness (PopUseE). For example, abstinence and faithfulness, as proposed in the ABC strategy, have relatively high theoretical effectiveness but relatively low effectiveness at subsequent levels of implementation. The reverse is true of circumcision. Each level is associated with specific forms of scientific enquiry and associated research questions: basic and clinical sciences with ThE; clinical and social sciences with UseE; epidemiology and social, economic and political sciences with PopUseE. Similarly, the focus of investigation moves from biological organisms, to the individual at the physiological and then psychological, social and ecological level, and finally takes as perspective populations and societies as a whole. The framework may be applied to analyse issues on any approach. Hence, regarding consideration of HIV treatment as a means of prevention, examples of issues at each level would be: ThE: achieving adequate viral suppression and non-transmission to partners; UseE: facility and degree of adherence to treatment and medical follow-up; PopUseE: perceived validity of strategy, feasibility of achieving adequate population coverage. Discussion: Use of the framework clarifies the questions that need to be addressed at all levels in order to improve effectiveness. Furthermore, the interconnectedness and complementary nature of research from the different scientific disciplines and the relative contribution of each become apparent. The proposed framework could bring greater rationality to the prevention effectiveness debate and facilitate communication between stakeholders.

When Cooperation Stumbles: the effects of grades on indicators of cooperation

(English Abstract) In western societies, grades are to date the most widespread means by which achievement and performance are assessed in educational contexts. Grades are used for their capacity to provide individuals with a clear indicator of success or failure, in particular in comparison to others; in this respect, we study their impact on particular work contexts requiring cooperation. Indeed, students are often exhorted to cooperate and work in groups, while at the same time assessed with grades and focused on inter-individual comparison. However, to the best of our knowledge, no work has investigated the effects of grades on cooperation and on indicators of cooperation, a central question to be addressed given its significance for educational trends encouraging cooperative practices, and which we propose to explore in the experimental parts of this thesis. The first experimental chapter, Chapter 4, investigates the effect of grades with regards to their capacity to highlight individual visibility and at the same time social comparison. It tries to disentangle which of these facets could affect a motivated bias likely to reduce cooperation, namely individuals' preference for information confirming their own choice. In two experiments, results showed that a graded-cooperative situation increased this preference effect in comparison to other conditions where only individual visibility was manipulated, and furthermore increased individuals' perception of a competitive atmosphere. Chapter 5 investigates the effect of grades on direct cooperative inter- individual interactions, namely on group information sharing. Two experiments showed that grades hindered informational communication between individuals, leading them to withhold crucial task-information. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the effects of grades on another indicator of group cooperation, namely inter-individual coordination. Results indicated that showcasing grades at the onset of a cooperative task necessitating inter-individual coordination decreased group performance and elicited more negative dominant behaviours amongst participants. Together these results provide evidence that grades hamper group cooperation. We conclude by discussing implications for the practice of grading in Education. ------------------------------------------------------- (Résumé en langue française) Dans la plupart des pays occidentaux, les notes sont majoritairement utilisées pour évaluer la performance et rendre compte de la réussite scolaire des individus. Dans cette perspective, elles sont non seulement un indicateur de succès ou d'échec, mais aussi de la valeur comparative des individus. Dans cette thèse nous proposons de tester l'effet des notes lorsque celles-ci sont utilisées dans des contextes bien spécifiques de coopération. En effet, si les notes et la comparaison sociale sont pratique courante, les étudiants sont souvent encouragés et amenés à coopérer en groupe. Cependant, à notre connaissance, point d'études ont testé l'effet des notes sur la coopération; études qui seraient pourtant légitimes étant donné la tendance existante en milieu éducatif à encourager les pratiques coopératives. C'est précisément ce que proposent de faire les chapitres expérimentaux de cette thèse. Le premier (Chapitre 4) teste l'effet des notes au regard de leur capacité à accentuer à la fois la visibilité et la comparaison sociale. Deux expériences investiguent l'effet des notes et tentent de démêler ce qui, de la visibilité individuelle, de la comparaison sociale ou des deux, pourrait affecter un biais motivationnel qui réduit la propension à coopérer: la propension à préférer les informations qui confirment les choix de l'individu. Les résultats montrent qu'en situation coopérative, les notes accroissent ce biais comparativement à des situations où seule la visibilité individuelle est soulignée, suggérant de plus que les notes produisent une focalisation des individus sur une comparaison sociale compétitive. Le second (Chapitre 5) teste l'effet des notes sur les interactions coopératives des individus, précisément sur le partage d'information. Deux expériences montrent que dans un contexte de travail en groupe coopératif, les notes entravent le bon partage des informations entre individus, les amenant à faire de la rétention d'information. Enfin, le troisième (Chapitre 6) investigue l'effet des notes sur un autre indicateur de coopération en groupe: la coordination interindividuelle. Les résultats montrent que les notes réduisent la coordination des individus et les mènent à avoir des comportements de dominance négative entre eux. En somme, les notes entravent la coopération et réduisent les comportements coopératifs entre individus. Enfin, nous discutons des implications pour le milieu éducatif.

The Identity Style Inventory (ISI-3) and the Utrecht-Management of Identity Commitments Scale (U-MICS): Factor structure, reliability, and convergent validity in French-speaking college students

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the factor structure and the reliability of the French versions of the Identity Style Inventory (ISI-3) and the Utrecht-Management of Identity Commitments Scale (U-MICS) in a sample of college students (N = 457, 18 to 25 years old). Confirmatory factor analyses confirmed the hypothesized three-factor solution of the ISI-3 identity styles (i.e. informational, normative, and diffuse-avoidant styles), the one-factor solution of the ISI-3 identity commitment, and the three-factor structure of the U-MICS (i.e. commitment, in-depth exploration, and reconsideration of commitment). Additionally, theoretically consistent and meaningful associations among the ISI-3, U-MICS, and Ego Identity Process Questionnaire (EIPQ) confirmed convergent validity. Overall, the results of the present study indicate that the French versions of the ISI-3 and UMICS are useful instruments for assessing identity styles and processes, and provide additional support to the cross-cultural validity of these tools.

Une approche strategique du vote : à propos de « vote par appobation, vote par note »

Ce texte a pour ambition de revenir sur une procédure d'expérimentation destinée à tester l'impact du vote par approbation ainsi que du vote par note sur l'ampleur de ce qu'on a coutume d'appeler le vote utile. Les résultats de ces expériences, menées lors des élections présidentielles françaises de 2007 et de 2012, ont fait l'objet de deux articles publiés dans la Revue économique. Notre objectif est ici d'attirer l'attention du lecteur sur la conception implicite qui sous-tend ces expériences : le vote comme outil de dévoilement des préférences individuelles. Une telle orientation se fait au détriment d'une conception stratégique du vote, c'est-à-dire le vote comme processus de coordination. Or, il nous semble que le propre du vote utile est précisément de s'inscrire dans une dimension stratégique du vote, dimension que la procédure expérimentale mise en place tend à gommer en ne fournissant pas aux votants de repères informationnels relatifs aux choix des autres votants. On parlera à cet effet d'isolation informationnelle. This text has the ambition to return to an experimental procedure designed to test the impact of approval voting as well as evaluating voting on the scope of what is called in French vote utile (strategic voting). The results of these experiences, held during the 2007 and 2012 French presidential elections, have been the object of two papers published in the Revue économique. Our aim is to catch the attention of readers on the implicit conception inherent to these experiences: voting as a means to reveal individual preferences. Such a direction is taken at the cost of a strategic conception of voting, i.e. voting as a coordination process. Yet, it seems to us that the main characteristic of strategic voting is precisely to be strategic. The design of the experimental procedure tends to erase this dimension, by depriving the voters of information on other voter's choices. This is what we call informational isolation.

Economics of public governance with strategic production of information: four essays

SUMMARY This paper analyses the outcomes of the EEA and bilateral agreements vote at the level of the 3025 communities of the Swiss Confederation by simultaneously modelling the vote and the participation decisions. Regressions include economic and political factors. The economic variables are the aggregated shares of people employed in the losing, Winning and neutral sectors, according to BRUNETTI, JAGGI and WEDER (1998) classification, Which follows a Ricardo-Viner logic, and the average education levels, which follows a Heckscher-Ohlin approach. The political factors are those used in the recent literature. The results are extremely precise and consistent. Most of the variables have the predicted sign and are significant at the l % level. More than 80 % of the communities' vote variance is explained by the model, substantially reducing the residuals when compared to former studies. The political variables do have the expected signs and are significant as Well. Our results underline the importance of the interaction between electoral choice and participation decisions as well as the importance of simultaneously dealing with those issues. Eventually they reveal the electorate's high level of information and rationality. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Unser Beitrag analysiert in einem Model, welches gleichzeitig die Stimm- ("ja" oder "nein") und Partizipationsentscheidung einbezieht, den Ausgang der Abstimmungen über den Beitritt zum EWR und über die bilateralen Verträge für die 3025 Gemeinden der Schweiz. Die Regressionsgleichungen beinhalten ökonomische und politische Variabeln. Die ökonomischen Variabeln beinhalten die Anteile an sektoriellen Arbeitsplatzen, die, wie in BRUNETTI, JAGGIl.1I1d WEDER (1998), in Gewinner, Verlierer und Neutrale aufgeteilt Wurden, gemäß dem Model von Ricardo-Viner, und das durchschnittliche Ausbildungsniveau, gemäß dem Model von Heckscher-Ohlin. Die politischen Variabeln sind die in der gegenwärtigen Literatur üblichen. Unsere Resultate sind bemerkenswert präzise und kohärent. Die meisten Variabeln haben das von der Theorie vorausgesagte Vorzeichen und sind hoch signifikant (l%). Mehr als 80% der Varianz der Stimmabgabe in den Gemeinden wird durch das Modell erklärt, was, im Vergleich mit früheren Arbeiten, die unerklärten Residuen Wesentlich verkleinert. Die politischen Variabeln haben auch die erwarteten Vorzeichen und sind signifikant. Unsere Resultate unterstreichen die Bedeutung der Interaktion zwischen der Stimm- und der Partizipationsentscheidung, und die Bedeutung diese gleichzeitig zu behandeln. Letztendlich, belegen sie den hohen lnformationsgrad und die hohe Rationalität der Stimmbürger. RESUME Le présent article analyse les résultats des votations sur l'EEE et sur les accords bilatéraux au niveau des 3025 communes de la Confédération en modélisant simultanément les décisions de vote ("oui" ou "non") et de participation. Les régressions incluent des déterminants économiques et politiques. Les déterminants économiques sont les parts d'emploi sectoriels agrégées en perdants, gagnants et neutres selon la classification de BRUNETTI, JAGGI ET WEDER (1998), suivant la logique du modèle Ricardo-Viner, et les niveaux de diplômes moyens, suivant celle du modèle Heckscher-Ohlin. Les déterminants politiques suivent de près ceux utilisés dans la littérature récente. Les résultats sont remarquablement précis et cohérents. La plupart des variables ont les signes prédits par les modèles et sont significatives a 1%. Plus de 80% de la variance du vote par commune sont expliqués par le modèle, faisant substantiellement reculer la part résiduelle par rapport aux travaux précédents. Les variables politiques ont aussi les signes attendus et sont aussi significatives. Nos résultats soulignent l'importance de l'interaction entre choix électoraux et décisions de participation et l'importance de les traiter simultanément. Enfin, ils mettent en lumière les niveaux élevés d'information et de rationalité de l'électorat.