Associative Issue Ownership as a Determinant of Voters' Campaign Attention

Campaigns raise public interest in politics and allow parties to convey their messages to voters. However, voters' exposure and attention during campaigns are biased towards parties and candidates they like. This hinders parties' ability to reach new voters. This paper theorises and empirically tests a simple way in which parties can break partisan selective attention: owning an issue. When parties own issues that are important for a voter, that voter is more likely to notice them. Using survey data collected prior to the 2009 Belgian regional elections it is shown that this effect exists independent of partisan preferences and while controlling for the absolute visibility of a party in the media. This indicates that issue ownership has an independent impact on voters' attention to campaigns. This finding shows that owning salient issues yields (potential) advantages for parties, since getting noticed is a prerequisite for conveying electoral messages and increasing electoral success.

Transparency and trust in government (2007-2014): a comparative study

In a 2000 report entitled "Trust in government. Ethics measures in OECD countries," OECD Secretary-General Donald J. Johnston emphasized the fact that public ethics are considered as a keystone of good governance. Moreover, public ethics are a prerequisite to public trust, which is in turn vital not only to any public service, but also to any society in general. At the same time, transparency reforms have flourished over the last few years and have several times been designed as a response to public distrust. Therefore, ethics, transparency and trust are closely linked together in a supposed virtuous circle where transparency works as a factor of better public ethics and leads to more trust in government on the citizens' side. This article explores the links between transparency and levels of trust in 10 countries between 2007 and 2014, using open data indexes and access to information requests as proxies for transparency. A national ranking of transparency, based on requests submitted by citizens to the administration and open data indexes, is then proposed. Key findings show that there is no sharp decline of trust in government in all countries considered in this article, and that transparency and trust in government are not systematically positively associated. Therefore, this article challenges the common assumption, mostly found in the normative literature, about a positive interrelation between the two, where trust in government is conceived as a beneficial effect of administrative transparency.

Ownership Effects on Unrelated Diversification: An Institutions' Perspective

Purpose To show that differences in the extent to which firms engage in unrelated diversification can be attributed to differences in ownership structure. Methodology/approach We draw on longitudinal data and use a panel analysis specification to test our hypotheses. Findings We find that unrelated diversification destroys value; pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners in a firm’s equity reduce unrelated diversification, whereas pressure-resistant domestic owners increase unrelated diversification; the greater the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the negative effect of pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners on unrelated diversification. Research limitations/implications We contribute to corporate governance and strategy research by bringing in owners’ institutional origin as a shaper of owner preferences in particular with regards to unrelated diversification. Future research may expand our investigation to more than one home institutional context, and theorize on institutional origin effects beyond the dichotomy between Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American (not oriented toward shareholder value maximization) owners. Practical implications Policy makers, financial analysts, owners, and managers may want to reflect about the implications of ownership structure, as well as promoting or joining corporations with particular ownership configurations. Social implications A shareholder value-destroying strategy, such as unrelated diversification has adverse consequences for society at large, in terms of opportunity costs, that is, resources could be allocated to value-creating activities instead. Promoting an ownership configuration that creates value should contribute to social welfare. Originality/value Owners may not be exclusively driven by shareholder value maximization, but can be influenced by normative beliefs (biases) stemming from the institutional context they originate from.