L'équité d'accès aux ressources en eau : fin ou moyen d'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'irrigation ? : la gestion des ressources en eau dans l'état du Gujarat (Inde) dans la perpective de la political ecology

La thèse présentée ici est le résultat d'une étroite collaboration avec une ONG indienne, AKRSP(I), intervenant dans le développement de l'irrigation au Gujarat depuis plus de 25 ans. Un SIG prototype a été mis en oeuvre et nous permet de proposer ime analyse spatiale et quantitative de l'action de cette ONG ainsi qu'une réflexion plus générale sur les leviers de mise en valeur et de gestion des ressources en eau à des fins agricoles. On peut souligner trois principaux enseignements: Les perspectives d'application des SIG au sein des ONG sont manifestes. Les exigences des bailleurs de fonds peuvent néanmoins faire obstacle à leur développement car, indi-rectement, ils favorisent la mise en oeuvre de SI voués à la justification plutôt qu'à la planification et au suivi des programmes d'actions. Ce résultat soulève la question de la pertinence de l'encadrement, des critères d'évaluation et de la conditionnalité de l'aide publique au développement. Les ONG ont un fort potentiel pour participer à la mise en valeur des ressources en eau en Inde et aider à relever le défi agro-démographique indien, en particulier dans les zones marginales où les services étatiques sont en retrait. Les stratégies d'action basées principalement sur l'application des instruments économiques et techniques doivent cependant être modifiées. Nous montrons qu'elles favorisent une inégalité d'accès aux ressources qui débouche sur une efficacité limitée des pratiques d'irrigation, sur un plan agro-technique. Ces résultats soulignent la nécessité de poursuivre une réflexion critique des discours et solutions dominants en matière de gestion des ressources en eau. Deux pistes d'amélioration sont avancées: 1. considérer l'équité d'accès comme un moyen d'optimiser la gestion de la ressource (limiter le volume d'eau par agriculteur pour encourager les choix de cultures irriguées peu consommatrices et l'adoption des technologies d'économie d'eau), 2. prêter attention à l'ordre dans lequel les différents instruments de gestion disponibles sont employés afin de les articuler dans un séquençage temporel pertinent. La Political Ecology apparait comme un cadre conceptuel très pertinent pour engager cette réflexion critique. Elle permet d'intégrer différentes échelles d'asymétries de pouvoirs à la compréhension des situations et des blocages observables localement : inégalités de capabilités et forces socio-politiques à l'échelle locale, politiques agro-industrielles (coton) et jeux d'alliances politiques des castes à l'échelle nationale, discours et conflits idéologiques ou orientations stratégiques des bailleurs de fonds à l'échelle internationale... Notre recherche empirique contribue modestement au développement de cette Political Ecology de la mise en valeur et de la gestion des ressources en eau. - The present research is based on a close collaboration with an indian NGO, AKRSP(I), which is active in the development of irrigation facilities in Gujarat for the past 25 years. We built a GIS prototype providing quantitative and spatial datas to analyse the NGO intervention and propose a general reflection about water resources development and management issues. Three main findings may be emphasized : The potential of GIS within the workings of an NGO is obvious, as an information ma-nagement tool as much as for developing analytical capacity. However, financial backers expectations may not favour a relevant development of this technology. Indirectly, they promote Information Systems built to justify rather than to plan or monitor action pro¬grammes. This raises the question of stricter framework, conditionality criters and stan¬dardised assessment indicators surrounding official development assistance. There is strong potential that NGOs can assist with the improvement of water resources in India. They can help in overcoming Indian demographic-related agricultural challenges, especially in marginal rural areas neglected by state services. However, intervention strategies mainly based on technical and economic management tools has to be adapted. We found that they lead to inequitable access and distribution of water resources what induces a low efficiency of irrigation practices from an agro-technical point of view. These results underline the need to go further in criticizing dominant ideas and guidelines regarding water resources management. We suggest two other options : 1. to consider equitable access has a tool to improve the effective use of water for agricul¬tural purposes (limiting the volume of water available per farmer would encourage them to adopt low water consumption crops and water saving technics), 2. to consider more carefully the order of use of the various management tools available and to structure them in a relevant sequence. Here, Political Ecology seems to be a relevant conceptual framework to enter into such a critical reflection, integrating different levels and scales of political asymmetries at the core of environmental issues. Indeed, the understanding of regional water situations and social stumbling blocks needs not only to consider local capabilities and socio-political inequities, but also agro-industrial policy (e.i. cotton) and caste political alliances at a national scale, as well as ideological and narrative struggles or strategical orientations of financial backers at an international level. Our empirical research modestly contributes to the development of such a Political Ecology of water resources development and management.

Transnational private authority and the participation of workers' organizations in the regulatory space surrounding the employment relationship

Most corporate codes of conduct and multi-stakeholder sustainability standards guarantee workers' rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, but many authors are sceptical about the concrete impact of codes and standards of this kind. In this paper we use Hancher and Moran's (1998) concept of 'regulatory space' to assess the potential of private transnational regulation to support the growth of trade union membership and collective bargaining relationships, drawing on some preliminary case study results from a project on the impact of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) social conditionality on worker organization and social dialogue. One of the major effects of neoliberal economic and industrial policy has been the routine exclusion of workers' organizations from regulatory processes on the grounds that they introduce inappropriate 'political' motives into what ought to be technical decision-making processes. This, rather than any direct attack on their capacity to take action, is what seems best to explain the global decline in union influence (Cradden 2004; Howell 2007; Howe 2012). The evidence we present in the paper suggests that private labour regulation may under certain conditions contribute to a reversal of this tendency, re-establishing the legitimacy of workers' organizations within regulatory processes and by extension the legitimacy of their use of economic and social power. We argue that guarantees of freedom of association and bargaining rights within private regulation schemes are effective to the extent that they can be used by workers' organizations in support of a claim for access to the regulatory space within which the terms and conditions of the employment relationship are determined. Our case study evidence shows that certain trade unions in East Africa have indeed been able to use IFC and other private regulation schemes as levers to win recognition from employers and to establish collective bargaining relationships. Although they did not attempt to use formal procedures to make a claim for the enforcement of freedom of association rights on behalf of their members, the unions did use enterprises' adherence to private regulation schemes as a normative point of reference in argument and political exchange about worker representation. For these unions, the regulation was a useful addition to the range of arguments that they could deploy as means to justify their demand for recognition by employers. By contrast, the private regulation that helps workers' organizations to win access to regulatory processes does little to ensure that they are able to participate meaningfully, whether in terms of technical capacity or of their ability to mobilize social power as a counterweight to the economic power of employers. To the extent that our East African unions were able to make an impact on terms and conditions of employment via their participation in regulatory space it was solely on the basis of their own capacities and resources and the application of national labour law.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Social Policy Preferences and Party Choice in the 2011 Swiss Elections

To what extent do social policy preferences explain party choice? This question has received little attention over the past years, because the bulk of the literature has argued that electoral choice is increasingly shaped by identity-based attitudes, rather than by preferences for economic-distributive social policies. We argue that in the wake of this debate, the significance of social policy preferences for electoral choice has been underestimated, because most contributions neglect social policy debates that are specific to post-industrial societies. In particular, they merely focus on income redistribution, while neglecting distributive conflicts around social investment. The Selects 2011 data allows investigating this crucial distinction for Switzerland. Our empirical analyses confirm that it is pivotal to take the pluridimensionality of distributive conflicts seriously: when looking at preferences for social investment rather than income redistribution, we find that social policy preferences are significant explanatory factors for the choice of the five major Swiss political parties.

Waste management policies for industrial symbiosis development: case studies in European countries

Industrial symbiosis (IS) emerged as a self-organizing business strategy among firms that are willing to cooperate to improve their economic and environmental performance. The adoption of such cooperative strategies relates to increasing costs of waste management, most of which are driven by policy and legislative requirements. Development of IS depends on an enabling context of social, informational, technological, economical and political factors. The power to influence this context varies among the agents involved such as the government, businesses or coordinating entities. Governmental intervention, as manifested through policies, could influence a wider range of factors; and we believe this is an area which is under-researched. This paper aims to critically appraise the waste policy interventions from supra-national to sub-national levels of government. A case study methodology has been applied to four European countries i.e. Denmark, the UK, Portugal and Switzerland, in which IS emerged or is being fostered. The findings suggest that there are commonalities in policy instruments that may have led to an IS enabling context. The paper concludes with lessons learnt and recommendations on shaping the policy context for IS development.

Is Transnational Private Regulation Potentially an Effective Means of Promoting Collective Industrial Relations?

This paper asks whether collective industrial relations can be promoted by means other than seeking change in public policy. Recent research points to the increasing significance of transnational private regulation (TPR) in developing economies. There is an emerging consensus that market incentives to improve wages and conditions of work can have a modest positive effect on measurable outcomes like hours of work, and health and safety. However, it appears that TPR has little impact on the capacity of workers to pursue such improvements for themselves via collective action. The paper takes a closer look at the potential of TPR to enhance worker voice and participation. It argues that this potential cannot be properly evaluated without understanding how local actors mobilise the social and political resources that TPR provides. The case studies presented show how different TPR schemes have been used by unions in Africa as a means to pursue the interests of members. The authors found that the scale of the impact of TPR in all of the contexts studied depended almost entirely on the existing capacities and resources of the unions involved. TPR led to the creation of collective industrial relations processes, or helped unions to ensure that certain enterprises participated in existing industrial relations processes, but did virtually nothing to enhance the political and organisational capacity of the unions to influence the outcomes of those processes in terms of wages and conditions of employment. The paper concludes that the potential of TPR to promote the emergence of collective industrial relations systems is very low.