Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Head-to-head comparison of length of stay, patients' outcome and satisfaction in Switzerland before and after SwissDRG-Implementation in 2012 in 2012: an observational study in two tertiary university centers.

On 1 January 2012 Swiss Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG), a new uniform payment system for in-patients was introduced in Switzerland with the intention to replace a "cost-based" with a "case-based" reimbursement system to increase efficiency. With the introduction of the new payment system we aim to answer questions raised regarding length of stay as well as patients' outcome and satisfaction. This is a prospective, two-centre observational cohort study with data from University Hospital Basel and the Cantonal Hospital Aarau, Switzerland, from January to June 2011 and 2012, respectively. Consecutive in-patients with the main diagnosis of either community-acquired pneumonia, exacerbation of COPD, acute heart failure or hip fracture were included. A questionnaire survey was sent out after discharge investigating changes before and after SwissDRG implementation. Our primary endpoint was LOS. Of 1,983 eligible patients 841 returned the questionnaire and were included into the analysis (429 in 2011, 412 in 2012). The median age was 76.7 years (50.8% male). Patients in the two years were well balanced in regard to main diagnoses and co-morbidities. Mean LOS in the overall patient population was 10.0 days and comparable between the 2011 cohort and the 2012 cohort (9.7 vs 10.3; p = 0.43). Overall satisfaction with care changed only slightly after introduction of SwissDRG and remained high (89.0% vs 87.8%; p = 0.429). Investigating the influence of the implementation of SwissDRG in 2012 regarding LOS patients' outcome and satisfaction, we found no significant changes. However, we observed some noteworthy trends, which should be monitored closely.