Salvation goods and Canonization Logic : On two Popular Cults of Southern Italy

(Summary of the production) The idea that religion has to succeed in a «market», selling «salvation goods», has proved to be extremely attractive to scholars in sociology and the study of religion. Max Weber used the term «salvation good» to compare different religious traditions. Pierre Bourdieu employed the term in order to analyze «religious economy». And recently, an American group of researchers advocating «rational choice of religion» put the theme at the forefront of current debates. This book - the fruit of an International Congress in Lausanne in April 2005 - brings together leading specialists in the fields of sociology and the study of religion who discuss the terms «salvation goods» (or religious goods) and «religious market». The authors test the applicability of these concepts by using specific examples and they either deliberately advocate or criticize Weberian, Bourdieusian or rational-choice perspectives.

What Price Salvation? The Exchange of Salvation goods between India and the West

Does Weber's notion of salvation goods, along with the connected one of the religious market, apply to the modern history of yoga? The case study chosen here (the yoga of Pattabhi Jois) clearly shows that these notions highlight many aspects of the expansion of yoga into a global market product. However, the notion of salvation goods resists the new hermeneutical situation of encounter and has to be adapted to the present situation of religious "patchwork". The notion of religious market lacks depth to describe the various understandings and appropriations of yoga in precise historical situations. Other aspects of the current global status of yoga may be highlighted by applying the concept of pilgrimage. La notion de bien de salut que nous lègue Max Weber et la notion de marché religieux qui en découle peuvent-elles s'appliquer à l'histoire moderne du yoga? L'étude de cas que nous consacrons au yoga de Pattabhi Jois montre que ces notions éclairent bien certains aspects de l'expansion du yoga en tant que produit d'un marché globalisé. Cependant la notion de bien de salut résiste à une réflexion de type herméneutique sur les processus de rencontres et doit être adaptée à la situation contemporaine, ou` les religions se présentent comme des ensembles composites. La notion de marché religieux ne permet pas d'expliquer les diverses compréhensions et appropriations du yoga dans des situations historiques précises. D'autres aspects de la situation du yoga sont mieux explicités si on prend le concept de pèlerinage comme point de référence.

On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave's contribution

This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standard textbook definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses on Richard Musgrave's contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and non-excludable - from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson's mathematical definition is generally used in models of public goods, the qualitative understanding of the specificity of pure public goods owes more to Musgrave's emphasis on the impossibility of exclusion. This paper also highlights the importance of the size of the group to which benefits of a public good accrue. This analysis allow for a reassessment of the Summary table of goods which first appeared in Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) textbook.

The interplay between relatedness and horizontal gene transfer drives the evolution of plasmid-carried public goods.

Plasmids carry a wide range of genes that are often involved in bacterial social behaviour. The question of why such genes are frequently mobile has received increasing attention. Here, we use an explicit population genetic approach to model the evolution of plasmid-borne bacterial public goods production. Our findings highlight the importance of both transmission and relatedness as factors driving the evolution of plasmid-borne public goods production. We partition the effects of plasmid transfer of social traits into those of infectivity and the effect of increased relatedness. Our results demonstrate that, owing to its effect on relatedness, plasmid mobility increases the invasion and stability of public goods, in a way not seen in individually beneficial traits. In addition, we show that plasmid transfer increases relatedness when public goods production is rare but this effect declines when production is common, with both scenarios leading to an increase in the frequency of plasmid-borne public goods. Plasmids remain important vectors for the spread of social genes involved in bacterial virulence thus an understanding of their dynamics is highly relevant from a public health perspective.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

La mortalité par tumeur maligne chez les ouvriers d'une fabrique de caoutchouc en Suisse: étude épidémiologique, 1955-1975. [Cancer mortality among the workers of a Swiss rubber goods factory. Epidemiological study, 1955-75].

In an epidemiologic investigation of mortality among workers in a Swiss rubber-goods factory the cancer mortality in the period 1955-1975 has been studied in all male workers active on 1 January 1955 in (a) a rubber-goods factory and (b) a munitions factory, the latter as reference population. The two groups numbered some 1000 each. Both factories were located in the same Central Swiss village where no other industry was present. Mortality in each industry is compared with that in the Swiss population in general (SMR) and the mortalities of the two industries are compared with each other. The results tend to confirm that rubber workers are exposed to a higher risk of cancer mortality. Three particular types of cancer are briefly discussed: cancer of the stomach, of the lower urinary tract, and glioblastoma.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Integration or individuation : are the salvation goods promised by first-century Christian preaching still attractive ?

(Résumé de l'ouvrage) The idea that religion has to succeed in a «market», selling «salvation goods», has proved to be extremely attractive to scholars in sociology and the study of religion. Max Weber used the term «salvation good» to compare different religious traditions. Pierre Bourdieu employed the term in order to analyze «religious economy». And recently, an American group of researchers advocating «rational choice of religion» put the theme at the forefront of current debates. This book - the fruit of an International Congress in Lausanne in April 2005 - brings together leading specialists in the fields of sociology and the study of religion who discuss the terms «salvation goods» (or religious goods) and «religious market». The authors test the applicability of these concepts by using specific examples and they either deliberately advocate or criticize Weberian, Bourdieusian or rational-choice perspectives.