7 resultados para Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission.
em Université de Lausanne, Switzerland
Resumo:
The global economic and financial crisis is a challenge for all governments, but particularly for federal states because divided and/or shared territorial powers make federations susceptible to coordination problems in fiscal policy making. This article explores the effects of the ongoing crisis on federal relations. Three kinds of problems that may become the cause of federal tensions and conflicts are evoked: opportunism of subgovernments, centralisation and erosion of solidarity among members of the federation. Our analysis of fiscal policies and federal conflicts of 11 federations between 2007 and the present reveals three kinds of coordination problems: shirking in the use of federal government grants, rent-seeking in equalisation payments, and over-borrowing and over-spending. Our results show that shirking remained limited to few cases and occurred only in the first part of the crisis. However, rent-seeking and over-borrowing and over-spending led to a reduction of solidarity among subgovernments and to increased regulation of the fiscal discretion of the members of the federation. Subsequently, tensions in federal relations increased - although only in one case did this challenged the federal order.
Resumo:
The deep drop of the fertility rate in Italy to among the lowest in the world challenges contemporary theories of childbearing and family building. Among high-income countries, Italy was presumed to have characteristics of family values and female labor force participation that would favor higher fertility than its European neighbors to the north. We test competing economic and cultural explanations, drawing on new nationally representative, longitudinal data to examine first union, first birth, and second birth. Our event history analysis finds some support for economic determinants of family formation and fertility, but the clear importance of regional differences and of secularization suggests that such an explanation is at best incomplete and that cultural and ideational factors must be considered.
Resumo:
Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilize electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, austerity reforms have been characterized by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base of the mainstream parties.