Research in psychopathology: epistemologic issues.

Etiologic research in psychiatry relies on an objectivist epistemology positing that human cognition is specified by the "reality" of the outer world, which consists of a totality of mind-independent objects. Truth is considered as some sort of correspondence relation between words and external objects, and mind as a mirror of nature. In our view, this epistemology considerably impedes etiologic research. Objectivist epistemology has been recently confronting a growing critique from diverse scientific fields. Alternative models in neurosciences (neuronal selection), artificial intelligence (connectionism), and developmental psychology (developmental biodynamics) converge in viewing living organisms as self-organizing systems. In this perspective, the organism is not specified by the outer world, but enacts its environment by selecting relevant domains of significance that constitute its world. The distinction between mind and body or organism and environment is a matter of observational perspective. These models from empirical sciences are compatible with fundamental tenets of philosophical phenomenology and hermeneutics. They imply consequences for research in psychopathology: symptoms cannot be viewed as disconnected manifestations of discrete localized brain dysfunctions. Psychopathology should therefore focus on how the person's self-coherence is maintained and on the understanding and empirical investigation of the systemic laws that govern neurodevelopment and the organization of human cognition.

The philosophical foundations of classical "rDzogs chen" in Tibet : investigating the distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes)

While the syncretistic Tibetan tradition known as rDzogs chen ("Great Perfection") has attracted considerable attention over the past few decades, its philosophical foundations remain largely unknown to those unacquainted with its primary sources. This thesis looks at the essentials of rDzogs chen philosophy through the lens of two principal distinctions that the tradition has considered indispensable for understanding its distinctive views and practices: dualistic mind (sems) versus primordial knowing (ye shes) and dharmakâya versus the 'ground of all' (kun gzhi) conditioned experience. Arguing that the distinctions provided classical rDzogs chen scholars with a crucial framework for (a) articulating the necessary conditions of nondual primordial knowing, the conditio sine qua non of rNying ma soteriology, and (b) schematizing the relationship between the exoteric and esoteric vehicles of Indian Buddhism within a unifying conception of the Buddhist path as the progressive disclosure of primordial knowing, the thesis shows how the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind has been integral to the tradition's complex soteriology. The thesis consists of two parts: (1) a detailed philosophical investigation of the distinctions and (2) an anthology of previously untranslated Tibetan materials on the distinctions accompanied by critical editions and introductions. The first part systematically invesigates the nature and scope of the distinctions and traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Buddhist Cittamâtra, Madhyamaka, Pramàriavàda, and Vajrayâna views. It concludes with an exploration of some soteriological implications of the mind/primordial knowing distinction that became central to rDzogs chen path hermeneutics in the classical period as authors of rDzogs chen path summaries used this distinction to reconcile progressivist sutric and non-progressivist tantric models of the Buddhist path. The translations and texts included in part two of the thesis consist of (a) a short treatise from Klong chen pa's Miscellaneous Writings entitled Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan (Reply to Questions Concerning Mind and Primordial Knowing), (b) selected passages on the distinctions from this author's monumental summary of the rDzogs chen snying thig system, the Theg mchog mdzod (Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle), and (c) an excerpt on rDzogs chen distinctions taken from 'Jigs med gling pa's (1729-1798) 18th century Klong chen sNying thig path summary entitled Treasury of Qualities (Yon tan mdzod) along with a word-by- word commentary by Yon tan rgya mtsho (b. 19th c.).

Redondances. Paul Ricoeur et ses sutures théologico-politiques

Paul Ricoeur construit la philosophie comme une hétérotopie, en la soumettant à l'ordre, juridique et théologique, d'un «aveu». En soustrayant la pensée à la compétence première de la philosophie pour l'accorder à l'ordre d'un récit, Ricoeur fait de l'exercice de la philosophie une «empirique de la volonté serve». Ce primat donné à un ordre de médiation, par le biais d'un récit, dépouille ainsi la philosophie de toute tâche inaugurale. Dans ses Valences of the Dialectic, le philosophe américain Jameson est revenu de façon critique sur ce montage, soulignant le paradoxe qui oblige Ricoeur à ôter la pensée du temps des tâches premières de la phénoménologie. Cet article vise à en exposer les conséquences (notamment le basculement vers une herméneutique), pour interroger les effets théologico-politiques de ce vaste projet. --- Paul Ricoeur has built up philosophy as a heterotopy by submitting it to the juridical and theological order of a "confession". By taking away thought as the primus competence of philosophy, and attributing it to narration, Ricoeur transforms philosophy into an "empirics of the serve-will". This priority given to mediation through narration deprives philosophy from any inaugural task. In his Valences of the Dialectic, the American philosopher Jameson has critically questioned this construction, underlining the paradox that forces Ricoeur to take away thought of time from the primus tasks of phenomenology. This paper intends to expose the consequences of such a deal (among others the swing to hermeneutics), and to inquire about the theologico-political effects of such a vast project.

Al-Bīrūnī's Kitāb Sānk and Kitāb Pātanğal:A Historical and Textual Study

The historical pole of this research distinguishes differing historical and cultural contexts in which the scholar al-Bïrûnî evolved. Between the years 973 and 1017, he lived in Khwarezm (Kät and JürjänTya), Ray, and Jürjän. He also dwelt in Kabul and Ghazna, both situated on a passage between Persia and India, and travelled to some parts of early medieval India between the years 1017 and 1030. Evidence pointing to him having made actual direct observations beyond the abode of Islam remains scanty. According to his writings, only five locales emerge as having been visited by him, all situated in today's Afghanistan and Pakistan. When al-BTrunl visited these places, he encountered the society of the Indian Shähis, who followed a form of Brahmanism. Al-Bïrûnï's knowledge of Sanskrit was the result of a long process that lasted at least 30 years (1000-1030). In order to reach the level of Sanskrit that enabled him to translate several works from Sanskrit into Arabic, he needed to work with literate people well-versed in Sanskrit, who may also have had some comprehension of Arabic, and/or Persian. The textual pole of this dissertation examines the question of the relationship between al- Bïrûnï's Arabic Kitab Sank and Kitäb Pätangal - two works related to Sämkhya-Yoga - and their possible Sanskrit sources. A philological survey based on these Arabic translations and on Sämkhya-Yoga Sanskrit literature highlights that al-Bïrûnï's translations, both, are related to the classical phase in the development of these two Indian philosophical systems. Despite the early spread of Yoga and Sämkhya ideas through Sanskrit literature, it seems that between the early 11th and 16th centuries they lost vitality amongst Indian scholars. Therefore, al-Bïrûnï's translation of works related to these specific Indian philosophies in the early 11th century CE deserves attention. The second pole of this study also demonstrates that al-BTrünl's hermeneutics played an important part in his transmission of these two Indian schools of thought, as he highly transformed his source in both form and substance. This dissertation considers the question of the relationship between al-Bïrûnï's Arabic translations and their possible Sanskrit sources from the viewpoint of Translation Studies; which makes it possible to point out potential candidates for being al-Bïrûnï's original Sanskrit sources with some confidence. Overall, the Kitäb Sank and the Kitäb Pätangal represent original works of Sämkhya and Yoga, as viewed and transmitted by a Perso-Muslim scholar, rather than pure translations of Sanskrit work.

Le visage au-delà de l'apparence. Levinas et l'autre rive de l'éthique

In this article I look at the significance of Emmanuel Levinas' thought for an ethics of care. I argue that the meaning Levinas gives to the term « face » is a central aspect related to this issue. The face is in this French philosopher's view an ambiguous phenomenon, an enigma, that bears high ethical significance : beyond its physical appearance, the face of the other escapes every affort at representation, it indicates the way in which the representation of the other exceeds any idea of the other in me, and it is precisely this irreducibility of alterity that lights up its ethical meaning. In Levinas' view, to be oneself is to be for the other, and the otherness of the other manifests itself in the face-to-face encounter. Accordingly, responsibility is the response to the injunction, the interpellation, of the other's face, preceding the claim of justice, and humaneness is conceived as entangled in the other's face. Against this background, I suggest that Levinas' philosophical insight constitutes a turning point from a traditional to a new conception of responsibility that may bear great significance to a renewed understanding of an hermeneutics and an ethics of care.