Causal explanations and scientific realism in particle physics

Particle physics studies highly complex processes which cannot be directly observed. Scientific realism claims that we are nevertheless warranted in believing that these processes really occur and that the objects involved in them really exist. This dissertation defends a version of scientific realism, called causal realism, in the context of particle physics. I start by introducing the central theses and arguments in the recent philosophical debate on scientific realism (chapter 1), with a special focus on an important presupposition of the debate, namely common sense realism. Chapter 2 then discusses entity realism, which introduces a crucial element into the debate by emphasizing the importance of experiments in defending scientific realism. Most of the chapter is concerned with Ian Hacking's position, but I also argue that Nancy Cartwright's version of entity realism is ultimately preferable as a basis for further development. In chapter 3,1 take a step back and consider the question whether the realism debate is worth pursuing at all. Arthur Fine has given a negative answer to that question, proposing his natural ontologica! attitude as an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the debate (in particular the realist side of it) is in fact less vicious than Fine presents it. The second part of my work (chapters 4-6) develops, illustrates and defends causal realism. The key idea is that inference to the best explanation is reliable in some cases, but not in others. Chapter 4 characterizes the difference between these two kinds of cases in terms of three criteria which distinguish causal from theoretical warrant. In order to flesh out this distinction, chapter 5 then applies it to a concrete case from the history of particle physics, the discovery of the neutrino. This case study shows that the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant is crucial for understanding what it means to "directly detect" a new particle. But the distinction is also an effective tool against what I take to be the presently most powerful objection to scientific realism: Kyle Stanford's argument from unconceived alternatives. I respond to this argument in chapter 6, and I illustrate my response with a discussion of Jean Perrin's experimental work concerning the atomic hypothesis. In the final part of the dissertation, I turn to the specific challenges posed to realism by quantum theories. One of these challenges comes from the experimental violations of Bell's inequalities, which indicate a failure of locality in the quantum domain. I show in chapter 7 how causal realism can further our understanding of quantum non-locality by taking account of some recent experimental results. Another challenge to realism in quantum mechanics comes from delayed-choice experiments, which seem to imply that certain aspects of what happens in an experiment can be influenced by later choices of the experimenter. Chapter 8 analyzes these experiments and argues that they do not warrant the antirealist conclusions which some commentators draw from them. It pays particular attention to the case of delayed-choice entanglement swapping and the corresponding question whether entanglement is a real physical relation. In chapter 9,1 finally address relativistic quantum theories. It is often claimed that these theories are incompatible with a particle ontology, and this calls into question causal realism's commitment to localizable and countable entities. I defend the commitments of causal realism against these objections, and I conclude with some remarks connecting the interpretation of quantum field theory to more general metaphysical issues confronting causal realism.

Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic Science

Continuing developments in science and technology mean that the amounts of information forensic scientists are able to provide for criminal investigations is ever increasing. The commensurate increase in complexity creates difficulties for scientists and lawyers with regard to evaluation and interpretation, notably with respect to issues of inference and decision. Probability theory, implemented through graphical methods, and specifically Bayesian networks, provides powerful methods to deal with this complexity. Extensions of these methods to elements of decision theory provide further support and assistance to the judicial system. Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic Science provides a unique and comprehensive introduction to the use of Bayesian decision networks for the evaluation and interpretation of scientific findings in forensic science, and for the support of decision-makers in their scientific and legal tasks. Includes self-contained introductions to probability and decision theory. Develops the characteristics of Bayesian networks, object-oriented Bayesian networks and their extension to decision models. Features implementation of the methodology with reference to commercial and academically available software. Presents standard networks and their extensions that can be easily implemented and that can assist in the reader's own analysis of real cases. Provides a technique for structuring problems and organizing data based on methods and principles of scientific reasoning. Contains a method for the construction of coherent and defensible arguments for the analysis and evaluation of scientific findings and for decisions based on them. Is written in a lucid style, suitable for forensic scientists and lawyers with minimal mathematical background. Includes a foreword by Ian Evett. The clear and accessible style of this second edition makes this book ideal for all forensic scientists, applied statisticians and graduate students wishing to evaluate forensic findings from the perspective of probability and decision analysis. It will also appeal to lawyers and other scientists and professionals interested in the evaluation and interpretation of forensic findings, including decision making based on scientific information.

Mesure de l'impact de l'implication des proches aidants de patients hospitalises dans une unité de soins psychiatriques aigus sur eux-mêmes

Le but de cette étude est de mesurer ainsi que de qualifier l'impact de l'implication des proches aidants de patients hospitalisés dans des unités de soins psychiatriques aigus sur eux-mêmes. Le cadre conceptuel utilisé est celui du fardeau des familles de Schene (1990). Il différencie les parties objectives et subjectives du fardeau familial. La récolte de données a été réalisée à l'aide de l'Involvement Evaluation Questionnaire (IEQ). Les résultats de cette étude montrent que les proches aidants souffrent d'un niveau d'inquiétude élevé, 3.8 sur une échelle de Likert à 5 questions, ainsi que d'un niveau de tension à 2.44 sur une échelle de Likert à 5 questions. Des associations ont été trouvées. L'augmentation de la durée du trouble diminue l'inquiétude, avec une valeur ρ de 0.048. Le fait d'être habitué à la situation a également un impact en diminuant la tension, avec une valeur ρ de 0.002. Plus on est « habitué à la situation », avec une valeur ρ de -0.021, moins le proche est inquiet par rapport à la situation du patient. Ainsi que, plus le patient est jeune, plus le proche aidant ressent de tension, avec une valeur ρ de 0.008. Ces résultats, peu généralisables au vu du petit échantillon (n=24), pourraient toutefois impliquer une réflexion approfondie sur l'accueil, la place et le soutien des proches aidants de patients souffrants de troubles psychiatriques hospitalisés dans une unité de soins aigus de la part des infirmières.