Religions in Play. Games, Rituals, and Virtual Worlds

Often dismissed as "not serious," the notion of play has nevertheless been at the center of classical theories of religion and ritual (Huizinga, Caillois, Turner, Staal, etc.). What can be retained of these theories for the contemporary study of religions? Can a study of "play" or "game" bring new perspectives for the study of religions? The book deals with the history of games and their relation to religions, the links between divination and games, the relations between sport and ritual, the pedagogical functions of games in religious education, and the interaction between games, media and religions. Richly illustrated, the book contributes to the study of religions, to ritual, game and media studies, and addresses an academic as well as a general public.

Social rationality and scales of action: inter-ethnic relations in cockfighting and game-fishing, Raiatea, French Polynesia

This article challenges the notion of economic rationality as a criterion for explaining ethnic boundary maintenance. It offers an ethnographic analysis of inter-ethnic relations in the context of games (cockfights and game-fishing contests) in the island of Raiatea (French Polynesia). Although all players engage in the same basic gambling practices, money is differentially scaled and mobilized by the Tahitian and Chinese participants. Building on recent pragmatic approaches to rationality, it is shown that the players' rationalities differ not from the point of view of economic maximization, but only in so far as they participate in social relations at different scales.

«Où, quand, et comment ?» : Évolution des conduites agressives en football et en hockey sur glace

RésuméCette étude a pour objectif d'observer l'évolution des actes agressifs dans deux sports d'équipes en fonction de facteurs situationnels (périodes de jeu, lieu de la faute, état du score) et du type d'agressions (instrumentales, hostile). 60 matchs professionnels de football et de hockey sur glace ont été filmés puis analysés à l'aide de grilles d'observation différenciant les deux types d'agressions. Les résultats révèlent que dans ces deux sports, les agressions instrumentales sont plus fréquentes dans les zones importantes du terrain (milieu ou défense) ou lorsque le score est serré. En revanche, les agressions hostiles ne varient pas (ou peu) selon ces facteurs. Les résultats sont discutés au regard de la théorie de l'apprentissage social et de l'hypothèse frustration-agression.AbstractThis study aims at examining observed aggression in two team sports as a function of situational triggers (periods, zones of field, games score) and of type of aggression (instrumental, hostile). 60 soccer and ice hockey games were recorded and analyzed using a grid that differentiates the two types of aggression. The results revealed that theses two sports, instrumental aggressions were more frequent in important zones of field (neutral or defensive ones) and in tied score situations. However, no difference was found for hostile aggression according to these factors. The discussion focused on the social learning theory and frustration-aggression hypothesis.

Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.